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Abstract 
Growth accounting exercises suggest that the reason for the remarkable growth in 
East Asian newly industrialising economies over the past four decades was capital 
accumulation. Capital accumulation, rather than productivity growth, was 
identified as the main source of economic growth. 
This thesis explores the character of East Asian growth, and how it has been 
driven by structural change over the past four decades. Structural change 
increased capital intensity in industrial production in new industries and high-
quality production with the accumulation of capital. The argument is that this 
process mechanically leads to low productivity gains, because the joint 
contribution of capital and technology to output growth is solely attributed to 
capital, so underestimating the role of technological change. It is therefore 
misleading to interpret low measured productivity growth in growth accounting 
studies as a sign of the unsustainability of growth on the assumption that 
measured productivity growth is identical to technological change. 
Verification of the sequencing of the sources of output growth (productivity 
growth in light industries leads to capital accumulation in heavy and 
petrochemical industries and in tum to productivity growth through R&D 
investment) and interaction between capital and productivity growth provides a 
new interpretation of the growth accounting results. East Asian NIBs have not yet 
arrived at the final stage of development, where innovation by R&D investment is 
the primary means of technological change. Rapid growth in these economies has 
been driven by structural adjustment, which links capital accumulation and 
technological change. 
The thesis has two implications for technological change in follower countries. 
First, there are shifts in the major channels of technology transfer over different 
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phases of development (from informal methods to capital import to technology 
imports to R&D investment). Second, rival and bounded components of 
technology have played a crucial role in East Asian growth. 
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1 Productivity and the Sustainability of 
Growth in the NIEs 
The small contribution of technical change in industry to overall growth may thus in 
part be a statistical illusion; since the new technology has been embodied in capital, a 
significant part of its contribution may be misattributed to capital accumulation in the 
Denison-type growth accounting (Adelman 1991: 501). 
The remarkable economic growth in the East Asian newly industrialising 
economies (NIEs) over the past three decades has been a major issue in the 
literature on economic growth. The East Asian growth phenomenon was widely 
viewed as a success story based on an outward-oriented strategy involving 
increasingly free trade, and it was regarded as a model for developing countries in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The debate on East Asian growth was revitalised in the 
1990s. The view of World Bank (1993) was that East Asian success resulted from 
functional interventions affecting market fundamentals. Sound macroeconomic 
policies, an emphasis on investments in human capital and export orientation are 
examples of functional interventions. The Bank argued that selective 
interventions in Korea were unsuccessful considering total factor productivity 
(TFP) performance in targeted industries was considered a criteria of success. 
Opposing this view, revisionists argued that selective interventions played a role 
in creating dynamic advantages (Amsden 1994; Kwon 1994; Lall1994a; 1996). 
However, the focus of the debate was on the validity of government interventions, 
so that important features of Asian growth, such as sequential structural 
adjustments, were not investigated. Subsequently, the weakness of productivity 
growth in NIEs became the main concern of economists. 
Growth accounting exercises call into question the view that high productivity 
growth is the reason for the remarkable growth in this region, identifying resource 
mobilisation, in particular capital accumulation, as the main source of economic 
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growth (Young 1992; 1994; 1995; Kim and Lau 1993; 1994a; 1994b; Collins and 
Bosworth 1996). Kim and Lau (1993: 19-20; 1994b) estimate that productivity 
growth in the NIEs has not been significantly different from zero over the past 
few decades. On the other hand, according to Young's (1995) estimates, the 
contribution of TFP to growth in each country is 31.5 per cent in Hong Kong, 2.3 
per cent in Singapore, 27.7 per cent in Taiwan, and 16.5 per cent in Korea, while 
the contribution of capital is 40.8, 64.9, 33.6 and 37.2 per cent, respectively, and 
according to Collins and Bosworth (1996), the contribution of TFP to growth is 
27.8 per cent in Singapore, 34.5 per cent in Taiwan and 26.3 per cent in Korea. 
Krugman (1994) concludes that growth in the NIEs is unsustainable, comparing 
them with former Soviet Russia, which experienced a dramatic slowdown after 
remarkable growth fuelled by capital mobilisation. He argues that East Asian 
economies may also inevitably experience a slowdown because of a lack of 
productivity gains. Low productivity growth, when combined with the view that 
disembodied technological change driven by innovation is the main contributor to 
long-run growth (Griliches 1973; 1979; 1980; 1986), implies that NIEs will not 
be able to achieve sustainable growth in the long run. The judgement on the 
sustainability of growth is based on two theoretical assumptions: that 
disembodied technological change driven by R&D efforts is the sole source of 
long-run growth; and that growth accounting techniques correctly measure 
technological change as productivity growth. 
Another stream of studies, the proponents of convergence (or of the advantage of 
backwardness), emphasises that East Asian growth should be viewed from the 
perspective of follower countries, characterised by learning and utilising 
standardised foreign technology, rather than innovation. Empirical studies in this 
school show a convergence of per capita income levels but no convergence of 
TFP levels, confirming the findings of the growth accountants (Dollar and 
Sokoloff 1990; Dollar 1991; Dowrick and Gemmel1991; Pack 1992a; 1993; 
Pack and Page 1994; Drysdale and Huang 1996). They do not, however, agree on 
the unsustainability argument because they maintain that capital intensity or 
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export orientation in these economies has a positive effect on productivity 
growth. This argument may not be strong because the measured productivity gain 
is not large. 
The empirical findings and the implication that growth in the NIBs is 
unsustainable may not be robust. 
First, highly aggregated data are used to calculate productivity growth, so 
aggregation bias is present. An aggregate production function approach can be 
justified only if all sectoral production functions are identical (Jorgenson 1990: 
24). Second, capital stock data are unreliable because they are constructed from 
historical investment data using simplistic and arbitrary assumptions. Third, some 
studies using the production function estimation technique are also unreliable 
because of their assumption that the weights of inputs are constant over time. The 
first part of the thesis seeks to overcome these problems by employing a 
disaggregated standard growth accounting approach and by using capital stock 
data constructed directly from surveys. Then the robustness of the previous 
findings and their pessimistic conclusion can be checked to confirm whether the 
use of disaggregated data leads to a different conclusion. 
Recently, the neoclassical approach to questions of growth has extended the 
debate to encompass an historical view which provides a different interpretation, 
questioning the argument of convergence in developed countries (Bernard and 
Jones 1996a; 1996b; Lau 1996; Landau 1989; 1992). The debate over the 
neoclassical and convergence paradigm, which mainly concentrates on economic 
growth in developed countries, has meant that the study of growth in the NIBs has 
proceeded in the light of experience in developed countries. Despite the 
limitations of this procedure, the debate has produced some valuable insights into 
understanding the puzzle of low productivity gains in East Asian NIBs. These 
include ideas about the sequencing of the sources of output growth, the 
interactions between capital formation and technological change, and the effect of 
structural adjustment on productivity growth. Later, the thesis explores reasons 
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for the low contribution of productivity growth to growth in the NIBs, on the 
basis of these theoretical developments. 
Why is high growth in the NIBs explained by capital accumulation rather than 
productivity growth? Does this necessarily mean that technological change has 
played a minor role in the high growth in this region? These are some of the 
questions to be considered in the thesis. 
Lau ( 1996) hypotheses that the sources of output growth change according to the 
stage of development. Capital accumulation is the main source of economic 
growth in the early stages of development. Later, disembodied technological 
change becomes a more important source of growth. This hypothesis successfully 
explains why capital formation rather than productivity growth was the main 
source of growth in the NIBs. These economies have not yet emerged from the 
earlier stage in which innovative technological change is not important. This 
hypothesis also questions the definition of technology used in the growth 
accounting framework. It questions the logic of judging whether growth is 
sustainable on the basis that disembodied technological change driven by R&D 
efforts is the sole source of long-run growth. It is a view that implies that 
economic growth driven by capital accumulation does not necessarily lead to a 
significant future decline in growth even though it is the sole source of output 
growth in the early stage of development. In this respect, Krugman's pessimism 
about sustainability of growth may be misleading. 
Landau (1989; 1992) hypothesises that there are interactions between capital 
formation and technological change, so that capital accumulation can be a major 
source of long-term growth in transitional (or catching-up) economies. This 
hypothesis also successfully explains the reason for low productivity gains in the 
NIBs. Moreover, it undermines the logic of the growth accountants' judgements 
on the sustainability of growth. According to growth accounting methodology, 
capital and technology are independent of each other, and measured productivity 
growth, by definition, represents technological change. If capital accumulation 
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has a technological component, measured productivity growth may not be 
equivalent to real technological change. For this reason, productivity growth may 
underestimate the role of technological change. This hypothesis, combined with 
Lau' s historical hypothesis, leads to the corollary that technology plays an 
important role even in the early phase of growth, since this phase is driven by 
capital accumulation which has the technological components. Thus, if both 
hypotheses are right, technological change may be a major source of long-run 
growth at any stage of development, in just the way predicted by the neoclassical 
growth model. 
The arguments about the sequencing of sources of output growth and of the 
interactions between capital accumulation and technological change successfully 
explain the puzzle of low productivity gains and invalidate the pessimistic 
scenario of the sustainability of growth. Technological change may have played a 
bigger role in economic growth than would be predicted by measured 
productivity growth, since the technological component of capital formation is 
solely assigned to capital in the growth accounting technique. However, a detailed 
description of how capital accumulation is related to technological change has yet 
to be constructed. 
Recent developments in models of endogenous growth provide an answer. This 
new theory models technological change as an expansion in the variety of 
products or improvements in the quality of products. The model of expanding 
varieties of products sees an increase in the number of products as basic 
innovations, akin to opening up a new industry, whereas the latter describes 
technological change as a continuing series of improvements and refinements of 
goods and techniques (Barro and Sala-i-Matin 1995: Chapters 6 and 7). Both 
kinds of technological change (entering new industries or moving to high-quality 
products) have in fact been present in East Asian NIBs, even though they cannot 
be categorised as innovation. Park and Kim (1992) argue that the engine of 
sustained growth in the Korean economy has been a succession of structural 
adjustments (movement in the industrial structure towards more technology-
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intensive industries), which has led to productivity growth and overcome the 
pressures of higher wages. East Asian NIBs have periodically undergone 
structural adjustments, moving from labour- to capital-intensive industries and 
from labour-intensive to capital- or skill-intensive industries, and then from these 
industries to capital- and technology- and skill- and technology-intensive 
industries. This process has been accompanied by the importation of new capital 
and intermediate inputs. Thus, capital accumulation in new industries and high-
quality products carries the components of technological change. Singapore, 
Taiwan and Korea show strong adjustments in production and export structures, 
while Hong Kong relies more on comparative advantage in the labour-intensive 
sector. 
Growth accountants do not specifically concern themselves with sequential 
structural adjustments and their effects on productivity growth. However, Sarel 
(1995a: 246-47) verifies that estimates of productivity growth are very sensitive 
to capital (labour) shares and a specific estimation period in the case of NIBs. 
Sensitivity to capital (labour) implies that a more capital-intensive industrial 
structure results in lower productivity growth, and vice versa, because of the 
mechanical properties of growth accounting. Sensitivity to a specific estimation 
period may be another corollary: an estimation period characterised by capital-
(labour-) intensive industry leads to lower (higher) productivity growth. Thus, 
structural adjustments in NIBs, accompanied by import and accumulation of 
capital goods, might lower productivity growth, and calculated productivity 
growth is not identical to technological change. 
The thrust of this thesis is to examine the possible effect of structural adjustment 
on productivity growth and technological change. It argues that structural 
adjustment is very important to an understanding of the combination of rapid 
growth and low productivity gains in NIBs. 
It is necessary here to distinguish the experience of the four East Asian NIBs from 
each other. The share of industry in Hong Kong's GDP declined rapidly from the 
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late 1970s, showing a different trend from other East Asian NIBs. In 1996, the 
share of industry in GDP had fallen to 14.9 per cent, more than 20 per cent lower 
than other countries (Figure 1.1 ). The share of textiles and clothing in 
merchandise exports, a proxy for labour intensity and structural adjustment, was 
larger in Hong Kong than other countries, whereas the export share of labour-
intensive goods in Singapore was quite small (Figure 1.2). Growth accounting 
analysis suggests that there was high productivity growth in Hong Kong and 
insignificant productivity growth in Singapore. As can be inferred from the data 
in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, these results may be merely an artefact of the mechanical 
properties of growth accounting; high productivity growth in Hong Kong arising 
from its small industry share in GDP and low labour intensity and very low 
labour intensity in Singapore leading to insignificant productivity growth. 
Figure 1.1 Changes in economic structure in NIEs: Industry share in GDP 
50~---------------------------------------------
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-·······Taiwan 
-----Korea 
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10 
5 
Note: Data for industry's share in GDP in Hong Kong are not available for 1970-79. 
Source: International Economic Data Bank, ANU, Asia Pacific Profiles 1997, ANU. 
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The thesis takes up the case of Korea. Korea is an important and interesting case. 
It has had a rather different policy environment from other East Asian NIBs. Also, 
the share of industry in Korean GDP and labour intensity in merchandise exports 
are not outliers, unlike Hong Kong and Taiwan. The Korean data are 
acknowledged to be better than the data of Taiwan. Previous studies of the 
Korean case provide a useful point of departure. 
This study questions the validity of the aggregated growth accounting approach 
and its conclusions on the sustainability of growth, and seeks to explain the 
reasons for the low productivity gains in the NIBs. The thesis proposes a new 
model for technological change in a follower country. Arguments about the 
sequencing of sources of growth and the interaction between capital formation 
and technological change provide a clear answer as to why productivity growth 
rates are so low and capital contribution so high in economic growth in the NIBs. 
Structural adjustments which require capital accumulation are proposed as an 
explanation for the relationship between capital accumulation and technological 
change in follower countries. A broad concept of technology needs to be 
employed in analysing economic growth in follower countries, and the notion of 
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the sequencing of the sources of technological change and technology transfer 
needs to be considered. 
For this purpose industry-level disaggregated growth accounting data on the 
Korean manufacturing sector comprising 36 industries is used. 
Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews past research on these issues. This includes the empirical 
findings of aggregate growth accounting studies and their implications for 
sustainability of growth, and theoretical issues such as the sequencing of the 
sources of output growth; interaction between capital formation and technological 
change; and structural adjustments and diminishing returns to scale. 
Chapter 3 builds a disaggregated analytical framework and employs a standard 
growth accounting approach at the industry level. After reviewing past research 
on the concept of productivity growth and the measures of capital and labour, I 
construct a rationale for the sustainability of economic growth, through 
contribution of productivity growth to aggregate manufacturing. Then I calculate 
the sources of growth for the 36 industries in the Korean manufacturing sector. 
My aim in this chapter is: (1) to attain a standard measure for productivity and 
input growth; (2) to test the validity of aggregate versus disaggregate growth 
accounting studies; and (3) to address the problem of sustainability (by 
determining whether or not productivity growth contribution significantly to 
industrial output). 
Chapter 4 analyses the reasons for low productivity gains in the East Asian NIEs. 
This chapter explores the various methods of enhancing output and productivity 
growth in a follower country at different stages of development. Mter testing the 
interaction between capital formation and productivity growth, the chapter 
examines the non-decreasing marginal productivity of capital in the Korean 
manufacturing sector, using additional data as well as those used in Chapter 3. 
9 
Chapter 5 describes structural adjustment towards more technology-intensive 
industries or products in the manufacturing sector, and puts forward the 
possibility that structural adjustment is the driving force behind the link between 
technological change and capital accumulation. Structural adjustment induces 
technological change, even though this results in lower productivity growth. The 
chapter reviews the past experience of structural adjustments and resulting 
changes in technological niches in NIBs, then makes some predictions about the 
future growth trajectory in these countries. 
Chapter 6 explores developments in technology over the past three decades in 
terms of R&D investment and technology imports to clarify the characteristic 
technological change path of East Asian NIBs, and proposes the idea of the 
sequencing of sources of technological change. It defines technological change 
from the follower country's point of view, considering the empirical results of 
previous chapters. 
Chapter 7 summarises of the results of previous chapters. It also recommends 
some policies for growth and sets out the limitations of the study. 
The main interest in the thesis is how to incorporate into the standard analysis -
low-level or capital-related technological change induced by structural adjustment 
in developing countries. A disaggregated growth accounting framework is 
employed, and growth accounting results are interpreted in different ways from 
the two hypotheses, namely the sequencing of the sources of growth and the 
interaction between capital accumulation and technological change. Then, 
structural adjustment is introduced as an underlying force linking capital 
accumulation and low-level technological change. Finally, an explanation of the 
sequencing of technological change and technology transfer is suggested. 
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2 Growth Accounting Studies and Reasons 
for Low Productivity Gains 
Introduction 
The literature review in this chapter focuses on the empirical findings of earlier 
studies; it also examines two hypotheses on the sequencing of the sources of 
output growth and interaction between capital accumulation and technological 
change. In the process of the literature review, theoretical arguments which are 
central to the whole idea of the thesis are raised. This survey leads to a re-
evaluation of the results of growth accounting studies. However, issues relating to 
structural adjustment are not developed fully in this chapter. Later chapters of this 
thesis present a fuller and more systematic development of these arguments. 
Many economists have employed growth accounting techniques to find the 
underlying reasons for the remarkable growth in the East Asian NIBs. They have 
attempted to identify how much of the growth has been due to productivity gains 
and how much to the accumulation of inputs. Some of these studies conclude that 
resource mobilisation rather than productivity growth was the main source of 
economic growth in NIBs, and that NIBs will therefore not be able to sustain 
growth in the longer term. 
The first part of this chapter reviews the literature which questions the 
sustainability of growth in NIBs. Young (1992; 1995), Kim and Lau (1993; 
1994a; 1994b), Dollar (1991), Dollar and Sokoloff (1990) and Krugman (1994) 
are among those who explore the sources of growth, technological catch-up, 
convergence of TFP levels, and sustainability of growth in the NIBs. 
The chapter then focuses on the literature which explores the reasons for the low 
contribution of productivity growth and the high contribution of capital 
accumulation to growth in NIBs. Two hypotheses, relating to the sequencing of 
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the sources of output growth and the interaction between capital formation and 
technological change, are proposed. These hypotheses undermine the robustness 
of the growth accounting findings by questioning the theoretical basis of their 
conclusions about the sustainability of growth. The two proposals put forward are 
that disembodied technological change driven by R&D investment may not be the 
sole source of long-run growth; and that measured productivity growth may not 
be equivalent to real technological change. 
Section 2 reviews the empirical findings of aggregate growth accounting studies: 
namely that resource mobilisation rather than productivity growth is the main 
source of growth; that there is little technological change and technological catch-
up; and that, while there has been convergence of per capita income, there has 
been little convergence of TFP levels. This section also raises questions about the 
validity of the findings. Section 3 reviews the theoretical hypotheses which might 
explain the reasons for low productivity gains and the role of technological 
change in East Asian economic growth. Section 4 summarises and outlines the 
approach I take in developing the argument of the thesis. 
Empirical findings of earlier studies 
Earlier studies, involving both the growth accounting approach and the 
convergence approach, arrive at the consensus that economic growth in the NIEs 
was not significantly based upon productivity growth, and that capital 
accumulation (convergence in capital intensity) played the crucial role in the 
rapid growth of NIEs (Young 1995; 1994; 1992; Collins and Bosworth 1996; 
Nadiri and Kim 1996; Kim and Lau 1994b; Pack 1993; Dollar and Sokoloff 1990; 
Dollar 1991; De Long and Summers 1991; 1993; Levine and Renelt 1992; Jones 
1994; Greenwood et al. 1997)_2 Kim and Lau (1994a; 1994b; 1996) and Pack 
2 These findings are not new. Westphal, Kim and Dahlman (1985) conclude that innovative 
technological change does not contribute to growth in NIEs, in contrast to the experience in 
developed countries. They find that resource reallocation accounts for most of the 
improvement in productivity growth in East Asian NIEs. According to Chenery, Robinson and 
Syrquin (1986), half of productivity growth in semi-industrialised, less developed countries is 
the result of resource reallocation rather than technological change. 
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(1993) suggest that the TFP gap between developed and developing countries in 
fact widened in the course of East Asia's rapid economic growth. 
Resource mobilisation rather than productivity growth 
Young (1995) undertakes a thorough growth accounting study of growth in the 
NIEs (see Table 2.1).3 The contribution of TFP to output growth is 31.5 per cent 
in Hong Kong, 27.7 per cent in Taiwan, 16.5 per cent in Korea, and 2.3 per cent 
in Singapore, while the contribution of capital is 40.8 per cent, 33.6 per cent, 37.2 
per cent, and 64.9 per cent, respectively. In the case of manufacturing, the 
contribution of TFP in each country is 18.4 per cent in Korea, 15.7 per cent in 
Taiwan, and -11.8 per cent in Singapore, while the contribution of capital is 51.3 
per cent, 50.7 per cent, and 78.5 per cent, respectively. Based on these results, 
Young concludes that 'with the exception of Singapore, productivity growth in 
the NICs is not particularly low, it is also, by postwar standards, not 
extraordinarily high' (Young 1995: 671). Young's result differs from Kim and 
Lau (1993: 19-20), who conclude, more strongly, that productivity growth 
(technological change) in the NIEs has not been significantly different from zero 
over the past few decades. Young concludes that rather than high productivity 
growth, rising participation rates, intersectoral transfers of labour,4 improving 
levels of education,5 and expanding investment rates,6 are the main factors in the 
extraordinary growth experienced. 
Young's empirical finding that the productivity performances of NIEs, with the 
exception of Singapore, are not outliers, and that capital accumulation is the main 
contributor to rapid growth in the NIEs has had a strong influence on recent 
studies of long-run growth and the question of its sustainability . 
3 Dowrick (1995) and Sarel (1995a) argue that calculations of productivity growth of the Four 
Tigers by Young and Lau and Kim are sensitive to estimations of capital stock and elasticity of 
capital, and that they underestimate the real productivity growth of the four countries. 
4 Output per worker grew more slowly in the non-agricultural sector than in the aggregate 
economy. 
5 In Hong Kong and Taiwan, average increases in educational attainment were offset by 
declining hours of work. 
6 With the exception of Hong Kong, investment, particularly in machinery, has skyrocketed in 
the NIEs. 
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Table 2.1 TFP growth in the economy and manufacturing 
Time Output Capital Labour Labour TFP growth 
period growth growth and growth and share and 
(%) contribution contribution contribution 
(%) (%) (%) 
Hong Kong 
economy 66-91 7.3 8.0 (40.8) 3.2 (27.5) 0.628 2.3 (31.5) 
manufacturing 
Singapore 
economy 66-90 8.7 11.5 (64.9) 5.7 (33.3) 0.509 0.2 (2.3) 
manufacturing 70-90 8.5 11.2 (78.5) 7.0 (33.3) 0.404 -1.0 (-11.8) 
Taiwan 
economy 66-90 9.4 12.3 (33.6) 4.9 (38.7) 0.743 2.6 (27.7) 
manufacturing 66-90 10.8 13.0 (50.7) 6.3 (33.8) 0.579 1.7 (15.7) 
Korea 
economy 66-90 10.3 12.9 (37.2) 6.4 (43.7) 0.703 1.7 (16.5) 
manufacturing 66-90 14.1 15.1 (51.3) 7.4 (27.3) 0.521 3.0 (18.4) 
Notes: 1) In the case of Korea and Taiwan, the values of the economy represent those of the 
non-agricultural sector. 
2) The values in parentheses represent the contribution of the factor to output growth. 
Source: Tables V, VI, VII, VIII in Young (1995). 
According to Collins and Bosworth (1996: 156-57), TFP growth in Singapore, 
Taiwan and Korea in 1960-94 period is 1.5, 2.0 and 1.5 per cent, respectively. 
Accordingly, TFP contributions to output growth are 27 .8, 34.5 and 26.3 per cent, 
respectively. They (1996: 156) conclude: 
as stressed by Young, it is quite surprising to note the extent to which the 
extraordinary growth of East Asia has been driven by factor accumulation, while 
gains in TFP have been rather modest. 
Higher estimates of productivity growth are produced by Sarel ( 1995b ), showing 
3.8 per cent in Hong Kong, 1.9 per cent in Singapore, 2.8 per cent in Taiwan and 
3.1 per cent in Korea in 1975-90. These differences in productivity growth arise 
from differences in capital shares and time period estimated. However, all the 
growth accounting studies are based on the same set of mechanical properties 
arising from the methodology itself. Productivity growth is calculated as a 
residual as follows: 
(2-1) illnTFP (T) = illn V (T) -a .!linK (T) - (1-a) illnL (T), 
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where a is the capital share or elasticity of output with respect to capital, and V, 
K, and L represent value-added output, capital input and effective labour input. 
Equation (2-1) can be simplified further in the assumption of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function with constant returns to scale: 
(2-2) L\ lnTFP (T) = L\ In VIL (T) -a L\ In K/L (T). 
Equation (2-1) shows that high capital share, more rapid capital growth, and low 
output growth mechanically result in lower total factor productivity growth. 
Equation (2-2) shows that high capital share, high capital intensity, and lower 
growth in labour productivity mechanically result in lower total factor 
productivity growth. Thus, there is a tendency for the extraordinary growth in 
capital in East Asia to lead to low productivity growth under the growth 
accounting scheme, even though this tendency may be affected by capital share 
and capital stock. In this respect, Young (1995) is more convincing than other 
studies because Singapore and Korea's capital growth far surpassed Hong Kong's 
and their productivity growth was lower, whereas Hong Kong's productivity 
growth was the highest among the NIBs. Thus, Young can be considered as the 
representative of all the growth accounting studies on East Asian NIBs. For this 
reason, the literature review mainly focuses on Young. 
The applicability of his findings to the question of sustainability is somewhat 
problematic from this perspective. First, his finding is based on a highly 
aggregated study rather than disaggregated data. As Jorgenson et al. (1987: 63-
64) established, productivity calculations based on an aggregate production 
function can be misleading if aggregation bias exists. The aggregate approach 
requires very stringent assumptions about production patterns at the level of 
individual sectors of the economy. Intuitively, the technology of each sector must 
be a replica of the aggregate production function if this approach is to produce 
robust conclusions. In this context, Jorgenson (1990: 66) states: 
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The existence of an aggregate production function requires that the technology of 
each sector is separable in value-added and that value-added is a function of capital 
and labor inputs and the level of technology. Moreover, the sectoral value-added 
functions must be identical for all sectors, while the functions relating labor and 
capital input to their components must be identical for all sectors. Finally, each 
component of these input aggregates must receive the same price in all sectors. 
In Chapter 3, I ask whether Young's finding is robust in respect of this bias by 
analysing the sources of growth at an industry level following Jorgenson, and 
compare the findings with the results obtained using an aggregated approach. 
Moreover, resource reallocation (the difference between aggregate productivity 
growth and the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth) in this 
disaggregated framework contains information about structural adjustment in 
NIBs. If structural adjustment occurs over time, the weighted sum of sectoral 
productivity growth becomes greater than the productivity growth of aggregate 
manufacturing because aggregate output and two aggregate inputs cannot capture 
the sectoral movements of disaggregated outputs and inputs towards more 
efficient sectors. This is tested in Chapters 3 and 5. 
East Asian NIEs have increased their shares of investment and saving in GDP 
over the last three decades (see Table 2.1). Young (1995) interprets high 
investment growth rates as evidence of resource mobilisation growth in NIBs. 
However, expanding investment rates may be related to technological change for 
follower countries, even though this possibility has been ignored in the theory 
after being verified by data on developed countries. Pack (1993: 285-87) 
maintains that a portion of capital accumulation is related to technological change 
in transitional economies (see Figure 2.1). Suppose an economy is at point A now 
and point E is the steady-state equilibrium point. The neoclassical model predicts 
that an economy moves from point A to pointE along the production function/. 
But transitional dynamics, which feature a learning process, might suggest 
another interpretation: while the leader country operates along the production 
function/, the follower country, operating at point A along the/ production 
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function, has the opportunity to move toward/ and to shift from technologies 
that have a lower TFP at any given capital-labour ratio to technologies that have 
a higher TFP. As a result transitional economies arrive at the pointE', and 
experience capital deepening. 
Figure 2.1 Transitional dynamics: another interpretation 
YIL(y) 
E' 
y*' 
n+g+D 
y* 
YI 
Source: Pack (1993: 286). 
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Capital accumulation involving structural adjustment, entering new industries or 
moving into high-quality products might be related to technological change in 
follower countries despite the fact that this is not the case where capital 
accumulation is unrelated to structural adjustment. For example, large Korean 
conglomerates have diversified their production activities over the last three 
decades. They entered new industries and moved into the production of high-
quality products by setting up new plants or new processes, accompanied by 
imports of capital and intermediate inputs. This kind of capital accumulation is 
quite different from that of former Soviet Russia, where capital accumulation 
took place in the same industry or the same process. It may be that the marginal 
product of capital in aggregate declined more slowly in Korea than in Russia 
because new capital was accumulated in new ( disaggregated) industries over time 
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without inducing decreases in marginal productivity in existing industries. If this 
is the case, Krugman's (1994) comparison of growth in Asian countries with that 
of former Soviet Russia is misleading.7 
This question surrounding the relationship between capital accumulation and 
productivity growth is investigated further in several ways. First, when 
establishing the growth accounting framework, the embodiment effect or quality 
change of capital is classified as a component of productivity growth rather than a 
capital contribution, following Denison. 8 Second, I investigate interactions 
between capital accumulation and productivity growth in Chapter 4. A positive 
relationship is expected. Third, I separate productivity growth into two 
components: the share effect, a proxy for the structural change effect; and the 
productivity growth effect. A positive share effect from structural change is 
expected. The structural change argument was at the heart of the analysis of 
Kuznets (1959), Denison (1985)9 and Chenery et al. (1986). But their definition 
of structural change is the movement of labour from the agricultural to the non-
agricultural sectors. By contrast, the focus of this thesis is capital accumulation in 
new industries resulting from structural adjustment within the manufacturing 
sector. 
Following the problem of aggregation bias and the relationship between capital 
and productivity growth, the third issue affecting the robustness of Young's 
finding is the possibility that stage of development and industrial structure 
strongly affect productivity performance in the case of follower countries. This 
point can be seen from the results of an early study by Young (1994). Estimating 
TFP in 118 sample countries using the Summers & Heston dataset, he shows that 
the rates of productivity growth in the NIEs are well matched with those of 
7 Opportunities to delay the decline of the marginal product of capital are limited, as follower 
countries catch up to the economic level ofleader countries. Follower countries' opportunities 
to enter new industries and processes will disappear or become unnecessary in the mature 
stage of development. In this way, they will ultimately experience a decline in marginal 
productivity, as Krugman argues. 
8 I shall discuss this issue again in Chapter 3 when establishing a growth accounting 
framework. 
9 Denison finds that intersectoral shifts in production explain part of aggregate productivity 
growth. 
18 
developed or developing countries where the growth of output per capita was 
considerably slower than that of the NIEs. The four Asian NIEs are ranked 
highest in growth in GDP per capita but their rankings in TFP growth diverge. 
Hong Kong maintains a relative high ranking (6th) in TFP while the rankings of 
Singapore drop from 4th to 63rd. The rankings of Taiwan and Korea drop from 
2nd and 5th to 21st and 24th, respectively. However, these results do not negate 
the possibility of technology catch-up in the NIEs. The TFP performance of NIEs 
is, nonetheless, stronger than that of Japan and many other OECD countries. 
Convergence literature suggests that a follower country experiences technology 
catch-up at a declining rate as follower countries approach the technology level of 
leader countries. In this respect, TFP growth in NIEs, which is neither high nor 
low, is well matched with the predictions of convergence literature. According to 
Dowrick (1995) and Drysdale and Huang (1996), labour productivity at the initial 
stage of development explains about one-third of the variation in subsequent rates 
of growth. This means that productivity performance in a developing country 
divergs according to the stage of development. 
A country's measured productivity growth may also depend on the industrial 
structure. According to Table 2.1, the higher the labour share, the higher the TFP 
growth. Figure 1.1 shows industry's share in GDP. A striking feature of this 
figure is that Hong Kong's industrial structure is quite different from other NIEs. 
The low share of industry in GDP is offset by the share of services in Hong Kong, 
which is much higher than in other NIEs (Figure 2.2). The share of industry in 
Hong Kong declined from the early 1970s while the shares of Singapore and 
Korea merely stabilised in the late 1980s (Taiwan's share declined, but only from 
the late 1980s). The gap between the share of industry in Hong Kong and other 
NIEs is approximately 20 per cent. Figure 2.2 also shows the shares of labour-
intensive exports in total merchandise exports in NIEs, when export products are 
classified into four categories; agriculture-, labour-, capital- and mineral-intensive 
(Asia Pacific Profiles 1997: 11-12). The labour-intensive export share in Hong 
Kong is much higher than that of the other NIEs, whereas the share in Singapore 
is quite low. This means that technological intensity in merchandise exports in 
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Hong Kong is not strong, even though the share of manufacturing in GDP is quite 
small. As can be inferred from the data in Figures 1.1 and 2.2, Hong Kong's high 
productivity growth and Singapore's negative productivity growth in Young 
(1995) may arise from the mechanical properties of growth accounting; high 
productivity growth in Hong Kong arising from its small industry share in GDP 
and low labour intensity, and very low labour intensity in Singapore leading to 
insignificant productivity growth. 
Figure 2.2 Structural change and adjustment in NIEs, 1965-95 
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Note: Data for services' share in GDP in Hong Kong are not available for 1970-79. 
Source: International Economic Data Bank, ANU 
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If higher labour intensity resulting from labour-intensive industrial structure leads 
to higher TFP growth and higher TFP contribution to growth, TFP may not be a 
good indicator of the technology level, contrary to the expectations of the growth 
accounting theorists. Growth accounting is mechanical in this respect. It might be 
that technological change is different from productivity growth in the case of 
follower countries. I argue that follower countries have opportunities to exploit 
standard technology via structural adjustment that entails capital accumulation in 
new industries and processes. If this is the case, the growth accounting approach 
may underestimate the role of technology and overestimate the role of capital 
because measured productivity growth does not include the technology 
components that are linked to structural adjustments. This issue is also related to 
the definition of technology adopted. 
No technological change, no technology catch-up 
Kim and Lau (1993; 1994b), in two influential papers on economic growth in 
NIBs, argue that technological change in the NIBs over the past few decades has 
not been significantly different from zero, and that consequently there is no 
evidence of technology catch-up. This finding is stronger than that of Young 
(1992; 1994; 1995), who simply suggests that productivity growth in the NIBs has 
not been extraordinary. This conclusion is quite different from the historical view, 
which argues that follower countries are capable of faster growth and technology 
catch-up, since they can exploit the technology backlog accumulated by leader 
countries through learning rather than innovation (Gerschenkron 1962; 
Abramobitz 1986; Baumol1986; Dowrick and Nguyen 1989; Drysdale and 
Huang 1996). 
Kim and Lau's quite strong conclusion derives from the peculiar meta-production 
function approach they adopt. Lau (1996: 68) explains the two basic assumptions 
of the meta-production function as follows: 
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First, all the countries have the same underlying aggregate production function F(.) in 
terms of standardized, or 'efficiency-equivalent,' quantities of outputs and inputs. 
Second, the measured outputs and inputs of the different countries may be converted 
into the unobservable standardised, or 'efficiency-equivalent,' quantities of outputs 
and inputs by multiplicative country- and output- and input-specific time-varying 
augmentation factors. 
The meta-production function means that 'if we can change the units of 
measurement to reflect differential efficiencies of the inputs across countries, then 
all countries will have the same production function' (Lau 1996: 73). After 
transforming country-specific input and output data into efficiency-equivalent 
units, or transforming country-specific production functions into a meta-
production function on the basis of the United States' production function, Kim 
and Lau account for the sources of economic growth for all the countries. Of 
course, this methodology has the advantage that it does not require the 
assumptions of traditional growth accounting; namely constant returns to scale, 
neutrality of technological change, producers' equilibrium conditions and 
completely disembodied technological change. In particular, economies of scale, 
which are considered to be residual, are omitted from the technological change 
(residual) of the new methodology. Economies of scale are one of the most 
important factors determining traditional productivity growth in developing 
countries. In the case of Korean manufacturing, they were critical in the 1970s, 
when heavy and chemical industries were promoted and developed. 
This approach also has weaknesses. First, it shares the aggregation bias problem 
with the standard aggregated growth accounting method. Second, it makes the 
growth accounting results difficult to interpret. For example, consider Figure 2.3. 
Suppose that the production function of the follower country moves from/ to f, 
and that meta-production functions g1 and l correspond to/ and/, respectively. 
Then, segment EE' represents the shift in production function (technological 
change) in country-specific units, and segment MM', corresponding to segment 
EE', represents technological change in efficiency units. There is the possibility 
of arbitrariness in this correspondence, and there is also room for dispute about 
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whether it is better to measure technological change by original units than by a 
meta-production function. 
Figure 2.3 Technological change in the meta-production function 
UY i I i 
original 
unit 
A f 
Source: Author's scheme. 
Conceptually, a meta-production function is the same as the United States' 
aggregate production function, so technological change measured by a meta-
production function will only be affected by those factors that can shift the United 
States' production function. Those factors are R&D investment and 
organisational change. Other factors, which might improve the technology of a 
follower country but cannot cause technological change in the leader country, are 
simply ignored in the process of transforming original units into efficiency-
equivalent units. Based on their own growth accounting framework, Kim and Lau 
argue that technological change in the growth of the NIEs is not apparent, and 
they find an increasing technology gap between the OECD countries and the 
NIEs, instead of technology catch-up. This empirical finding is not at all 
surprising when their empirical setting is taken into account. However, Lau's 
argument on the absence of technological change and no technology catch-up 
loses force if we identify other factors which can cause technological change in 
NIEs, such as structural adjustment (entering new industries or high-quality 
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products), technology imports and informal means of foreign technology 
acquisition. It is true that R&D efforts are not major contributors to technological 
change in NIBs (for example Pack and Page 1994; Westphal, Kim and Dahlman 
1985; Kim 1990; 1995; Enos and Park 1988; Amsden 1989). But that does not 
imply that technological change is not an important source of growth during the 
early phases of growth. 
Kim and Lau (1994a; 1994b) also exhibit measurement problems such as 
aggregation bias, unreliable capital stock data and the assumption of the constant 
weights of inputs. 
Convergence of per capita income but no convergence of TFP level 
Much of the literatl.!re on convergence verifies empirically that developed 
countries exhibit TFP catch-up as well as a convergence in labour productivity 
(per capita income), particularly after the Second World War (Baumol1986; 
Abramobitz 1986; Dowrick and Nguyen 1989; Dollar and Wolff 1988; 1994; 
Wolff 1991; De Long and Summers 1991; Mankiwi et al. 1992; Jones 1994). 
Convergence proponents also attempt efforts to extend the convergence argument 
to NIBs. However, there is wide consensus that TFP catch-up did not occur, even 
though convergence in per capita income (YIL) is evident among developing 
countries (Dollar and Sokoloff 1990; Dollar 1991; De Long and Summers 1993). 
Dollar (1991) and Dollar and Sokoloff (1990) seek to accqunt for the sources of 
labour productivity (Y/L) in the Korean manufacturing sector. Both studies 
provide valuable insights into the sources of growth at the industry level. In 
particular, their use of industry level data has merit over aggregate growth 
accounting studies. Dollar (1991) verifies that Korean labour productivity (YIL) 
converges towards the Gemian level, with capital deepening (K/L) and TFP 
accounting for two-thirds and one-third of labour productivity convergence, 
respectively. However, the source of convergence differs greatly across industries. 
For heavy industries, capital deepening is the sole source of the labour 
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productivity convergence. It follows that decomposing output (Y) growth into 
input growth, capital (K) and labour (L), would yield no evidence of productivity 
growth. For light industries, TFP is the sole source of labour productivity 
convergence. According to Dollar and Sokoloff (1990), TFP convergence 
explains 30 per cent of labour productivity convergence for heavy industry, and 
60 per cent for light industries. From this evidence, they conclude that TFP 
convergence occurred. Dollar emphasises that the employment structure of 
Korean manufacturing changed from heavy industry to light industry over this 
period, promoting TFP convergence at an aggregated level. In Chapter 3 I shall 
examine whether or not productivity growth in heavy industries is at or near zero. 
Yet contrary to Dollar's prediction, Korea's industrial structure changed in the 
opposite direction from the mid-1970s. The continuous change in the 
competitiveness of Korean manufacturing from light industries to heavy 
industries shifted manufacturing production continuously towards heavy industry 
in the 1980s and 1990s. This trend and the empirical finding of almost zero 
productivity growth in heavy industry lead to the conclusion that TFP catch-up 
did not occur, contrary to his expectation of catch-up, even though convergence 
in labour productivity was evident. On this point, Dollar finally arrives at the 
same conclusion as that of growth accounting studies. 
The empirical finding of TFP convergence in these two studies appears fragile 
rather than robust. An important question arises: why did industry characterised 
by capital deepening and lower TFP growth (heavy industry) increase its 
production share, leading to a decreasing share in the production of the higher 
TFP growth industries (light industry)? 
According to Dollar (1991) and Dollar and Sokoloff (1990), the Korean 
government's development program for heavy and petrochemical 
industries-subsidising investment in those industries in the 1970s10 --distorted 
10 Recent arguments by the World Bank (1993) on the ineffectiveness of selective interventions 
are an extension of Dollar (1991) and Dollar and Sokoloff (1990). 
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Korea's comparative advantage, increasing inefficiency. However, heavy industry 
displayed higher productivity growth than light industry over the whole period, 
even though there was lower productivity growth in this sector in the earlier 
period.11 Lee (1995) verifies that Korea rapidly gained competitiveness in heavy 
industries, while it maintained competitiveness for a long time in light industries, 
as predicted by neoclassical theory. It appears that the explanation of Dollar, and 
Dollar and Sokoloff as to why heavy industry increased its share is not the whole 
story. Instead, the argument of sequential structural adjustment to create dynamic 
comparative advantage in more technology-intensive industries over the longer 
term has some merit. 
Despite the fragility of the findings of Dollar, and Dollar and Sokoloff, they 
provide an insight into the sources of productivity growth in follower countries in 
the early stage of development. Dollar and Sokoloff (1990: 326) argue that 
'developments in the labour-intensive industries were primarily responsible for 
the extraordinary record of total factor productivity growth in South Korean 
manufacturing', and that the main source of TFP convergence in Korean 
manufacturing may be 'scale economies associated with the transition from craft 
to modem labor-intensive production'. This argument implies that there are other 
sources of productivity growth than R&D investment, and that productivity 
growth is not identical to innovative technological change in follower countries. 
In this respect, the findings of Kim and Lau ( 1993; 1994a; 1994b) are misleading 
because their estimates of productivity growth (technical progress in their paper) 
in NIEs are confined to conceptually innovative technological change. 
This finding describes well the characteristic of manufacturing growth in the 
1960s and early 1970s, when light industry products, such as textiles, clothing, 
toys and plywoods were key export goods. However, it does not seem to be valid 
after the period in which capital-intensive industries replaced labour-intensive 
11 The relative increase in the production of capital-intensive products clearly decreases TFP 
growth rates in the Korean manufacturing sector over the period 1968-93. Of course, labour-
intensive industries show a stronger declining trend in TFP growth than capital-intensive 
industries. 
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industries. There was a different mechanism for output and productivity growth, 
lowering productivity growth. If different stages of development and/or industrial 
structure (labour intensity) lead to different productivity growth, any international 
comparison of TFP performance at any particular time will be seriously biased. 
Sustainability of growth in N!Es 
The earlier empirical work in both growth accounting and convergence studies 
suggests that economic growth in the NIBs was not based on exceptionally strong 
productivity growth, and that capital deepening played a major role. Standard 
neoclassical growth theory predicts that long-run growth can only be achieved by 
technological change and that growth led by capital accumulation cannot be 
sustained. 
If Y represents output, and K and L represent capital and labour, and E represents 
the efficiency of labour, then the aggregate production function can be written as: 
Y=F(K,EL) 
where EL is the labour force measured in efficiency units. If we assume a CRS 
(constant returns to scale) production function, the production function can be 
rewritten as: 
y =f(k) 
where y = Y/EL, k = K/EL, andf(k) = F(k,l). 
We assume that L is growing at rate n, and introduce the simplest assumption 
about technical change, that it causes E to grow at some constant rate g. Then, the 
economy grows, as does labour measured in efficiency units, and k evolves 
according to 
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& = sf(k)- (n + g + 8) k 
where s is the rate of saving, and 8 is the rate at which capital depreciates. 
The economy arrives at the steady state when & =0 or 
sf(k*) = (n + g + 8)k*. 
In this steady state, output per efficiency unit, y* = f(k* ), is constant, output per 
physical unit grows at rate g, and total output grows at rate (n +g). Thus, in the 
long run (steady state), only technological change can explain sustained growth in 
output per worker. It does not depend on the rates of saving and population 
growth (Mankiwi 1995: 276-78). Technological change in the model is assumed 
to be neutral and disembodied. The growth accounting tradition, based on 
neoclassical theory, formulates that productivity growth is the output of R&D 
investment (Griliches 1973; 1979; 1980; 1986). 
Thus, combining the earlier empirical findings with the influence of neoclassical 
theory leads to a pessimistic prediction about the sustainability of growth in the 
NIEs because it was the remarkable mobilisation of factors (in particular capital) 
rather than productivity growth which was the main contributor to rapid growth in 
East Asia (Krugman 1994). 
Krugman (1994) compares the growth performance ofNIEs (Singapore) with that 
of former Soviet Russia. Stalinist Soviet Russia experienced strong growth until 
the 1950s but growth declined dramatically thereafter because of a lack of 
technological change. He refers the possibility that the Tigers (NIEs) may turn out 
to be 'paper tigers'. This argument is couched in careful terms but it represents an 
extreme position; it is supported empirically only by Kim and Lau (1993; 1994b), 
who use the meta-production function methodology to claim that these economies 
did not show technological change. This methodology has a bias toward the no 
technological change position, as discussed above. The question of aggregation 
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bias also weakens Krugman's pessimistic logic. This question of the 
sustainability of East Asia's growth is revisited in Chapter 3 by examining the 
role of productivity growth in output growth in a disaggregated framework, and in 
Chapter 4 by investigating the trend in the marginal product of capital. Any 
relationship between stage of development and productivity growth also weakens 
the pessimistic view of the sustainability of growth. This is dealt with in Chapter 
4. 
Theoretical issues: reasons for low productivity gains 
Why is it held that high growth in the NIEs is explained by capital accumulation 
rather than productivity growth? Does this necessarily mean that technological 
change has played a minor role in the remarkable growth of this region? 
Hypotheses about the sequencing of the sources of growth and the interaction 
between capital accumulation and technological change provide an answer. 
There are two theoretical premises on which judgements about the sustainability 
of growth are based: the first is that disembodied technological change driven by 
R&D effort is the sole source of long-run growth; and the second is that the 
growth accounting technique is correct to measure technological change as 
productivity growth. Sequencing in the sources of output growth raises questions 
about the first premise. The interaction between capital accumulation and 
technological change raises questions about the second. 
Sequencing of sources of output growth 
A key idea is that the principal sources of output growth are likely to change 
according to the stage of development. Physical and human capital accumulation 
are the main sources of economic growth in the early stages of development. 
Later, disembodied technological change (innovation driven by R&D effort) 
becomes the main source of economic growth. This idea originated in the 
economic history of follower countries. Follower countries can grow faster than 
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leader countries by taking advantage of the backlog of technological opportunities 
accumulated by leader countries, while the technological catch-up of the former 
occurs through a learning process, without innovation (Gerschenkron 1962; 
Amsden 1989; Hikino and Amsden 1994). This historical view predicts that 
follower countries have access to sources of fast growth other than innovative 
technological change during the learning (catch-up) period. Follower countries 
first employ easier means of technological development, and finally resort to 
innovation when other means of technological change are exhausted. 
Accepting this view, some proponents of neoclassical growth theory admit the 
possibility that capital deepening can be a long-run source of economic growth 
for transitional economies such as Japan and NIEs, but not in a steady-state 
economy. If a country is already at the technological frontier, with the stock of 
available technological opportunities independent of investment activity, the mere 
fact that some or all of the new technology must be embodied in capital does not 
increase the long-run rate of growth of output. However, Baily and Shultze (1990: 
399) argue that capital deepening is a principal contributor to long-term growth 
before disembodied technological change becomes important: 
In an economy well below the technological frontier the situation is quite different. 
So long as the education and general skills of the labor force are compatible with 
what is required by frontier technology, a higher investment share can for a long time 
generate an increase in the growth rate. The essential characteristic of catch-up 
growth is that the backlog of unexploited technological opportunities available to the 
economy is very large, so that one year's additional 'embodying' investment does not 
significantly eat into that backlog. 
Recently the sequencing issue has again attracted interest. Lau (1996: 88) accepts 
the late industrialisation argument based on the experience of economic history: 
Much of the economic growth in the United States in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries can be similarly [to NIEs now] explained by the growth in 
tangible capital and labor inputs. Technical progress was not found to be a significant 
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source of U.S. economic growth until the studies of Abramobitz (1956) and Solow 
(1957) for the period starting in the late 1920s. The same was also true of the 
Japanese experience. We may therefore reasonably draw the conclusion that physical 
(or tangible) capital accumulation is most important for countries at an initial phase 
of economic development. 
Lau is the first to provide a formal hypothesis about the sequencing of physical 
capital, human capital, and technological change in the process of a country's 
economic growth. Using the earlier empirical findings, 12 Lau (1996: 88) explains 
the idea of the sequencing of sources of output growth as follows: 
After a certain level of capital intensity has been reached, diminishing marginal 
productivity of physical capital will inevitably set in, given that land and natural 
resources are fixed and the labor input can grow only slowly. When that happens, the 
desirability of intangible capital will increase relative to that of tangible capital; this 
preference is further reinforced by the complementarity between tangible and 
intangible capital, which requires a minimum level of the former for the latter to be 
productive. Technical progress can therefore be expected to assume increasing 
importance as an economy is transformed from developing to developed status. There 
is thus a time sequence--with physical capital accumulation being the most 
important source of economic growth in the initial phase and technical progress 
assuming an increasingly significant role in the mature phase, after sufficient capital 
accumulation has taken place. To this extent, technical progress may be considered to 
be endogenous in the aggregate. 
Lau's sequencing argument is consistent with the late industrialisation 
experiences in the United States, Germany and Japan. This view provides a clue 
12 Lau summarises the earlier findings of Kim and Lau (1994b) as follows. First, technological 
change is the most important source of economic growth for the developed countries, while 
capital accumulation is the most important source of economic growth for the NIBs. Moreover, 
the hypothesis of no technological change in the NIBs cannot be rejected. Second, human 
capital is a significant contributor to economic growth; it explains 20 per cent of economic 
growth for the NIEs and 10 per cent for the OECD countries. Third, approximately 80 per cent 
of technological change is embodied rather than disembodied for OECD countries (Japan: 96 
per cent). NIEs did not exploit embodied technological change because no technological 
change occurred. Fourth, there is evidence of catch-up in OECD countries, while there is a 
large and widening gap between the technologies of the OECD and the NIBs (NIBs are falling 
behind instead of catching up). 
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to understanding the growth process of NIBs using a perspective different from 
the neoclassical tradition, which is not always helpful in analysing catch-up or the 
learning process of follower countries. The sequencing idea predicts that NIBs 
have sources of long-term growth which differ from those of leader countries. 
Follower countries can grow fast by accumulating (physical and human) capital 
over a long period of time. 
The sequencing hypothesis successfully explains why capital accumulation rather 
than productivity growth was the main source of growth in the NIEs. These 
economies have not yet emerged from the early stage in which innovative 
technological change has yet to assume great importance. This hypothesis also 
questions the premise, on which the judgement about the sustainability of growth 
is based, that disembodied technological change driven by R&D efforts is the sole 
source of long-run growth. This view implies that economic growth driven by 
capital accumulation does not necessarily lead to a significant future decline in 
growth even though it is the sole source of output growth in the early stage of 
development. In this regard, Krugman's pessimism about sustainability of growth 
may be misleading. This hypothesis is explored in Chapter 4 using Korea's 
manufacturing data. 
Lau explains the sequencing of sources of growth using the complementary 
relationship between capital formation and technological change. Shortage of 
physical (human) capital decreases the efficiency or effectiveness of human 
(physical) capital and technological change. Lau (1996: 89) explains why it takes 
so long for innovation activity to become the main contributor to productivity 
growth and growth: 
This complementarity may in fact be one reason why technical progress is not as yet 
an important source of economic growth in the developing countries. At the 
prevailing levels of physical capital and human capital, it has not yet become 
profitable for the developing countries to invest in R&D and other technical 
progress-creating activities. In time, with diminishing marginal productivity of 
physical capital and the increase in inputs complementary to technical progress 
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(physical and human capital), the attractiveness of technical progress creation will 
increase relative to traditional investment in physical capital. 
According to this explanation, after the marginal productivity of capital 
diminishes and (human and physical) capital accumulation is sufficient to induce 
technological change, it becomes the main source of growth. This hypothesis, 
combined with the earlier argument that structural adjustment (entering new 
industries and production shift to high-quality products) slows down the 
diminishing trend in marginal product of capital in aggregate economy, implies 
that innovative technological change becomes the major source of growth after a 
period of time. 
Lau suggests a sequencing in the sources of growth from capital to technological 
change. However, productivity growth by the introduction of modem labour-
intensive production may be the first step in the sequencing of the major sources 
of growth, as suggested by Dollar and Sokoloff (1990). 
This hypothesis, combined with the hypothesis of the interaction between capital 
accumulation and technological change, leads to the conclusion that even in the 
early phase of growth, technology plays an important role, one characterised by 
the technological components of capital accumulation. If such interactions exist, 
the earlier findings of the growth accounting studies that productivity growth 
played a minimal role in the rapid growth of NIBs lose their basis. A further 
implication is that technology should be defined in much broader terms. Collins, 
for example, comments on Page ( 1994a) that 'technological change and factor 
accumulation appear to interact in complex but difficult to measure ways, and we 
may learn a considerable amount by studying this interaction'. 
Interactions between capital formation and technological change 
Neoclassical theory and the growth accounting method assume that capital and 
technology are independent of one another, hence they are separate and 
independent contributors to economic growth. Some economists, however, have 
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raised doubts about this assumption (Landau 1989; 1992; Boskin 1988; Hulten 
1975; 1979; 1992a; Greenwood et al. 1997). For example, Landau (1992: 304) 
argues that: 
R&D and creative design are seldom performed by themselves--but rather only 
when they are expected to be employed in new or improved facilities and/or in 
superior operating modes. So technological change is not only embodied in physical 
capital investment, it is itself capital-intangible capital-and also a powerful 
inducement to it, since the availability of superior technology is a major incentive to 
investment. Investment in tum stimulates more R&D and creative learning. 
If the neoclassical assumption is not valid, productivity growth, as measured by 
growth accounting, does not represent separately and fully the role of technology 
in economic growth. Landau and Boskin, for example, argue that capital and 
technology must be viewed as interchangeable components; net capital formation 
and the depreciation or maintenance of capital always carry new technology 
components, and technological change also leads to both the retirement of old 
capacity and the installation of new. Technological change then becomes the 
driving force for productivity growth but is very strongly related to capital 
formation (Landau 1989: 504). 
The interaction argument is strengthened by the example of Japan's rapid 
economic growth after the Second World War. Landau (1992: 303) explained 
Japan's rapid growth in the following way: 
The comparative performance of the U.S. and Japanese labor productivity growth 
rates has been heavily influenced by the much higher (often doubled) rate of 
Japanese capital investment in a number of their industrial sectors, made possible by 
the very high Japanese savings rates ... This helped fuel the rapid adoption by most 
Japanese industries of the latest available technologies from abroad ... Other data also 
suggest a very high correlation. between national investment and economic growth 
rates. 
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There are two ways in which the interactions between technological change and 
capital formation occur. One possibility is the embodiment effect (from capital 
formation to technological change); technology is embodied in new capital, so 
capital formation induces technological change. Recently the so-called Stanford 
technology school (Boskin, Lau and Kim) have emphasised the embodiment 
effect, based on the finding of meta-production function studies that 
approximately 80 per cent of technological change in OECD countries is 
embodied rather than disembodied. Boskin cited in Lau (1996), illustrates this 
possibility as in Figure 2.4. Suppose that an economy is at point A at t0 , and that 
pro-investment policy leads to a higher capital formation and a transition to a 
higher level of income. Neoclassical theory suggests that the economy arrives at 
point Bat time t1, where the economy returns to a long-run growth path (2). 
However, if there is an interaction between technology and capital formation, 
there is a possibility that the economy follows path (3) instead of path (2), and a 
higher growth rate than the former long-run growth rate. This hypothesis is tested 
in Chapter 4. Capital stock data in Chapter 3 are estimated without considering 
the embodiment effect. It follows that a positive correlation should be observed 
between the productivity growth rate and the growth rate of capital input, if the 
embodiment effect exists (Wolff 1991: 566). 
Figure 2.4 Alternative growth paths: technological change 
and capital formation 
YIL 
Source: Landau (1989: 487). 
(3) 
(2) 
(1) 
35 
time 
Landau (1992: 305) explained the meaning of Hoskin's path (3) as follows: 
This increased growth path may be viewed as a series of transitions in a dynamic 
economy never really at equilibrium because of continuing unpredictable, 
endogenous technological changes. If technological change is not exogenous, 
embodiment and learning by doing interact with capital investment to improve 
growth rates, and capital investment is critical in reaching a higher equilibrium and 
approaching the technological frontier throughout the economy at a faster rate. 
The other possibility is the hypothesis of induced technological change (from 
technological change to capital formation), which means that technological 
change increases capital formation. Under this scenario, capital accumulation 
appears to have almost no independent role in determining economic growth. 
Using Figure 2.5, Hulten argues that the real effect of technical progress is the 
sum of the shift in the production function plus induced capital accumulation. 
Assume that there is a production function that relates capital per unit labor to output 
per unit labor. And let us assume that the economy is at some point A where labor 
force 'growth' is static and investment is just enough to keep the capital stock 
intact...Suppose that a new technology is introduced that causes the production 
function to shift. The multifactor productivity residual will now show a positive 
growth rate ... Under the standard growth accounting story, we would measure the 
importance of multifactor productivity as a source of economic growth by the shift in 
the production function A to B. But we should also notice that this shift results in 
additional output per person and that the additional output will result in extra 
saving ... The extra saving will result in more capital per worker, so the economy 
moves along the production function. This extra capital generates still more saving 
and capital, which generates still more output, etc. The economy will come to rest at 
some point C at which depreciation of large capital stock just equals the additional 
saving. The contribution of the initial shift in the production function is therefore not 
the distance A to B; it is really the vertical distance between A and C (the segment 
AD). That is, all of the economic growth that occurs as the economy moves from A to 
C is due to technical change, qua shift in the production function. The conventional 
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growth accounting story, on the other hand, would erroneously say that BDIAD per 
cent of total change in output per worker is due to capital, and AB/AD is due to 
technical change. (cited by Landau 1989: 488-89) 
Figure 2.5 Induced technological change 
total effect of 
technological 
change (AD) 
YIL 
Source: Landau (1989: 489). 
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This hypothesis also successfully explains the reason for low productivity gains in 
the NIBs. Moreover, it undermines the logic of judging whether growth is 
sustainable or unsustainable. According to growth accounting methodology, 
capital and technology are independent of each other, and measured productivity 
growth, by definition, represents technological change. If capital accumulation 
has a technological component, measured productivity growth may not be 
equivalent to real technological change. For this reason, productivity growth may 
underestimate the role of technological change. 
Summary 
The first section of this chapter reviewed previous empirical findings that support 
the hypothesis of unsustainability of growth in the NIBs. This literature suggests 
that: first, capital accumulation rather than productivity growth is the major 
37 
source of growth in NIBs; second, technology catch-up does not occur; third, 
convergence of labour productivity occurs without convergence of TFP level. 
There are questions about the robustness of these empirical findings, and Chapter 
3 proposes to test these findings under the disaggregated growth accounting 
framework. Among the issues to be explored further are: the problems of the 
aggregated growth accounting approach and the validity of the disaggregated 
approach; the embodiment hypothesis or changes in quality of capital; major 
sources of output growth at a disaggregated level; and sustainability of growth in 
Asian NIBs at a disaggregated level. 
The second section of the chapter reviewed theoretical issues that might provide 
an explanation for the low productivity gains in the NIBs. It emerged from the 
review that productivity growth in labour-intensive industries, capital 
accumulation in heavy and petrochemical industries and productivity growth in 
relation to R&D investment were major sources of growth at different stages of 
development. Thus, the low productivity gains in NIBs identified by the growth 
accountants may simply result from the fact that these economies are in the 
second stage of growth, in which capital plays the major role. 
Interaction between capital formation and technological change was also 
reviewed. If this hypothesis is verified, growth driven by capital accumulation 
does not necessarily mean a minor role for technological change even in the face 
of low productivity gains. This is because the intersection contribution of capital 
and technology to output growth is mechanically attributed to capital in the 
mechanical growth accounting scheme, underestimating the role of technological 
change. In this way, productivity growth and technological change in developing 
countries diverge in the case of follower countries and a new paradigm of low 
productivity growth but high technological change is formed. Chapter 4 
investigates both these issues using the data for Korea's manufacturing sector. 
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Chapter 5 provides a more specific explanation for low productivity gains. 
Structural adjustment is the crux of the link between capital accumulation and 
technological change. In broad terms, technological change in developing 
countries is induced by structural adjustment towards more technology-intensive 
industries. Productivity growth in new industries or high-quality products, where 
structural adjustments occur, is relatively low compared with existing industries 
because of the mechanical properties of growth accounting in treating the 
interaction between capital accumulation and technological change. 
Chapter 6 defines technology in broad terms from the perspective of follower 
countries, and sets out an explanation of the sequencing of the sources of 
technological change suggested by the two hypotheses and the argument about 
structural adjustment. It also verifies that the major means of technology transfer 
changed over different stages of development: from informal means in the 1960s, 
to import of capital in the 1970s to the early 1980s and technology imports in the 
1980s. 
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3 Growth Accounting: Framework and 
the Results 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviewed earlier empirical findings at the aggregated level that resource 
mobilisation rather than productivity growth is the major source of East Asian 
growth, and that there is no evidence of productivity catch-up in this region. 
However, highly aggregated data were used in calculating productivity growth, 
and capital stock data are unreliable because they are constructed from the 
historical investment data under arbitrary assumptions on depreciation rate and 
the reference period used for extrapolation. This chapter seeks to account for the 
sources of output growth of Korean manufacturing at the disaggregated level, and 
examines whether or not the earlier findings are valid using a disaggregated 
industry study. It also tests two issues outlined in Chapter 2: the validity of the 
aggregate production function approach to growth accounting and the 
sustainability of growth. Another aim of this exercise is to produce data for use in 
the analysis in subsequent chapters, which focus on sequencing of sources of 
growth, interactions between capital input growth and technological change, 
structural adjustment across industries, and the relationship between technology 
imports and productivity growth and between R&D investment and productivity 
growth. 
Section 2 reviews the controversy between Denison and Jorgenson concerning the 
growth accounting scheme. This section highlights the relationship between the 
estimation of capital stock and productivity growth on the one hand, and the 
importance of disaggregation by industry on the other hand. Section 3 develops a 
hybrid framework for the standard growth accounting analysis and expresses it 
mathematically. The aggregation procedure across industries is examined to test 
the validity of the aggregate production function approach used in the next 
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section. Section 4 explains the data and sets out the basic growth accounting 
results, aggregated and disaggregated, over various time periods. Section 5 
explores issues arising from the basic results, such as the validity of the 
aggregated approach, the sustainability of growth and technology catch-up. It also 
compares the growth accounting results in this chapter with earlier studies. 
Section 6 provides a summary. 
Literature review: the controversy between Denison and Jorgenson 
The most important contribution of Jorgenson and his colleagues to the literature 
on growth accounting is their emphasis on disaggregation and the way in which 
they illustrate the problems of the highly aggregated approach. However, their 
growth accounting approach is not appropriate for our purpose, which focuses on 
follower countries' opportunities for technology catch-up and the effects of 
structural adjustment on technological change and productivity growth. Their 
basic conclusion is that capital accumulation is the most important contributor to 
growth, and that productivity growth is the least important contributor to growth 
in output. This conclusion differs sharply from the conclusions of other 
mainstream growth accountants, represented by Denison. There is general 
agreement from Solow to Denison that multifactor productivity growth is the 
most important source of growth, and the role of capital accumulation is less 
important. The difference in their results, of course, lies in the different growth 
accounting schemes used by Jorgenson and Denison and others. 
The aim of this section is to review the debates on the growth accounting 
framework, and to seek a hybrid of the Denison and Jorgenson models combining 
the merits of both: capital estimation without quality change and disaggregation, 
and use of net output on the one hand, and a sectoral (industry) production 
function approach to overcome the aggregation bias problem on the other. Such a 
model would view productivity growth as a fundamental source of growth in a 
sectoral model on the one hand, and resource reallocation as a component of 
productivity growth in an aggregated model on the other. 
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Growth accounting tradition 
Early growth accounting studies assigned the overwhelming part of productivity 
growth to the unexplained residual, while the contribution of capital to labour 
productivity was seen as very small (Abramovitz 1956; Solow 1957). For 
example, Solow (1957) argues that one-eighth of the long-term variation in 
output per worker is due to capital accumulation (KIL) and seven-eighths is a 
productivity residual interpreted as technological change. This result is a very 
powerful argument emphasising the lesser role played by capital accumulation in 
the long run. Yet these studies are unsatisfactory because they do not explain the 
residual term successfully. In this regard, Denison and Jorgenson attempt to 
reduce the size of the unexplained residual and provide a more satisfactory 
explanation of growth. Both stress the importance of careful measurement and 
adjustment of the factor inputs, especially labour and the role of human capital. 
However, their views on the main contributors to long-run growth differ, and they 
arrive at different conclusions. Denison emphasises the role of technological 
change and assigns a small role to capital, as suggested by the neoclassical model. 
The contribution of productivity growth to output growth in the United States, for 
example, is 47.3 per cent (advances in knowledge: 31.1 percent; resource 
reallocation: 10.8 per cent; economies of scale: 12.3 per cent) during the period 
1929-82, while capital's contribution to growth is 13.7 per cent in the same 
period (Denison 1985: Table 7.1 ).13 In contrast, Jorgenson assigns a much bigger 
role to capital, reducing the size of the unexplained residual: in his analysis the 
contribution of productivity growth to growth in the United States was 21.7 per 
cent during the period 1947-85, while the contribution of capital was 44.2 per 
cent in the same period (Jorgenson 1990: 23). 
13 Denison (1967) also studies the extent to which differences in growth rates of output can be 
accounted for by differences in growth rates of capital per capita in eight European 
industrialised countries. The answer is that only a small portion of the differences can be 
explained by differences in the growth rates of capital per capita. 
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The basic difference between the two approaches is well illustrated in the debate 
about the idea of 'identity'. Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), who contradict the 
earlier growth accountants' belief in the importance of TFP growth, argue that the 
value of total product is equal to the value of factor inputs as an accounting 
identity. Thus, the contribution of TFP to growth is negligible if real product and 
real factor inputs are accurately accounted for. On this issue, Denison (1972b: 
1 00) states that: 
The identity does and can hold in a current price output measure only if output is 
valued at factor cost; in that series it must hold because the value placed upon each 
unit of output is, by definition, the amounts earned by the factors in providing it. But 
current price measures have little to do with 'productivity measurement,' and the 
identity does not hold in constant prices even at factor costs--unless one abolishes 
the concept of productivity change. Productivity change is precisely a measure of the 
degree to which the identity does not hold. 
Denison's point is that TFP terms (advances in technological, managerial and 
organisational knowledge, economies of scale by expansion of markets, and the 
allocation of resources) are not trivial sources of long-run growth, and that the 
other view is alien to common sense and contradicts previous research. 
These two different views on the theory of growth lead to different growth 
accounting frameworks and to different empirical results. Denison believes that 
growth accounting can be a useful tool to classify sustainable and unsustainable 
sources of growth and to measure the welfare consequences of growth in the long 
run. He accounts for the sources of growth with an eye to identifying the 
contribution of growth to consumption in the long run. The production structure 
of an economy is not at the centre of his analysis. In contrast, the neoclassical 
production function is the basis of Jorgenson's analysis, emphasising the structure 
of economic production. In particular, he emphasises the need for rigorous 
aggregation procedures, which he accomplishes by assuming a translog 
production function and Divisa input indexes. 
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Their vastly different conclusions on the sources of long-run growth lead them to 
different theories on growth and investment policy. However, Denison's approach 
is consistent with the predictions of neoclassical growth theory. On this point, 
Denison's growth accounting approach can be employed in a practical way to 
construct the criterion for evaluating sustainability based on technological 
change. The debates and their origins are traced in the next section. 
Debates on capital estimation 
There are striking differences between the two approaches as far as the empirical 
base of estimation of capital is concerned. From the perspective of 'identity', 
Jorgenson and his colleagues concentrate on weighting, as far as possible, the 
different types and vintages of capital by their respective marginal products, so as 
to increase the contribution of capital input to growth. In practice, this process is 
the origin of the debate with Denison on the three issues related to capital 
estimation. The first issue is that of so-called embodied technological change 
(technological change embodied in the design of new capital goods), and the 
others are the extent of disaggregation and the degree of weighting, and the 
measurement of the decline in capital efficiency with age. 
Take the first issue. Denison argues that embodied technology, if it exists, should 
appear in the residual, instead of in capital input, as was the case in Solow's 
original analysis (Denison 1964; Baily and Schultze 1990: 388). In contrast,. 
Jorgenson and Griliches argue that embodied technology or unmeasured quality 
change of capital should be considered as a contribution of capital input rather 
than a contributi(:)il Of the residual. 
The embodiment effect is very important because some of the contribution of 
technological change will be transferred from productivity to input if unmeasured 
quality improvement in capital goods is counted as an increase in capital input. 
Denison (1972b: 97) explains Jorgenson's methodology and raises some 
problems. 
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[Jorgenson and Griliches] would like to weight capital goods of different vintages 
which are in simultaneous use by their relative marginal products if services prices 
were available from which relative marginal products could be inferred ... Because of 
design improvement, each successive vintage would be counted as more input, 
relative to a vintage remaining in use, than the preceding vintage when it had been in 
the same physical condition. Hence, replacement of each vintage by a later vintage 
would raise capital input. The procedure would therefore raise the growth rate of the 
capital stock in constant prices (and hence capital input) relative to the conventional 
capital stock measure, and change the classification of growth sources by transferring 
from advances in knowledge to capital. 
In response to Denison's argument about the problem of transfer, Jorgenson and 
Griliches (1972b: 168) distinguish two measures of quality change; 'quality 
change which make it equal to one or another version of the residual 
tautologically [embodied technological change], and quality change estimated 
from current differences in marginal products [measured quality change of 
capital]'. Jorgenson and Griliches agree with Denison about the first type of 
quality change but they stick to their argument on increasing the contribution of 
capital input to growth by emphasising the second type of quality change. 
Jorgenson (1966) had already pointed out the equivalence of embodied and 
disembodied technological change on the grounds that the two types of 
technological change are based on the same set of factual implications. 
The two approaches generally agree that the gain that vintage models imagine to 
be derived from additional new investment is not great. This gain is realised by 
shortening the average life of capital while a reduction in the average amount of 
quality improvement incorporated in new capital has an offsetting effect, 
lowering the average age (Denison 1964;1980: 224). Hulten (1992a: 976) also 
concludes that 'changes in the quality of capital had a nontrivial impact on the 
growth of U.S. manufacturing industries ... but they also suggest that Denison 
( 1964) was right about the unimportance of this increase on output growth'. 
Accepting the general agreement on this issue, there is no need here to consider 
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embodied technological change as a component of capital input in my growth 
accounting framework. Like Denison, I will simply incorporate it in the residual. 
This is quite appropriate when considering follower countries' technological 
development, which is characterised by entry into new industries and movement 
into high-quality products through the import of capital goods. 
The second issue is the extent of disaggregation and the weighting scheme. After 
arriving at a similar conclusion to Denison on the embodiment issue, Jorgenson 
and Griliches (1972a) emphasise the quality change of capital estimated from 
current differences in marginal products, which they distinguish from 
embodiment-related quality change, seeing this as a factor that can increase the 
contribution of capital input to growth. Using the translog indexes of capital 
input, Jorgenson and his colleagues attempt to increase the measured growth of 
capital services relative to Denison's approach. To use their words (1972b: 169), 
we would wish to count it [quality change of capital different from embodied 
technological change] as part of input in the capital-using sector. This procedure will 
not eliminate productivity change by definition since it will result in higher 
productivity growth in the capital-producing sector. It will only attribute it where it 
belongs. 
For Jorgenson and his colleagues, quality change is an important process, which 
can eliminate 'aggregation error' by disaggregating capital input as separate 
components wherever possible. Jorgenson et al. (1987) disaggregate sectoral 
capital stock by six types of asset class (producers' durable equipment, 
consumers' durable equipment, tenant-occupied residential or non-residential 
structure, owner-occupied residential structure, inventory and land) and four 
forms of legal organisation (corporate business, non-corporate business, 
household and business) for each of the disaggregated sectors. They then weight 
the sectoral growth rates of the capital stock with sectoral rental price measures 
(translog input indexes) to capture the effect of the shift in the composition of the 
aggregated capital stock among types of capital with different returns (that is, 
with different marginal products). In contrast, Denison distinguishes capital stock 
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and land, and disaggregates capital stock into two components (non-residential 
structures and equipment and inventories). He does not attempt the much more 
detailed disaggregation and weighting scheme that has been developed over the 
years by Jorgenson with various co-authors. Any quality changes of capital need 
to be incorporated in the residual of Denison's framework. 
I shall also follow Denison's approach on this point. In particular, I do not 
propose to disaggregate capital stock by legal form, nor include consumer 
durables and residential structures in the category of capital, because these 
processes do not affect the long-run prospects for an economy. 
Another difference between the two approaches related to the importance of 
capital is due to the different shares of capital and labour. Denison's capital-land 
share (property share) is lower than that of Jorgenson and his colleagues while 
Denison's labour share is higher. Thus, capital's contribution to growth is higher 
in Jorgenson's studies than in Denison's, and this leads to a lower estimate of the 
contribution of productivity to growth in Jorgenson and Griliches than in 
Denison. This gap mainly arises from the inclusion or exclusion of indirect 
business tax less subsidies (capital gains) in measuring income from capital. 
Jorgenson and Griliches argue that factor shares for the components of capital 
must be imputed from the accounting data on total property income (gross private 
domestic product in current prices less private domestic labour income), and 
capital gains should be incorporated into the allocation of property income among 
classes of assets. They (1972a: 154) maintain that 'Denison is in error, not only in 
failing to take capital gains into account in measuring income from land, but 
omitting capital gains in measuring income from other assets'. In contrast, 
Denison (1972a: 40) argues as follows: 
They count indirect business tax liability minus subsidies less current surplus of 
government enterprise and plus business transfer payments and the statistical 
discrepancy in the national accounts as earnings of capital and land ... Inclusion of 
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these items in the earnings of capital and land raises their capital-land share from 
29.2 percent to 36.2 per cent, or by almost one-fourth, and lowers their labor share 
from 70.8 to 63.8. 
The last difference in the two streams is the measure of the decline in the 
efficiency of capital. Jorgenson assumes a geometrically declining pattern of 
efficiency when estimating capital stock while Denison assumes a straight-line 
(one hoss shay) depreciation. Jorgenson's assumption appears to reduce the 
measured growth of capital services related to the efficiency assumptions made 
by Denison, but the difference does not make for different results. 
Debates on gross versus net output 
It is generally believed that the differences in estimating capital input explain the 
differences in the empirical findings of Denison and Jorgenson. However, Baily 
and Schultze (1990: 388) find that it is not the case. They conclude that: 
[Denison and Jorgenson] do not in practice seem to explain much of the wide 
discrepancy between the two sets of empirical results in their estimates of the 
importance of capital. Most of the divergence comes simply from the fact that the 
two studies cover different segments of the economy. When they are adjusted to 
cover the same 'domain' of output, the Jorgenson estimates of the contribution of 
capital tum out to be only moderately higher than those of Denison. 
Denison analysed the growth of output net of depreciation, on the grounds that an 
increase in gross output that is due solely to the consumption of capital at an 
accelerated rate is simply trading future consumption for current consumption, 
without necessarily increasing national welfare. Jorgenson analyses gross output 
on the grounds that improvements in multifactor productivity tend to increase 
output gross of depreciation, and that the gross output measure is therefore 
appropriate for the analysis of productivity change. 
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Jorgenson's concept of output includes depreciation (capital consumption) and 
the services of consumer durables, residential structures, and non-profit 
institutions, in which capital contributes almost 100 per cent of the growth, and 
which are excluded in the analysis of Denison. This broader concept of output 
increases the contribution of capital to growth in the following way. 
First, inclusion of capital consumption (depreciation) in the output concept in 
Jorgenson's framework leads to higher capital contribution in output growth. 
Baily and Schultze (1990: 389-90) illustrate this result as follows: 
Everything else being equal, an analysis of the sources of the growth in gross output 
will, simply from the arithmetic of growth accounting, assign a larger contribution to 
the growth of capital than will an analysis of net output... Think of gross national 
product as being composed of two components: net national product and capital 
consumption. That part of the growth in GNP represented by the growth in capital 
consumption is, by definition, 100 percent contributed by capital input. The 
contribution of capital to the other component is, of course, much smaller. When the 
growth of GNP is being analysed, the capital contribution will be a weighted average 
of its contribution to the first component (100 per cent) and its much smaller 
contribution to the second component. When net output is being analysed, only the 
capital contribution to the second component is included. Operationally this is 
reflected in the fact that the weight given to the capital input in studies of the growth 
of gross output is equal to the gross property income share, while Denison argues that 
the appropriate weight in analyses of net output is the net property share. 
Neither approach is necessarily right or wrong. From the perspective of tracking 
an aggregate production function the Jorgenson approach--gross output and the 
gross share-makes sense. Denison, on the other hand, wants to adjust for the fact 
that the ultimate value of capital comes from its ability to produce net output. The 
fact that increases in capital add to gross output because they increase 
depreciation is a somewhat fictitious concept. Denison does not want to count 
this as part of capital's contribution to growth. He (1972a: 38; 1967: 14-15) 
comments that: 
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The reason I chose to analyse the growth of net rather than gross product is both 
fundamental and conventional. Insofar as a large output is a proper goal of society 
and objective of policy, it is net product that measures the degree of success in 
achieving this goal. Gross product is larger by the value of capital consumption. 
There is no more reason to wish to maximize capital consumption--the quantity of 
capital goods used up in production--than there is to maximize the quantity of any 
other intermediate product used up in production. 
Second, services of consumer durables, residential structures, and non-profit 
institutions need to be considered. Baily and Schultze (1990: 390) explain how 
the inclusion of these services in the concept of output increases the role of 
capital: 
The next important source of the difference in results stems from the inclusion of the 
services of residential structures, consumer durables, and nonprofit institutions in the 
Jorgenson team's analysis, outputs that are excluded from the Denison measure of 
output in the nonresidential business sector. These exceedingly capital-intensive 
sectors account for 21 percent of the Jorgenson output measure in 1979, and the 
capital share of income originating is 94 percent. The capital contribution to the 
growth of the Jorgenson-Gollop-Fraumeni aggregate output measure is thus a 
weighted average of a modest capital contribution in the business nonresidential 
sectors of the economy and a 94 percent contribution in the remaining sectors that, as 
noted, account for over 20 percent of output. 
Partially offsetting this feature of the Jorgenson-Gollop-Fraumeni analysis is 
their inclusion, and Denison's exclusion, of the output of the general government 
sector where the capital contribution, by definition, is zero. 
There has been a longstanding controversy over the use of net versus gross 
measures of national product in accounting for economic growth. However, I 
argue that neither approach is necessarily right or wrong. In this regard, Hulten 
(1992b: 9) concludes that: 
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the two measures are not substitutes, but complements which reveal different aspects 
of the growth process: gross product is the correct output concept for estimating the 
structure of production, while net product is the correct concept for measuring the 
welfare consequences of economic growth. 
I accept this appraisal of the issue. However, given the focus of this study on 
long-run growth, I employ Denison's concept. One focus in this chapter is the 
long-run sustainability of growth in the Korean manufacturing sector. Another 
focus in this thesis is changing patterns of technological niches resulting from 
structural adjustment. These questions bear little relation to capital consumption, 
housing and consumer durables, where the role of capital is much larger. 
Debates on disaggregation and intermediate input 
In the preceding two parts of this section, I reviewed the discrepancies between 
Denison and Jorgenson and his colleagues from the perspective of the 
appropriateness of their model for evaluating the long-run sustainability issue. In 
this process, I inevitably focused on the sources of growth in one-sector aggregate 
economy models because of the aggregated nature of Denison's framework of 
analysis. Thus, I omitted the most important contributions of Jorgenson and his 
colleagues to the growth accounting literature--the importance of disaggregation 
of output into many sectors, and intermediate inputs. These aspects are very 
important to my framework. This section focuses on individual sectors and their 
relationship to the aggregate sector to provide a basis for later study of the 
validity of the aggregated approach and the sustainability of growth. 
Most growth accounting studies have employed a highly aggregated model which 
provides broad simplifications and powerful predictions. However, as Jorgenson 
(1990) and Jorgenson et al. (1987) observe, the study of the sources of economic 
growth based on the notion of an aggregate production function is highly 
problematic; the aggregate approach requires very stringent assumptions about 
production patterns at the level of individual sectors of the economy. Intuitively 
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speaking, the technology of each sector must be a replica of the aggregate 
production function. In this context, Jorgenson (1990: 24) states: 
The existence of an aggregate production function requires that the technology of 
each sector is separable in value-added and that value-added is a function of capital 
and labor inputs and the level of technology. Moreover, the sectoral value-added 
functions must be identical for all sectors, while the functions relating labor and 
capital input to their components must be identical for all sectors. Finally, each 
component of these input aggregates must receive the same price in all sectors. 
As suggested in the previous chapter, I argue that each individual sector in 
developing countries, particularly in individual manufacturing industries, has 
reached a different level of technology, and that technological change in a small 
range of industries causes structural adjustment in aggregate manufacturing, 
resulting in resource reallocation. My intention is to incorporate this kind of 
equilibrium shift separately into the aggregate productivity growth term. 
There are many studies of the relationship between aggregate productivity 
growth, sectoral productivity growth, and resource reallocation. Domar (1961), 
Hulten (1979), Jorgenson (1980; 1990) and Jorgenson et al. (1987) decompose 
aggregate productivity growth to a weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth 
plus resource reallocation, emphasising the disaggregated model. The meaning of 
resource reallocation is clearly set out by Hulten (1978: 511). He explains that: 
it [is] important to distinguish between productivity change originating in a sector 
and the impact of productivity change on the sector. Productivity change in the first 
sense refers to the shift in the sectoral technology and is measured by the 
conventional productivity residual. Productivity change in the second sense measures 
the equilibrium response to the shifting sectoral technologies, and includes (a) the 
induced reallocation of factor input between sectors, and (b) the induced expansion 
in intermediate input, which serves to magnify the effect of technical change. 
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The disaggregation approach tends to induce intermediate input as a factor of 
production. It is believed that omitting intermediate input from growth accounting 
leads to an upward bias in the contribution of productivity, because technological 
change in an industry generally affects other industries via an interdependence 
relationship. As Jorgenson says, the assumption that value-added should be 
separable from intermediate input is required if we are to define the value-added 
production function. But this assumption is very stringent. Sectoral growth 
accounting studies with intermediate input show a different picture of sources of 
growth. According to Jorgenson (1990: 26): 
Comparing the contribution of intermediate input with other sources of output growth 
[at the sectoral level], we find that this input is by far the most significant source of 
growth. The contribution of intermediate input exceeds productivity growth and the 
contributions of capital and labor inputs. If we focus attention on the contributions of 
capital and labor inputs alone, excluding intermediate input from consideration, we 
find that these two inputs are a more important source of growth than changes in 
productivity. 
Jorgenson does not adjust intermediate input for quality change. He argues that 
the predominant role of intermediate input is unaffected by the omission of 
changes in quality, based on the empirical result that growth in quality is not an 
important component of growth in intermediate input. 
This study takes a disaggregated approach and accounts for sources of growth 
with and without intermediate input. The former has merit when evaluating the 
sustainability of growth, and when comparing the results with other growth 
accounting studies, which largely calculate sources of growth without 
intermediate input. 
Analytical framework 
This section clarifies the growth accounting scheme of this chapter. I define the 
sectoral growth rates of productivity for each individual industry, and express the 
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aggregate productivity growth of the aggregate manufacturing sector. In addition I 
explore the aggregation procedure across all industries, while clarifying the 
relationship between aggregate productivity growth and growth rates of sectoral 
productivity. All the mathematical expressions in this section are based on 
Jorgenson et al. (1987) and Jorgenson (1990). Jorgenson and his colleagues 
emphasise the sectoral production function, and are critical of the aggregate 
production function approach. To clarify this point, they calculate productivity 
growth rates at the sectoral level and then calculate the aggregate productivity 
growth under stringent assumptions. This procedure offers an insight into 
separating the structural adjustment effect as a component of aggregate 
productivity growth. 
Based on the literature survey in the earlier section, I now develop a hybrid 
framework for analysing productivity growth using growth accounting 
techniques. The basic strategies are as follows. 
First, following Jorgenson, the manufacturing sector is disaggregated into 36 
industries, and the sources of growth in each industry are calculated. 
Second, following Denison, I shall not consider the embodiment effect and 
change in the quality of capital as components of capital input. 
Third, following Denison, I do not include capital consumption (depreciation) and 
housing and consumer durables in the scope of output, where the role of capital is 
much larger, and would distort the question of long-run sustainability. 
The first strategy avoids aggregation bias, and gives detailed information on 
productivity growth at the industry level. It also makes it possible to study 
structural adjustment across industries, interaction between capital formation and 
productivity growth, and sources of productivity growth. 
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Other strategies adopted make this study comparable to others, so providing 
answers to the sustainability question. They also guarantee relatively higher 
productivity growth than in Jorgenson's framework, retaining components which 
are not categorised as technological change for leader countries in the 
productivity growth term. These components include economies of scale and 
quality change of capital. 
Sectoral productivity growth 
In defining output, capital, and labour inputs, and productivity in terms of data on 
quantities and prices, we consider a specific form of the production function for 
each industry: 
(i = 1, 2, ... , 36) 
where Tis time, {Vi} is the set of outputs, and {Ki} and {Li} are the capital and 
labour inputs. Following Jorgenson and his associates, we refer to this production 
function as the transcendental logarithmic production function or, more simply, 
the translog production function. 
We can define the shares of capital input and labour input, say {viK} and {vi£}, in 
the value of output by 
(i = 1, 2,. .. 36) 
where {Piv}, {PiK}, {PiL} denote the prices of outputs, and capital and labour 
inputs, respectively. 
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The necessary conditions for producer equilibrium are given by equalities 
between the shares of each input in the value of output and the elasticity of output 
with respect to that input: 
(i = 1, 2,-··36). 
Similarly, we can define the rate of productivity growth, say {vi T}, for each sector 
as the rate of growth of output with respect to time, holding capital input and 
labour input constant: 
(i = 1, 2,-··, 36). 
The translog production function is characterised by constant returns to scale if 
and only if the parameters satisfy the conditions 
(i = 1, 2,-··, 36). 
If we consider data at any two discrete points of time, say T and T-1, the growth 
rate of output can be expressed as a weighted average of the growth rates of 
capital and labour inputs plus the average rate of productivity growth: 
(3-1) In Vi(1) -In Vi(T-1) = •iK [In Ki(1) -In Ki(T-1)] 
+ t,iL [In Li(1) -In Li(T-1)] +tiT, (i = 1, 2,-··, 36). 
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where the weights are given by the average value shares: 
(i = 1, 2,-··, 36). 
We refer to the average rates of productivity growth {vir} as trans log rates of 
productivity growth. Rearranging equation (3-1), we can write the rates of 
sectoral productivity growth as follows: 
(3-2) ,iT= [ln V;(I) - ln V;(T-1)] - >riK [ln K;(I) - ln K;(T-1)] 
- >riL [ln L;(T) -ln L;(T-1)] (i = 1, 2,-··, 36). 
Aggregate productivity growth 
We can arrive at aggregate output, and aggregate capital and labour input by 
summation of sectoral output, and sectoral capital and labour input. 
(i = 1, 2;··, 36). 
We can also define the shares of value-added for all industries--say { w;}-in 
aggregate value-added by 
(i = 1, 2;··, 36), 
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denoting the prices of value-added by {pi v}. 
As before, we consider a translog form for the aggregate production function in 
defining value-added in terms of data on quantities and prices: 
V = exp[ao +aKIn K + aL In L +arT+ 0.5 ~KK (In K)2 + ~KLInK In L + ~KT InK 
T + 0.5 ~LL (In L)2 + ~LT In L·T + 0.5 ~TT r]. 
We can define the shares of aggregate capital and labour input, say VK, and VL, in 
the value-added by 
VK = PK K I Pv V, 
VL=PLLI Pv V 
where Pv, PK, PL denote the prices of value-added and capital, and labour inputs, 
respectively. 
Necessary conditions for producer equilibrium are given by equalities between 
the shares of each input in the value of output and the elasticity of output with 
respect to that input: 
VK = a In vI a InK= ClK + ~KK InK+ ~KL In L + ~KT T, 
VL = a In vI a In L = ClL + ~KL In K + ~LL In L + ~LT T. 
Similarly, we can define the rate of productivity growth, say vr, as the rate of 
growth of aggregate output with respect to time, holding capital input, and labour 
input constant: 
VT = a In vI a T = Clr + ~KT In K + ~LT In L + ~TT T. 
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The sectoral value shares and rate of productivity growth are identical to the 
corresponding aggregate value shares and rate of productivity growth. 
The translog production function is characterised by constant returns to scale if 
and only if the parameters satisfy the conditions 
~KL +~LL = 0, 
If we consider the data at any two discrete points of time, say T and T-1, the 
growth rate of output can be expressed as a weighted average of the growth rates 
of capital, and labour inputs plus the average rate of productivity growth: 
(3-3) tT= [In V(1) -In V(T-1)]- ~K [In K(T) -In K(T-1)] 
- ~L [ln L(1) -ln L(T-1)] 
where the weights are given by the average value shares: 
~K = 0.5·[vK(1) + vK(T-1)], 
~L = 0.5-[v£(1) + VL(T-1)], 
~T = 0.5·[vr(1) + vr(T-1)]. 
I refer to the average rate of productivity growth vr as the translog rate of 
productivity growth. 
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Aggregation over sectors 
Jorgenson et al. (1987) show the relationship between (the weighted sum of) 
sectoral productivity growth and aggregate productivity growth. They compute 
the resource reallocation effect (a measure of aggregation error) in order to 
advocate a disaggregation procedure and to illuminate the problems of the 
aggregate production function approach. This framework gives valuable insight 
into the puzzle of low productivity growth in East Asian NIEs, and makes it 
possible to calculate the effect of structural adjustment across industries (Chapter 
5). 
Conditions for producer equilibrium at the sectoral and aggregate levels are 
equivalent only under the restrictive conditions that there exist for all sectors 
value-added functions that are identical to the aggregate production function, that 
capital and labour inputs within each sector are identical functions of their 
components, and that the prices paid for primary factor inputs are the same for all 
sectors (Jorgenson et al. 1987: 66). 
First, we can express the rate of productivity growth for the aggregate 
manufacturing as the equation (3-3). 
(3-3) '~>'r= [ln V(I) -ln V(T-1)]- '~>'K [ln K(I) -ln K(T-1)] 
- '~>'L [ln L(1) - ln L(T-1 ). 
Second, we can express the rate of productivity growth for each of the 36 
industries as equation (3-2). 
(3-2) 'Vir= [ln V;(I) - ln V;(T-1)] - '~>';K [ln K;(I) - ln Ki(T-1)] 
- '~>';L [ln L;(1) -ln L;(T-1)] (i = 1, 2,-··, 36). 
Multiplying equation (3-2) by the ratio of value-added in the corresponding sector 
to value-added in all sectors, and summing over all sectors, we obtain 
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(3-4) "i:;,"'i."ir= Lwi [In V;(1) -In V;(T-1)]- Lw;·~;K [In K;(1) -In K;(T-1)] 
- Th1,ti.~iL [In L;(1) -In L;(T-1)], (i = 1 2 ... 36) 
' ' ' 
where 
w; = 0.5 [wi(1) + w;(T-1)], 
(i = 1, 2 ,. .. , 36). 
Subtracting equation (3-4) from equation (3-3) and rearranging, we arrive at the 
rate of productivity growth for the aggregate manufacturing sector. 
(3-5) ~ = Lwi·~iT 
- Lw; [In V;(1) -In V;(T-1)] +[In V(1) -In V(T-1)] 
+ Th1,ti.~iK [In K;(1) -In K;(T-1)]- ~K [In K(1) -In K(T-1)] 
+ Th1,ti.~iL [In L;(1) -In L;(T-1)]- ~L [In L(1) -In L(T-1)], (i = 1, 2,. .. , 36). 
Equation (3-5) shows that aggregate productivity growth can be defined as the 
sum of a weighted sum of sectoral productivity growths and three resource 
reallocations. The first term on the right hand side expresses a weighted sum of 
sectoral productivity growth in 36 manufacturing industries, with weights given 
by ratios of the value of output in each industry to value-added in aggregate 
manufacturing. The other terms on the right hand side express the growth rates of 
the reallocations, which capture the differences between the growth rates of 
aggregate indexes of value-added, capital input, and labour input, and the 
corresponding indexes obtained by weighting sectoral output and inputs by its 
h . 14 output s are m aggregate output. 
14 Jorgenson and his colleagues decompose capital and labour input into more detailed 
components to capture the differences in marginal productivity over components. See the 
debate on adjusting the scheme for quality change in capital in the earlier section. However, 
following Denison, I do not decompose sectoral input into detailed components, so resource 
reallocation effects in equation (3-5) are smaller than those of Jorgenson. In sum, my growth 
accounting framework follows Jorgenson in form but Denison in content. 
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Jorgenson (1990: 66-67) explains the meaning of resource reallocations as 
follows. 
Reallocations of value-added, capital input, and labor input among sectors ... provide 
measures of departures from these assumptions. Reallocations of value-added 
incorporate differences in value-added functions among sectors and departures from 
the separability assumptions required for the existence of a value-added function in 
each sector. Reallocations of capital and labor inputs include differences in capital 
and labor aggregates among sectors, departures from separability assumptions 
' 
required for the existence of these aggregates, and differences in prices of individual 
capital and labor input among sectors. 
According to Jorgenson, aggregate productivity growth has meaning only when 
the sums of the reallocations of value-added, capital, and labour are near zero. If 
they are markedly different from zero, we cannot define an aggregate production 
function, by definition. However, this may be not the case for NIBs because 
strong structural adjustments might change the industrial structures of these 
countries. In this case, aggregate productivity growth can no longer be defined 
(the one-sector aggregate model becomes inappropriate), and the weighted sum of 
sectoral productivity growth replaces the role of aggregate productivity growth. A 
corollary is that the use of aggregate productivity growth is also inappropriate in 
questioning long-run sustainability. Conversely, if the reallocation effect is near 
zero, it confirms the appropriateness of the one-sector aggregate model. In this 
event the prospects for long-run growth may be judged by the calculated 
aggregate productivity growth. 
Growth accounting results 
Aggregated growth results and their implication of unsustainable growth in the 
NIEs are problematic, because the data used were highly aggregated, and 
unreliable in the case of capital stock. Instead, I take a highly disaggregated 
approach and use capital stock data constructed by the national wealth survey. 
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The purpose of this section is to explain the data I employ and to account for the 
sources of growth the Korean manufacturing at both the aggregate and industry 
levels. I then test the validity of the aggregate production function approach and 
the long-run sustainability of growth. 
Data 
I employ the growth accounting data of Hong and Kim (1996) (KDI data 
hereafter), which are an extension study of Kim and Hong (1992), Kim and Park 
(1985) and Kim and Park (1988), because the dataset is consistent with my 
strategies for a growth accounting framework. They account for the sources of 
growth of 36 industries in the Korean manufacturing sector over the 1967-93 
period. They include intermediate input as a factor of production, following 
Jorgenson, but calculate sources of growth with the extension of Denison's 
methodology. On this reason, the KDI data are consistent with Denison's 
framework; for example, capital and labour input data are calculated using 
Denison's approach. 
Capital stock data are calculated as the sum of total fixed assets (non-residential 
structures and equipment plus land), weighted by 0.75, and inventories, weighted 
by 0.25. Inclusion of land and inventories decreases the growth rate in capital 
stock because land and inventories have grown more slowly than equipment and 
non-residential structures. Data on each component of capital stock are 
constructed using the National Wealth Survey and Mining and Manufacturing 
Survey; benchmark data for 1968, 1978 and 1987 are from the National Wealth 
Survey and Mining and Manufacturing Survey data are used to construct time 
series. Capital stock data from this study are more reliable than those constructed 
from historical investment data of the National Account, because they do not 
require arbitrary assumptions on depreciation rate and reference period used for 
extrapolation. 
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The labour input index is calculated by multiplying the total employment index, 
which includes self-employment as well as unpaid family workers, by the index 
of monthly labour hours and the index of quality change in labour. According to 
Kim and Park (1985), the increase in total employment explains 66 per cent of the 
increase in labour input, while the increase in labour hours and quality change 
due to enhancement of education each explains about 15 per cent. It is impossible 
to collect labour quality change data at the industry level. So Hong and Kim 
(1996), Kim and Hong (1992) and Kim and Park (1985) use the labour quality 
change data for the whole economy in all industries at the same time. The KDI 
labour input data are not weighted by age-sex profile. A one-to-one rule is 
applied in treating self-employed and unpaid family workers, where numbers 
have grown more slowly than in normal employment. Thus, the growth rate in the 
labour input index is lower than other cases. 
This study accounts for the sources of growth with and without intermediate 
input,15 and employs aggregation over sectors, following Jorgenson. It also takes 
15 sectors, integrating the 36 original industries as a basis of the study. However, 
a 36-industry model is also estimated to supplement the arguments of the study. 
The growth accounting data of the KDI dataset is similar to the data of Dollar and 
Sokoloff (1990), Dollar (1991) and the World Bank (1993) in the growth of 
output and capital. Classification of industries is explained in Table A3 .1. 
Aggregate productivity growth 
The aggregate growth accounting results are summarised in Table 3.1. During the 
period 1967-93, growth rates in output (value-added) and productivity are 16.1 
per cent and 6.0 per cent, respectively, and the contribution growth rates16 in 
capital and labour are 7.9 per cent and 2.3 per cent, respectively. The 
15 A basic model of this study is constructed without intermediate input to make the results 
comparable with other studies. However, productivity growth measured with intermediate 
input is used in the analysis of Chapters 4 and 6, when a strict concept of productivity is 
required. 
16 The contribution growth rate is calculated by multiplying the growth rate in an input by its 
share in output. 
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contributions of productivity growth, capital, and labour to output growth are 36.9 
per cent, 49.1 per cent, and 14.1 per cent, respectively. 
These results confirm the earlier findings that capital deepening plays a major 
role in rapid output growth; capital deepening explains 49.1 per cent of the output 
growth of Korean manufacturing. However, this study also suggests that 
productivity growth is a significant contributor to output growth, a somewhat 
different perspective from earlier findings. A 6 per cent productivity growth and 
36.9 per cent contribution ratio are not low when compared with the values of 
developed countries in the same period, even though productivity is not a leading 
contributor to growth, as predicted in Denison's framework. This conclusion is 
very similar to Drysdale and Huang (1996: 20-21), who argue against Krugman 
that 'although increases in factor inputs were significant contributors to growth of 
output in East Asian economies, productivity growth was also an important factor 
contributing to rapid growth'. 
Korean manufacturing continued to change its production structure from labour-
intensive industries to chemical and heavy industries from the early 1970s. The 
Korean manufacturing sector continued to accomplish high growth (20.6 per cent) 
by proceeding with chemical and heavy industrialisation in 1973-78, but in 1980 
and 1981 the Korean economy faced recession, following the prolonged boom of 
the previous two decades. The economy recovered from the recession of the early 
1980s with some restructuring. To identify the changes in trends, I divide the 
whole period into five sub-periods: 1968-73, 1973-78, 1978-83, 1983-88 and 
1988-93. The 1983-88 and 1988-93 periods were characterised by a production 
shift to chemicals, machinery, electronic products and automobiles, while the 
1968-73 and 1973-78 periods were characterised by labour-intensive products 
such as textiles and clothing. In the 1973-78 period, the production share of 
chemical and heavy industries increased within the manufacturing sector, but 
labour-intensive industries still maintained their international competitiveness. 
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Table 3.1 Sources of growth of aggregate output, 1968-93 
(per cent) 
68-73 73-78 78-83 83-88 88-93 68-93 
Growth rate 
Value-added 20.85 20.59 12.07 15.43 12.15 16.14 
Productivity 10.36 6.53 2.49 5.57 4.80 5.95 
Capital 7.02 10.56 8.62 7.62 6.13 7.92 
Labour 3.48 3.50 0.96 2.24 1.22 2.27 
Contribution 
Value-added 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Productivity 49.67 31.72 20.64 36.08 39.52 36.87 
Capital 33.65 51.28 71.41 49.38 50.42 49.07 
Labour 16.68 17.00 7.95 14.54 10.06 14.06 
CaEital share 61.62 62.15 60.61 59.83 57.08 60.23 
Source: Author's calculation. 
Productivity growth in 1968-73 is extraordinarily high. This phenomenon is not 
surprising at all when recalling Dollar and Sokoloff (1990), who identified 'scale 
economies associated with the transition from craft to modem labor-intensive 
production' as a main source of rapid productivity growth.17 In contrast, 
productivity growth in 1978-83 is extraordinarily low because of the over-
investment in chemical and heavy industries in the previous two periods as well 
as the second oil shock. If we do not consider the performances of these two 
periods to capture the long-run trend, productivity growth, capital growth, labour 
growth, and output growth declined steadily. 
There is some evidence that structural adjustment and liberalisation policies in the 
early 1980s were successful; the contribution of productivity growth to output 
growth increased to 36 per cent in 1983-88 while the contribution of capital 
growth fell to 49 per cent compared with the earlier period.18 Korean 
17 Developing countries show high productivity growth in the initial phase of development. 
The contribution of productivity to output growth was about 50 per cent in Korea in 1968-73, 
similar to that of developed countries. However, growth rates and the contribution of 
productivity growth to output growth decline thereafter (Chen 1997). The surprising thing is 
that high productivity growth in the initial phase of development is used as evidence of 
productivity catch-up. This is not the case. High productivity growth merely arises from the 
introduction of the modern factory system in labour-intensive industries. 
18 The development program for heavy and chemical industries caused over-investment and 
over-capacity in these industries, resulting in inefficiencies in the economy. At the same time a 
decrease in competitiveness in light industries caused inefficiencies in economy. Structural 
adjustment efforts occurred for these reasons. Less competitive plants in heavy industry, and 
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manufacturing stabilised in the 1988-93 period compared with the 1983-88 
period; the contribution of productivity to output growth increased a little. 
Table 3.2 decomposes aggregate productivity growth in the Korean 
manufacturing sector into the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth and 
resource reallocations of value-added, capital input, and labour input, using 
equation (3-5) on the assumption that Korean manufacturing comprises 36 
industries. 
Table 3.2 Aggregate productivity growth and its components, 1968-93 
(per cent) 
68-73 73-78 78-83 83-88 88-93 68-93 
Aggregate prod. growth 10.35 6.55 2.50 5.58 4.83 5.96 
(A+B+C+D) 
WSSP(A) 11.66 7.16 3.83 5.35 4.69 6.45 
Output reallocation (B) -1.93 -0.46 -1.77 0.05 0.04 -0.74 
Capital reallocation (C) 0.48 -0.65 -0.18 -0.16 0.10 -0.07 
Labour reallocation (D) 0.15 0.50 0.61 0.35 0.00 0.33 
Sum of reallocations -1.30 -0.61 -1.34 0.23 0.14 -0.49 
(B+C+D) 
Source: Author's calculation. 
Table 3.3 decomposes the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth in Table 
3.2 into contributions by industry. The contribution of each industry is a function 
of productivity growth in that industry and its output share.19 For the first two 
periods ( 1968-73 and 1973-78), chemicals and textiles are the main contributors 
to the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth of Korean manufacturing. 
But fabricated metals and machinery, office machinery and medical and precision 
instruments, electrical and electronic products, and motor vehicles as well as 
chemicals are the main contributors to the weighted sum of sectoral productivity 
growth in the last two periods ( 1983-88 and 1988-93). 
marginal firms in light industries, which previously enjoyed competitiveness, were the objects 
of restructuring in the early 1980s. 
The industry policy of the Korean government changed in the 1980s towards a reduced role for 
government and increased liberalisation (Smith 1995; 1994a). 
19 Output shares have a great effect on the values in the table. For example, food, beverages 
and tobacco contribute more than 10 per cent to the weighted sum of sectoral productivity 
growth over the whole period, not because productivity growth in this industry is high but 
because its share is big. 
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Table 3.3 Industry contribution to WSSP, 1968-93 
(15 sectors, per cent) 
68-73 73-78 78-83 83-88 88-93 68-93 
Food, beverage, tobacco 19.55 11.67 19.08 2.56 10.3 13.98 
Textiles 16.75 16.9 1.27 9.92 6.18 13.51 
Clothes, leather 4.45 3.78 6.88 4.84 4.39 4.68 
Wood, paper, printing 7.09 3.42 10.55 6.26 4.96 6.4 
Chemicals 17.29 30.77 15.66 12.13 10.49 18.23 
Refined petroleum 7.39 1.99 -12.17 4.95 5.38 3.06 
Rubber, plastic 2.71 2.28 2.72 8.14 0.61 3.22 
Non-metallic mineral 4.17 4.66 -4.9 2.78 8.45 3.63 
Steel, non-ferrous metals 4.95 3.42 4.01 4.99 5.07 4.4 
Machinery, fabricated 3.52 6.34 10.59 11.34 10.8 7.07 
metals 
Office, medical machinery 1.39 2.6 5.87 7.93 12.35 4.68 
Electric and electronic 3.32 5.48 14.01 9.76 7.56 6.1 
products 
Motor vehicles 3.11 4.65 8.11 6.15 11.58 5.58 
Other vehicles 2.48 -0.41 13.69 4.13 3.94 3.22 
Others 1.85 2.45 4.63 4.12 -2.08 2.22 
Manufacturing as a whole 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Author's calculation. 
Sectoral productivity growth 
Table 3.4 summarises the growth accounting results of 15 integrated industries 
which are based on the two-input model. Productivity growth is the largest 
contributor to output growth in eight of the 15 industries. They are textiles, 
clothes and leather, wood and paper and printing, chemical products, machinery 
and fabricated metals, office and medical machinery, motor vehicles and other 
vehicles. Past and present leading industries are included in this category, except 
electrical and electronic products. Disaggregate growth accounting leads to a 
somewhat different conclusion from aggregated growth accounting studies, 
namely that productivity growth played the major role in these industries. The 
other four industries also show significant productivity growth with a contribution 
ratio over 33 per cent. They are food and beverage and tobacco, rubber and 
plastic, non-metallic minerals and other manufacturing. 
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The five industries with the highest productivity growth over the whole period are 
office machinery and medical/precision instruments, chemicals and chemical 
products, other transportation vehicles, motor vehicles, and fabricated metals and 
machinery. The industries with the highest productivity are all in the chemical 
and heavy industry sectors. Textiles is sixth in productivity growth. The industries 
with the lowest productivity growth are refined petroleum, food and beverages 
and tobacco, non-metallic minerals, and other manufacturing. Their capital 
contribution ratios are 77.3, 61.7, 51.5 and 40.6 per cent, respectively. The 
industries with the lowest productivity growth are also the highest capital 
contribution industries. 
Table 3.4 Sources of growth of sectoral output, 1968-93 
(per cent) 
OutEut TFP CaEital Labour TFP CaEital Labour 
Food, beverages, 12.12 4.04 7.48 0.61 33.31 61.66 5.03 
tobacco 
Textiles 14.60 7.03 5.71 1.85 48.19 39.12 12.69 
Clothes, leather 12.73 5.69 4.69 2.35 44.72 36.84 18.45 
Wood, paper, 12.87 6.12 4.48 2.27 47.54 34.82 17.64 
printing 
Chemicals 21.12 10.07 8.45 2.60 47.68 40.00 12.32 
Refined petroleum 13.05 2.67 10.09 0.29 20.42 77.32 2.25 
Rubber, plastic 17.63 6.70 7.44 3.49 38.03 42.19 19.78 
Non-metallic 14.29 4.84 7.36 2.10 33.83 51.51 14.66 
minerals 
Steel, non-ferrous 20.43 5.95 11.63 2.85 29.12 56.91 13.97 
metals 
Machinery, 19.41 8.06 6.66 4.69 41.53 34.33 24.14 
fabricated metals 
Office, medical 25.11 10.49 8.20 6.42 41.77 32.67 25.56 
machinery 
Electrical/ electronic 23.95 6.05 12.44 5.46 25.26 51.93 22.81 
products 
Motor vehicles 22.28 9.13 9.12 4.04 40.95 40.92 18.14 
Other vehicles 19.71 9.88 6.16 3.67 50.13 31.23 18.64 
Others 14.10 5.07 5.72 3.30 35.98 40.59 23.43 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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Table 3.5 shows the trends in productivity growth of 15 integrated sectors over 
various periods. During the 1968-73 period, chemicals and chemical products, 
other transportation vehicles, and steel and non-ferrous metals showed the highest 
productivity growth while other manufacturing and food and beverages and 
tobacco showed the lowest productivity growth. 
Table 3.5 Productivity growth by time period, 1968-93 
(per cent) 
1968- 1973- 1978- 1983- 1988 1968-
73 78 83 88 -93 93 
Food, beverages, 8.38 4.31 2.93 1.16 3.23 4.04 
tobacco 
Textiles 13.00 10.76 0.33 6.04 3.35 7.03 
Clothes, leather 8.47 5.24 3.95 6.24 4.18 5.69 
Wood, paper, 9.03 4.53 5.72 6.52 4.07 6.12 
printing 
Chemicals 20.06 21.18 3.34 4.76 2.97 10.07 
Refined petroleum 9.78 1.91 -3.88 3.60 3.45 2.67 
Rubber, plastic 13.23 6.62 2.71 10.31 0.44 6.70 
Non-metallic mineral 9.38 8.74 -2.91 3.32 6.79 4.84 
Steel, non-ferrous 14.33 5.89 2.16 4.33 3.33 5.95 
metals 
Machinery, 10.47 13.22 5.50 7.90 4.58 8.06 
fabricated metals 
Office, medical 13.69 13.34 6.92 10.94 8.18 10.49 
machinery 
Electric and 8.46 7.41 6.75 6.48 3.32 6.05 
electronic products 
Motor vehicles 10.57 14.34 7.21 7.70 6.60 9.13 
Other vehicles 17.45 0.22 16.36 6.04 9.68 9.88 
Others 7.26 8.07 5.91 7.71 -4.01 5.07 
Total 10.36 6.53 2.49 5.57 4.80 5.95 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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During the 1973-78 period, chemicals and chemical products, motor vehicles, 
office machinery and medical/precision instruments, and fabricated metals and 
machinery showed the highest productivity growth while other transportation 
vehicles and refined petroleum showed the lowest productivity growth. During 
the 1978-83 period, other transportation vehicles, motor vehicles, office 
machinery and medical/precision instruments, and electric and electronic products 
showed the highest productivity growth while refined petroleum and non-metallic 
mineral showed the lowest productivity growth. During the 1983-88 period, 
office machinery and medical/precision instruments, rubber and plastic, 
fabricated metals and machinery, and motor vehicles showed the highest 
productivity growth while industry and food and beverages and tobacco and non-
metallic mineral showed the lowest productivity growth. During the 1988-93 
period, other transportation vehicles, office machinery and medical/precision 
instruments, and non-metallic mineral and motor vehicles showed the highest 
productivity growth while other manufacturing and rubber and plastic showed the 
lowest productivity growth. 
Comparison with earlier studies 
Earlier growth accounting studies on Korean manufacturing show a wide range of 
productivity growth estimates, from 1.1 per cent to 7.0 per cent. These differences 
arise from various factors. First, growth rates in output, capital stock and labour 
input differ according to the data source. For example, growth rates in output and 
labour in the Mining and Manufacturing Survey are higher than in other sources 
because it covers only those firms with more than five workers. This directly 
increases the estimate of productivity growth. Output growth is about 2.5-5.1 per 
cent higher according to Kim and Hong (1992) and Young (1995). The growth 
rate in capital stock estimated from the Mining and Manufacturing Survey and the 
National Wealth Survey is also higher than the estimate from the National 
Account. 
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Second, capital stock estimates differ according to the exclusion or inclusion of 
land and inventories. Inclusion of land and inventories in estimating capital stock, 
as in the case of KDI dataset, decreases the growth rate because growth rates in 
other types of capital stock, machinery and non-residential structures have grown 
faster. In this case productivity growth will be higher. Third, labour input growth 
rates differ according to the degree of weighting procedure, and the treatment of 
self-employed and unpaid family workers. For example, the KDI labour input 
index does not weight the input by age-sex profile, and applies a one-to-one rule 
in treating self-employed and unpaid family workers. This decreases labour input 
growth, and so increases productivity growth. However, the one-to-one rule has 
an offsetting force by decreasing productivity growth through lowering the labour 
share. 
Table 3.6 Productivity growth estimates of earlier studies 
(two-input model, manufacturing) 
Period TFP growth (per cent) 
This study 1968-93 5.95 
Young ( 1995) 1966-90 3.0 
Pya et al. (1993) 197Q-90 1.1 
Moon et al. (1991) 1971-89 3.7 
Dollar and Sokoloff ( 1990) 1953-79 6.1 
Kim and Park (1988) 1966-83 7.0 
Source: Young (1995), Kim and Park (1988). 
According to Table 3.6, this study falls within the higher productivity group as 
noted by Kim and Park (1988) and Dollar and Sokoloff (1990). In contrast, other 
studies show lower productivity growth (1.1-3.7 per cent). Table 3.7 examines 
the causes for the difference in productivity growth between this study and Young 
(1995). According to Table 3.7, capital stock data in the two studies do not make 
any difference in calculating productivity growth, even though the growth rate in 
Young is two percentage points higher, because a higher labour share completely 
compensates for the effect of higher capital growth in Young's study. The labour 
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contribution growth rate of Young's study is 1.59 per cent higher than in this 
study. This difference can also be decomposed by a difference in weighting of 
labour (0.58 per cent) and differences in data source (1.01 per cent). Young's 
weighting scheme for labour is more stringent than the KDI data set. He weights 
the working population by sex, age, education, industry, income, hours of work, 
and class of worker. In contrast, the KDI dataset weights total employment by 
education and working hours only. However, these different weighting schemes 
only result in a 0.58 per cent of difference in labour input growth. 
About 70 per cent of the difference in productivity growth (2.04 in 2.95 per cent) 
is simply a result of the difference in output growth. The KDI output data are 
estimated from the Input Output Table and the Mining and Manufacturing 
Survey, whereas Young uses National Account data. Productivity growth 
calculations based on National Account data require some assumptions such as 
capital share, depreciation rate, the reference period used for extrapolation, and 
the beginning of capital accumulation. According to Sarel (1995a: 246-47), 
capital share and the specific estimation period result in different levels of 
productivity growth in East Asia. In contrast the Input Output Table data does not 
require strong assumptions in calculating productivity growth, and allows a 
disaggregated approach. 
Table 3. 7 Productivity growth comparison with Young (1995) 
This study Young Difference in 
(1968-93) (1966-90) TFP growth 
Productivity growth(%) 5.95 3.00 2.95 
Output growth(%) 16.14 14.10 2.04 (+) 
Capital contribution growth (%) 7.92 7.23 0.69 (-) 
Labour contribution growth (%) 2.27 3.86 1.59 (+) 
Capital growth (%) 13.10 15.10 2.00 (+) 
Labour growth (weighted,%) 5.81 7.40 1.59 (+) 
Capital share 0.602 0.479 0.123 (-) 
Source: Calculated by the author. 
73 
Tests for hypotheses under the growth accounting framework 
Validity of the aggregate production function approach 
Jorgenson and his colleagues earlier argued that aggregate productivity cannot be 
identified if the sum of resource reallocation is markedly different from zero in 
dealing with aggregation over sectors (see equation 3-5: 21). I predict this will 
happen in the application of growth accounting technique to Korean 
manufacturing, because production diversification over industries (entry into new 
industries) in a transitional economy will lead to significant resource reallocation 
effects of capital and labour input. 
Table 3.2 show that the sum of resource reallocations is not far from zero over the 
whole period. This can be interpreted as a sign of the appropriateness of the 
aggregate model over the whole period. Hence, it is possible to assess long-run 
growth on the basis of calculation of aggregate productivity growth. However, an 
examination of the sum of resource reallocations by time period (the last row in 
Table 3.2) leads to a different conclusion. It is quite different from zero in 1968-
73, 1973-78 and 1978-83, though not in 1983-88 and 1988-93. 
These results suggest that the aggregate production function approach is not valid 
for the first three periods, and that the validity of the approach over the whole 
period is spurious. Thus, the sum of sectoral productivity growth weighted by 
industry share is a better measure of aggregate productivity growth. It also 
indicates that diversification across industries (entering new industries 
sequentially) is a prominent source of productivity growth in the first three 
periods. Aggregation bias disappears after the early 1980s, reflecting the 
exhaustion of opportunity for productivity growth by diversification across 
industries. Thus, the earlier aggregate growth accounting studies such as Young 
(1995) and Kim and Lau (1994a; 1994b; 1996) are somewhat misleading because 
the aggregate production function approach up until the early 1980s cannot be 
defined. This calls their findings into question. According to Equation (3-5), 
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aggregate productivity growth is equal to the weighted sum of sectoral 
productivity growth plus three kinds of resource reallocation. Note that the sum 
of resource reallocations is negative rather than positive. The weighted sum of 
sectoral productivity growth is greater than aggregate productivity growth. Hence, 
the earlier aggregated approach underestimated the real aggregate productivity 
growth of Korean manufacturing. 
Do these results mean that the opportunities for productivity growth through 
diversification are over? This may be not the case. Follower countries have other 
opportunities to enhance productivity growth, namely by production shift from 
low-quality to high-quality products within an industry. This study does not 
capture within-industry effects because more disaggregation is needed to detect 
such effects. This study merely captures the effects of expanding production 
activities over industries (across-industry effects). For example, the framework 
has the power to identify structural adjustment from labour-intensive to capital-
intensive industries, but has no power to identify a production shift from 4M 
DRAMs to 16M DRAMs. This kind of structural adjustment has been more 
common than entrance into new industries since the 1980s. 
Sustainability of growth 
Krugman (1994) and Kim and Lau ( 1994a; 1994b) argue that growth in East 
Asian NIBs cannot be maintained because their productivity performance is very 
poor, likening their situation to the case of former Soviet Russia. I evaluate this 
issue under the standard disaggregated growth accounting framework. 
According to Table 3.4, productivity growth is the largest contributor to output 
growth in eight industries: textiles, clothes and leather, wood and paper and 
printing, chemicals, fabricated metals and machinery, office machinery and 
medical/precision instruments, motor vehicles, and other transportation vehicles. 
Krugman's hypothesis in the case of these industries is debatable. Four other 
industries show that productivity growth is an important source of growth, with 
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productivity contribution ratios of over 33 per cent. In contrast, capital is the 
dominant contributor only in four industries: food and beverages and tobacco, 
refined petroleum, steel and non-ferrous metals, and electric and electronic 
products. Krugman's criticism is valid only for these industries. In the case of 
Korean manufacturing, productivity growth can explain output growth to such an 
extent that we can reject the unsustainable growth hypothesis. Moreover, the 
smooth declining trend in productivity growth over time implies that Korean 
manufacturing has not yet reached its growth limit. 
Although disaggregated growth accounting results reveal some evidence against 
Krugman's argument on the sustainability of growth, it cannot be disputed that 
capital growth is the largest contributor to output growth in the whole 
manufacturing sector.20 Does this mean that growth in the East Asian NIEs is 
necessarily unsustainable? Why was capital accumulation so important in East 
Asian growth? Does productivity growth measured by growth accounting 
techniques represent technological change? The growth accounting approach has 
limitations in answering the sustainability question because the growth 
accounting model lacks an explanation for the characteristics of the growth 
process of follower countries. In the following chapters I shall concentrate on 
theoretical issues that are helpful to understand the mechanism of growth in the 
East Asian NIEs, and that undermine the unsustainability criticism. 
Summary 
The question posed in this chapter concerns the validity of earlier empirical 
findings and their implication of unsustainable growth. Earlier findings may not 
be robust because highly aggregated data lead to aggregation bias, and because 
capital stock data constructed from investment data are unreliable. 
20 Although the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth, rather than aggregate 
productivity growth, is adopted in considering the aggregation bias problem, the role of 
productivity growth is not much magnified; it is 6.5 per cent in the 36-industry model over the 
whole period. 
76 
After the literature survey on Denison's and Jorgenson's framework, a hybrid 
model was constructed to overcome these problems and to confirm whether the 
use of disaggregated data leads to a different conclusion. First, the manufacturing 
sector was disaggregated into 36 industries, following Jorgenson, to check the 
validity of aggregate analysis. Second, the embodiment effect and quality change 
of capital in each industry were considered as components of productivity growth, 
following Denison, to see productivity growth as a fundamental source of growth. 
According to growth accounting results based on this framework, the earlier 
finding that the contribution of capital to growth is relatively high in the case of 
NIBs could not be denied in the aggregated Korean manufacturing sector, even 
though productivity's contribution to growth is significantly high, at about 37 per 
cent. However, disaggregated growth accounting leads to a different conclusion. 
Productivity growth was the largest contributor to output growth in eight of the 
15 industries. The aggregate production function approach was not valid in 
considering the sum of resource reallocations. It was quite different from zero in 
1968-73, 1973-78 and 1978-83, when the Korean manufacturing sector 
experienced structural adjustments through diversification. The results of no 
aggregation bias in 1983-88 and 1988-93 are also doubtful. They may arise from 
the failure of growth accounting to capture structural adjustment within industries 
(production shift to high-quality products). 
Earlier growth accounting studies directly link low productivity growth in NIBs to 
low technological change, and some of them go to the extreme of interpreting low 
productivity gains as evidence of unsustainable growth. However, the results in 
this chapter, in particular the aggregation bias story, show that we are just at the 
starting point of further investigation. Aggregation bias may be systematically 
linked to sequential structural adjustments in the Korean manufacturing sector, 
requiring careful interpretation of the growth accounting results. In that case, the 
mechanical properties of growth accounting become more severe than in other 
cases. As argued in Chapters 1 and 2, the characteristics of industrial structure 
affect productivity growth in mechanical ways. Establishing a direct link between 
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low productivity growth and sustainability of growth is also problematic. Explicit 
and implicit bases of this link are that measured productivity growth is identical 
to real technological change, and that R&D investment is the force behind 
productivity growth. However, productivity growth may not be identical to real 
technological change in follower countries and there are methods other than R&D 
investment to enhance production technologies. Chapters 4 and 5 seek a new 
interpretation of the growth accounting results and explain the relationship 
between the mechanical properties of growth accounting, capital accumulation 
and structural adjustment. . 
Other findings of this chapter are as follows. First, the differences in productivity 
growth in several studies arise from the data source. The National Wealth Survey 
and the Mining and Manufacturing Survey allow a disaggregated approach, and 
result in relatively high productivity growth. In contrast, National Income 
Account data only allow an aggregated approach, and require some arbitrary 
assumptions to estimate capital stock and productivity growth. Second, Sarel's 
(1995a: 246-47) argument that estimates of productivity growth are very 
sensitive to a specific estimation period is quite right. Productivity growth and its 
contribution to output growth are very high in 1968-73 but very low in 1978-83. 
Thus, extending the estimation period in the 1960s and/or in the 1990s leads to 
relatively high productivity growth, whereas focusing on the late 1970s and 1980s 
leads to low productivity growth. Third, the trends in productivity growth in the 
1970s and 1980 are quite different from the picture put forward by Dollar (1991) 
and Dollar and Sokoloff (1990), who emphasise changes in manufacturing 
structure from heavy industry to light industry and resulting TFP convergence. 
What really happened in Korea is a change in manufacturing structure from light 
industry to heavy industry and TFP convergence (Appendix 1). 
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4 Reasons for Low Productivity Growth 
Introduction 
The disaggregated growth accounting study in Chapter 3 found that productivity 
growth was an important contributor to output growth in Korea's manufacturing 
sector; it is the largest contributor to growth in eight out of 15 industries. Chapter 
3 also found that an aggregated approach is not acceptable because of detected 
aggregation bias (entry into new industries) in the periods 1968-73, 1973-78 and 
1978-83, or undetected aggregation bias (movement into high-quality products 
within industries) in the periods 1983-88 and 1988-93. Nevertheless, it is 
apparent that capital accumulation played the major role in Korea's rapid 
economic growth, confirming the earlier empirical findings of the aggregated 
studies. 
Why is high growth in the NIBs explained by capital accumulation rather than 
productivity growth? Does this necessarily mean that technological change has 
played a minor role in the high growth in this region? The aim of this chapter is to 
understand the puzzle of low productivity gains in NIBs. The sources of output 
growth are not independent of the stage of industrialisation through which an 
economy is passing. Nor is the rate of technological change independent of the 
role of capital accumulation, as the discussion in Chapter 2 suggested. 
This chapter tests two hypotheses about these relationships, using Korean data, 
and examines why productivity has been so high in Korea's manufacturing sector. 
Section 2 examines the sequencing of sources of economic growth. Section 3 
tests the interaction between capital accumulation and technological change. 
Section 4 explores the relationship between productivity growth, the output-
capital ratio, and capital-labour ratio. Section 5 provides a summary. 
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Sequencing of sources of output growth 
Lau ( 1996) hypotheses that the sources of output growth change according to the 
stage of development: capital accumulation is the main source of economic 
growth in the earlier stages of development, then disembodied technological 
change (by R&D investment) becomes more important. Following Dollar and 
Sokoloff (1990) and Dollar (1991), I hypothesise that productivity growth is the 
main source of growth in the initial stage of development, reflecting the transition 
to modern labour-intensive production, before capital accumulation becomes the 
major contributor to growth. Hence, productivity growth (through the 
introduction of the modem factory system), capital growth, and then productivity 
growth (through R&D investment) would be the major sources of growth, in that 
sequence. I test this modified version of the hypothesis, and use it as an 
explanation for the puzzle of low productivity gains in NIBs. 
Figure 4.1 shows the contribution ratios of productivity and capital growth to 
output growth over the period 1968-93. The major source of output growth 
appears to change over time. Productivity growth is the major source of growth in 
the first stage of growth (1968-73). Capital deepening is the major source of 
growth in the second stage (1973-78 and 1978-83). Capital deepening plays the 
major role in growth but the role of productivity growth increases in 1983-88 and 
1988-93.21 Figure 4.1 confirms that the experiences of Korea's manufacturing 
sector are consistent with the hypothesis of sequencing the sources of growth, and 
that the manufacturing sector is in a period of transition from the second stage to 
the third stage, where innovation is the sole source of technological change. 
The hypothesis is also validated in the industry-level analysis (Table A4.1, A4.2 
and Figure A4.1 ). Sequencing of the major sources of growth is identified in the 
disaggregated industries, such as food and beverages and tobacco, textiles, clothes 
and leather, refined petroleum, non-metallic mineral, steel and non-ferrous 
metals, machinery and fabricated metals, office and medical machinery and other 
21 At the third stage, the capital contribution decreases while the productivity share increases. 
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vehicles. Quite different trends are seen in wood and paper and printing, rubber 
and plastic, electrical and electronic products and motor vehicles, which are 
characterised by major changes in product items within the same classification. 
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Figure 4.1 Sources of growth in the manufacturing sector 
(per cent) 
73-78 78-83 83-88 
period 
Source: Author's calculation. 
88-93 
Figure 4.1 and Table A4.1 and A4.2 reveal that productivity growth is the major 
contributor to output growth in 1968-73. This is consistent with the findings of 
Dollar and Sokoloff (1990) and Dollar (1991) that productivity catch-up occurred 
in labour-intensive industries in Korea, even though this was not the case in the 
second (1973-83) and third transition period (1983-93), when the share of light 
industry in total output decreased. The second stage is characterised by capital 
deepening and poor performance in productivity growth, as Young (1995) and 
Lau and Kim (1994) argue. But their finding is not valid for the first stage, when 
productivity growth was the major contributor to growth. In the last period, 
capital input growth and capital contribution gradually decreased while 
productivity contribution increased gradually, as observed by Lau (1996) and 
economic historians. Perhaps the next period (the third stage of development), 
when all the opportunities for faster growth for a follower country are exhausted 
and innovation activity is the sole source of technological change, will confirm 
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the neoclassical prediction that productivity growth through R&D efforts is the 
major source of output growth. 
This hypothesis successfully explains why capital accumulation rather than 
productivity growth was the major source of growth in the NIBs. These 
economies have not yet graduated from the earlier stages of growth in which 
innovation by R&D investment is not the only method of technological change. 
This hypothesis challenges the criticism that poor productivity performance in 
NIBs means that they will be unable to sustain growth. For example, though 
capital accumulation is the sole source of output growth in the earlier stages of 
growth, in particular in the second stage, this does not necessarily imply that 
growth will show a significant decline in the future. 
As argued in reviewing Dollar (1991) and Dollar and Sokoloff (1990), the high 
productivity gains in the initial stage of development should be interpreted 
carefully; high productivity growth does not necessarily arise from innovative 
technological change but may arise from the introduction of improved 
manufacturing production in labour-intensive industries. Thus, there is some 
value in validating the presence of technology catch-up by referring to high 
productivity gains in the initial stage of development. 
It is not useful to compare the productivity growth of a country in the first stage 
of development with that of another country in the second or third stage, without 
consideration of sequencing of sources of growth or stage of development. Poor 
productivity performance in the NIBs is not necessarily evidence of an unsound 
pattern of economic growth. 
Verification of the importance of sequencing also makes clear why different 
studies have arrived at different conclusions about the sources of East Asian 
growth, and how these conclusions depend heavily on the time period under 
study. The argument of Dollar and Sokoloff on technology catch-up seems to be 
verified by the experience in the 1960s and early 1970s, when labour-intensive 
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production was dominant and productivity growth is likely to have been very 
high. In contrast, capital deepening appears to have been the major source of 
economic growth in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Interaction between capital and productivity growth 
In the literature survey in Chapter 2 we hypothesised that there may be 
interactions between capital growth and technological change: embodied22 and 
induced technological change. I test this hypothesis employing a Granger 
causality test to clarify the direction of the interaction between the two. 23 
I estimate the cross-correlation function24 of productivity growth and capital 
input growth with a maximum of six lags at the industry and aggregated level. 25 
Then the Ljung Box Q statistic is calculated to test the joint hypotheses that the 
six cross-correlation coefficients between productivity growth and lagged capital 
input growth, and between capital input growth and lagged productivity growth, 
are zero. The first statistic gives information about the embodiment effect (from 
capital growth to productivity growth) whereas the second gives information 
about the induced technological change (from productivity growth to capital 
growth). 
Table 4.1 suggests that most industries are characterised by interaction between 
the two. Both the embodiment hypothesis (hypothesis I) and the induced 
technological change effect (hypothesis II) are identified in food and beverages 
and tobacco, textiles, refined petroleum, non-metallic minerals, office machinery 
and medical and precision instruments, other manufacturing, and aggregate 
22 Capital stock data are constructed without considering the embodiment effect. So, the 
existence of embodied technological change leads to a positive correlation between capital 
input growth and productivity growth, as suggested by Wolf (1991). 
23 I assume that measured productivity growth is identical to technological change in this stage. 
This assumption does not cause a problem in identifying the interactions between capital 
growth and technological change because productivity growth underestimates the role of 
technology. 
24 The cross-correlation function of X and Y is 
Pxv (k) = U: (Xt- Xbar)(Yt-k- Ybar)} t...J(X- Xbari ...J(Y- Ybar)2• 
25 The 36 Korean manufacturing industries have been categorised into 15 groups. Estimation 
has been made for aggregated manufacturing, for al115 groups, and for all 36 industries. 
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manufacturing. Only hypothesis I is accepted in chemicals and chemical products 
and other transportation vehicles. Only hypothesis II is accepted in clothes and 
leather, steel and non-ferrous metals, machinery and fabricated metals, electric 
and electronic products and motor vehicles. Neither hypothesis is accepted in 
wood and paper and publishing, and rubber and plastic. 
Table 4.1 Correlation between capital and productivity growth 
Test 1 (embodied) Test 2 (Induced) 
Q statistic signif. Q statistic signif. 
Food, beverages, tobacco 13.1 4.1** 14.8 2.2** 
Textiles 18.2 0.6** 31.4 0.0** 
Clothes and leather 6.3 39.3 13.4 3.7** 
Wood, paper and publishing 9.3 15.7 9.4 15.3 
Chemical and chemical products 86.7 0.0** 9.8 13.4 
refined petroleum 14.1 2.9** 20.0 0.3** 
Rubber and plastic 2.5 87.3 9.0 17.1 
Non-metallic mineral 18.3 0.6** 22.6 0.1** 
Steel and non-ferrous metals 3.1 80.0 66.2 0.0** 
Machinery and fabricated metals 6.2 39.8 14.8 2.2** 
Office machinery, medicaVprecision 28.3 0.0** 35.3 0.0** 
instruments 
Electrical and electronic products 2.4 88.4 22.5 0.1** 
Motor vehicles 6.5 37.0 12.9 4.5** 
Other transportation vehicles 25.6 0.0** 2.5 87.3 
Other manufacturing 25.6 0.0** 2.5 87.3 
Aggregate 34.0 0.0** 24.9 0.0** 
Note: 1)* means that the hypothesis is rejected at the 10 per cent significance level. 
2)** means that the hypothesis is rejected at the 5 per cent significance level. 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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The cross-correlation function gives only weak evidence for interaction between 
productivity growth and capital accumulation. First, the Ljung Box Q statistic has 
limited power to test the joint hypotheses that all the correlation coefficients are 
zero. Second, there is a possibility that third variables affect both productivity 
growth and capital input growth. In that case, cross-correlation coefficients 
between the two may be misleading. Thus, the Granger causality test is employed. 
I test whether there is causality between productivity growth and capital input 
growth in a bivariate environment.26 Capital input growth (productivity growth) 
is said to Granger-cause productivity growth (capital input growth) if productivity 
growth (capital input growth) can be forecast better using past productivity 
growth (capital input growth) and past capital input growth (productivity growth), 
rather than just by productivity growth (capital input growth). Causality from 
capital to productivity growth supports the embodied technological change 
hypothesis, whereas causality in the opposite direction supports the induced 
technological change hypothesis. 
To test whether X Granger-causes Y, we run two regressions: equation ( 4-1) and 
(4-2). 
Then, the hypothesis that ~1 = ~2 =···= ~j = 0 is tested, using the F statistic. The 
number of lags of Y is determined by correlogram, and that of X is determined by 
Akaike-Schwartz criteria.27 
26 1 performed a bivariate cointegration test using the Johansen procedure for capital and 
productivity levels. According to Amax and Atrace tests, there is no cointegrating factor. So, I 
conclude that there exists no cointegration relation between capital and productivity level. This 
result implies that the Granger causality test under a traditional V AR framework is valid. 
27 Optimal lag length is chosen where the Akaike statistic (equation 1) and/or the Schwartz 
statistic (equation 2) is minimised. 
(1) N log (RSS) + 2K 
(2) N log (RSS) + K (log N) 
where N is the number of observations, RSS is the residual of squares, and K is the number of 
regressors. 
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Table 4.2 reports the results. Causality from capital growth to productivity growth 
is found in chemical and chemical products (three-factor model only), refined 
petroleum, non-metallic minerals, office machinery and medical/precision 
instruments, electrical and electronic products, and motor vehicles at the 10 per 
cent significance level. This implies that capital input growth causes the increase 
in productivity growth (embodied technological change). 
Table 4.2 Interaction between capital and productivity growth 
(Granger causality test) 
2-factor model 3-factor model 
K~TFP TFP~K K~TFP TFP~K 
F stat (sig. F stat (sig. F stat (sig. F stat (sig. 
level,%) level,%) level,%) level,%) 
Food, beverages, tobacco 2.0 (16.8) 1.2 (38.1) 2.2 (15.1) 2.7 (8.5)* 
Textiles 1.7 (22.7) 3.4 (6.3)* 1.7 (25.9) 3.4 (6.2)* 
Clothes and leather 1.0 (46.4) 1.6 (25.2) 1.5 (24.8) 0.1 (77.8) 
Wood, paper and publishing 1.2 (34.3) 3.1 (5.3)* 1.2 (34.7) 2.8 (6.7)* 
Chemical and chemical 2.1 (12.0) 2.0 (14.3) 2.4 (9.0)* 2.2 (11.8) 
products 
Refined petroleum 2.7 (6.5)* 0.8 (53.1) 2.5 (8.8)* 1.5 (25.9) 
Rubber and plastic 0.4 (86.8) 7.3 (0.5)** 0.4 (90.0) 5.2 (3.2)** 
Non-metallic minerals 9.1 (0.3)** 0.2 (65.1) 5.9 (1.1)** 0.2 (63.3) 
Steel and non-ferrous metals 0.5 (47.6) 2.8 (6.6)* 12.5 (0.1)** 3.2 (5.9)* 
Machinery and fabricated 1.7 (21.3) 1.6 (25.7) 1.7 (20.6) 3.0 (4.9)** 
metals 
Office machinery, medical, 6.3 (0.9)** 8.0 (0.4)** 5.9 (1.1)** 7.4 (0.5)** 
precision instruments 
Electrical and electronic 12.0 (0.1)** 9.7 (0.0)** 12.5 (0.1)** 2.0 (16.8) 
products 
Motor vehicles 2.4 (9.1)* 0.7 (65.6) 2.3 (9.7)* 1.4 (27.7) 
Other transportation vehicles 0.8 (62.0) 6.2 (2.1)** 0.7 (68.2) 9.1 (0.3)** 
Other manufacturing 0.8 (37.0) 2.6 (9.7)* 0.9 (34.3) 4.6 (4.2)** 
Aggregate 3.4 (5.0)** 1.3 (35.0) 3.4 (5.0)** 1.3 (35.0) 
Note: 1)* means that the hypothesis is rejected at the 10 per cent significance level. 
2)** means that the hypothesis is rejected at the 5 per cent significance level. 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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Causality in the opposite direction is found in food, beverages, and tobacco 
(three-factor model only), textiles, wood and paper and publishing, rubber and 
plastic, steel and non-ferrous metals, machinery and fabricated metals (three-
factor model only), office machinery and medical/precision instruments, electrical 
and electronic products (two-factor model only), other transportation vehicles, 
and other manufacturing at the 10 per cent significance level. This implies that 
productivity growth causes the increase in capital input growth (induced 
technological change). 
The causality test is not valid when a third variable causes increases in both 
capital input and productivity growth. According to Figure A4.2, which shows 
similar trends in productivity growth and output growth, this might be a strong 
possibility. Kim and Hong (1992) and Hong and Kim (1996) find the strongest 
relationship between productivity growth and output growth. To eliminate this 
bias, we also test the causalities running from output growth to productivity 
growth on the one hand and to capital input growth on the other. According to 
Table 4.3, industries such as rubber and plastic, machinery and fabricated metals, 
office machinery and medical/precision instruments, and other manufacturing 
support the third variable bias possibility. This means the idea that embodied or 
induced technological change is verified in these four industries (in Table 4.2) is 
spurious. Hence, these four industries should be omitted from the interaction list. 
Then, the industries which support the embodied technology hypothesis are 
reduced to chemical and chemical products (three-factor model only), refined 
petroleum, non-metallic minerals, electrical and electronic products, and motor 
vehicles. The industries which support the notion of induced technical progress 
are also reduced, to food and beverages and tobacco (three-factor model only), 
textiles, wood and paper and publishing, steel and non-ferrous metals, electrical 
and electronic products, and other transportation vehicles at the 10 per cent 
significance level. Combining the two lists, interaction between productivity 
growth and capital input growth is found in ten of the 15 industries: food and 
beverages and tobacco, textiles, wood and paper and publishing, chemical and 
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chemical products, refined petroleum, non-metallic minerals, steel and non-
ferrous metals, electrical and electronic products (both interactions), motor 
vehicles, and other transportation vehicles. 
Table 4.3 Causality from output growth to capital and productivity growth 
Y~TFP Y~K 
2-factor 3-factor model 
model 
F stat (sig. F stat (sig. F stat (sig. 
level,%) level,%) level,%) 
Food, beverages, tobacco 0.4 (88.2) 0.3 (94.0) 1.2 (39.9)) 
Textiles 1.0 (45.1) 1.0 (46.0) 1.9(17.6) 
Clothes and leather 1.1 (44.1) 1.4 (27.9) 3.3 (8.1)* 
Wood, paper and publishing 0.4 (52.8) 0.4 (52.1) 0.1 (74.7) 
Chemical and chemical products 1.9 (18.7) 0.1 (78.2) 1.7 (19.2) 
Refined petroleum 3.5 (5.1)* 0.1 (93.9) 0.4 (68.1) 
Rubber and plastic 3.7 (3.0)** 4.2 (1.7)** 8.8 (3.0)** 
Non-metallic minerals 2.1 (16.1) 2.1 (15.7) 0.3 (57.9) 
Steel and non-ferrous metals 0.5 (67.8) 1.0 (43.0) 1.5 (25.6) 
Machinery and fabricated 5.3 (8.6)* 5.9 (0.6)** 4.0 (1.9)** 
metals 
Office machinery, medical, 3.9 (2.6)** 18.1 (0.1)** 3.5 (3.6)** 
precision instruments 
Electrical and electronic 1.2 (40.0) 1.3 (36.4) 10.6 (0.2)** 
products 
Motor vehicles 3.7 (3.1)** 3.8 (2.2)** 2.4(11.1) 
Other transportation vehicles 2.6 (12.2) 2.5 (10.9) 2.0 (15.1) 
Other manufacturing 6.6 (1.7)** 9.0 (0.7)** 6.9 (0.5)** 
Aggregate 2.7 (9.1)* 2.7 (8.8)* 
Note: 1)* means that the hypothesis is rejected at the 10 per cent significance level. 
2)** means that the hypothesis is rejected at the 5 per cent significance level. 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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Verification of the interaction between capital and productivity growth 
successfully explains the reasons for low productivity gains in NIEs, especially in 
the second stage of growth driven by capital accumulation. These economies have 
not yet emerged from the second stage of development in which capital-related 
low-level technological change plays a significant role in growth . 
Most growth accountants only emphasise the large role of capital deepening in 
growth and interpret this feature as evidence of the unsustainability of growth 
under the assumption that capital and technology are independent of each other. 
However, the assumption is not empirically verified because capital and 
technology have interchangeable components. Interaction between the two mean 
that technology plays a significant role even in the second stage of growth 
through the technological components of capital accumulation. Thus, the fact that 
capital deepening is the largest contributor to growth in NIEs does not necessarily 
mean a significant future decline in the growth rate. It simply suggests that these 
economies benefited from the low-level standardised technologies embodied in or 
induced to capital goods imported. Interactions between capital accumulation and 
technological change, combined with the sequencing of the sources of growth, 
lead to the insight that technological change is a major source of growth at any 
stage of development, in just the way predicted by the neoclassical growth model. 
According to growth accounting methodology, measured productivity growth is 
equivalent to technological change. This may be not the case; if capital 
accumulation has a technological component, measured productivity growth may 
underestimate the role of technological change. This is because the intersection 
contribution of capital and technology to output growth is attributed solely to 
capital accumulation. In this sense, growth accounting's decomposition of output 
growth into inputs and productivity is mechanical. According to the growth 
accounting scheme, productivity growth (i>T) is defined as follows: 
( 4-3) '~>'r = ~In V(1) - '~>'K ~ lnK(1) - '~>'L ~ ln£(1), 
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where +'K, +'L and +'r represent the average value shares of inputs. 
If an increase in capital stock is separated into two parts: capital accumulation 
without a technological component (t1lnKa) and with a technological component 
(t1lnKb), then technological change (+'rc) is defined as follows: 
(4-4) +'TC = +'T + +'K t1lnKb(1) 
= t1ln V(1) - +'K t1lnKa(1) - +'L t1lnL(1). 
Equation (4-3) and (4-4) show the divergence of technological change and 
productivity growth in mechanical growth accounting techniques. In this way, the 
question of why productivity growth has contributed so little to growth in 
follower countries can be answered, and thus Krugman's paradigm of low 
productivity gains in NIEs should be replaced by new paradigm: low productivity 
growth but high technological change. This conclusion is quite consistent with 
Adelman's (1991) speculation that the small contribution of technological change 
to growth may be a statistical illusion: 
In the industrial sectors of LDCs, the limited contribution of technical change may in 
fact be due to the fact that the modem factories that have been established in less 
developed countries have generally been turnkey operations involving the combined 
transfer of both capital and technology. The small contribution of technical change in 
industry to overall growth may thus in part be a statistical illusion; since the new 
technology has been embodied in capital, a significant part of its contribution may be 
misattributed to capital accumulation in the Denison-type growth accounting. 
(Adelman 1991: 501) 
Output-capital ratio, marginal product of capital and productivity growth 
A stylised fact made famous by Kaldor is that the output-capital ratio is constant 
over the long term. Solow's version of the neoclassical growth model also 
predicts that capital grows at the same rate as output in the steady state. The past 
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experiences of the United States and other developed countries provide evidence 
of long-run stability in this ratio. Stability of the output-capital ratio implies that 
the marginal product of capital is constant over the long term. 
If we suppose a Cobb-Douglas production function, then the average and 
marginal product of capital can be expressed as follows: 
APK = YIK = A(K/L)~-1 
MPK = dY/dK = ~·A(K/L)~- 1 
Inserting the average product of capital into the marginal product, the marginal 
product of capital is expressed as equation ( 4-5). 
( 4-5) MPK (t) = ~(t} YIK(t) 
Hence, a stable output-capital ratio directly means a stable marginal product of 
capital, on the condition that ~ is stable over the period, while the decreasing 
(increasing) output-capital ratio means decreasing (increasing) marginal product 
of capital. 
The output-capital ratio plays a crucial role in determining not only the level of 
marginal product of capital (equation 4-5) but also productivity growth. 
Rearranging equation (3-3), which calculates productivity growth in terms of 
growth rates in output, and effective labour and capital input, we arrive at: 
g(Y) = 'YT + 'YK g(K) + 'YL g(£) 
where g(Y) = [ln V(T) -In V(T-1)], g(K) = [ln K(T) -ln K(T-1)], and g(L) = [ln 
L(T) - ln L(T-1)]. 
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Subtracting labour input growth, g(L), from both sides of the equation and 
rearranging, we obtain: 
or g(Y/L) = +'r + +'K g(KIL), 
where g(YIL) and g(KIL) are growth rates of labour productivity and capital 
intensity. 
The rate of growth in the output per effective labour unit can be expressed by the 
sum of the growth rates in the output-capital ratio and the capital-labour ratio, 
because YIL = (YIK)·(KIL). Inserting this relationship into equation (4-6) and 
rearranging, we obtain equation ( 4-7). 
Equation ( 4-7) means that productivity growth is the sum of growth of the 
output-capital ratio and the contribution growth rate in the capital-labour ratio. 
Note that the two components are not independent of each other. For example, 
capital deepening leads not only to an increase in g(K/L) but also a decrease in 
g(YIK) in normal steady-state or decreasing marginal productivity conditions. 
However, g(YIK) plays a more crucial role in determining productivity growth 
than g(KIL), because the increase in g(KIL) is less than the decrease in g(YIK) in 
the normal condition when capital stock increases. This arises from the fact that 
the latter's contribution to productivity growth is reduced by labour share (output 
elasticity with respect to effective labour). 
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I calculate the output-capital ratios of the United States, Japan, West Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, Australia, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong for the 
period 1966-90, using the Penn World Table Mark 5.6.28 Figure 4.2 shows that 
the output-capital ratios of all countries, except Hong Kong, decline. 
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This declining trend in output-capital ratios suggests that the increase in capital 
stock results in lower productivity growth, because the increase in g(K/L) is less 
than the decrease in g(Y/K). Thus, the output-capital ratio is the crucial factor in 
determining the productivity growth of a country. In contrast, an increasing trend 
in the ratio, or a positive rate of growth in the ratio, as shown in the case of Hong 
Kong, is a sufficient condition for higher productivity growth. This means that 
capital deepening results in higher productivity growth through positive g(YIK), 
which is negative in normal conditions, as well as g(K!L) in equation (4-7). How 
can this abnormal situation be possible? One possibility is that large technological 
change overwhelms the counter-force of the decreasing marginal product of 
28 Output-capital ratios are calculated by dividing real GDP per worker (RGDPW) by capital 
stock per worker (KAPW). 
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capital and so an upward YIK ratio is revealed. Another possibility is that a 
country's industrial structure may be characterised by labour-intensive and/or 
service production. In this case, the YIK ratio is higher, and expansion of 
productive activity necessarily leads to relatively small increases in capital stock, 
resulting in a rising YIK ratio. 
I calculate the average and marginal product of capital in each industry using the 
KDI data set. Figure 4.3 shows the output-capital ratio of the aggregate 
manufacturing sector. According to the figure, contrary to the expectation of 
stable trends, the output-capital ratio increases over time.29 The output-capital 
ratios increased rapidly from 14 per to 30 per cent in the period 1967-78 before 
decreasing to 26 per cent in 1981. They then increased slowly, reaching 32 per 
cent in 1990, and remaining at that level thereafter. The marginal product of 
capital exhibits the same trend as the output-capital ratio. Figure 4.3, combining 
equation ( 4-5) and ( 4-7), demonstrates clearly that Korean manufacturing 
enhanced its production technology, in conjunction with the accumulation of 
capital stock. 
Industry level data show a pattern similar to manufacturing overall. The output-
capital ratio increased over time, except during the 1978-81 period. There is clear 
evidence of a continuous increase in marginal product in fabricated metals and 
machinery, office machinery and medical/precision instruments, motor vehicles, 
and other transport vehicles over time. These industries revealed the highest 
productivity growth in the growth accounting study set out in Chapter 3. In 
contrast, in textiles, refined petroleum, non-metallic minerals, iron and steel, and 
electrical and electronic products, there was declining marginal product of capital. 
29 The KDI data set shows increasing output-capital ratio whereas the PWT 5.6 data shows a 
decreasing trend. This difference results largely from the data source. Output and capital stock 
in the KDI data set are based on the National Wealth Survey, Input Output Table, and the 
Mining and Manufacturing Survey, which supply industry-level data. In contrast, the output 
and capital stock data in PWT 5.6 are estimated from the National Income Account, from 
which manufacturing cannot be disaggregated. The latter is also represented by international 
units instead of original units. 
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It is noteworthy that these industries showed the lowest productivity growth in the 
growth accounting study in Chapter 3. 
Figure 4.3 Output-capital ratio in manufacturing, 1968-93 
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As observed earlier, an upward trend in the YIK ratio may be the result of two 
possibilities: extraordinary technological change or a labour-intensive industrial 
structure. Both of these factors contributed to an upward trend in the YIK ratio in 
the Korean manufacturing sector. Production in the early and mid-1970s was 
characterised by labour-intensive production techniques while heavy and 
chemical industries were boosted in the mid- and late 1970s.30 The rapid increase 
in output-capital ratios until 1978 reflects these two facts. 
It is possible that the capital stock data are underestimated. However, according 
to Young (1995), the contribution growth rate of capital stock is 7.23 per cent 
30 The production share of heavy and petrochemical industries in total manufacturing has 
increased gradually: 43.8 per cent in the 1968-73 period, 53.3 per cent in the 1973-78 period, 
55.7 per cent in the 1978-83 period, 57.6 per cent in the 1983-88 period, and 63.4 per cent in 
the 1988-93 period. But a more important factor is that production techniques changed 
gradually towards capital-intensive ones within each industry over time. 
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over the 1966-90 period, not significantly different from the 7.92 per cent in the 
present growth measure for the period 1968-93. According to PWT 5.6 data, the 
output-capital stock ratio in the Korean economy declines over time. However, if 
residential capital stock is excluded from the capital stock, the ratio increases. 
Figure 4.4 Output-capital ratios at industry level, 1968-90 
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Source: Author's calculation. 
The increasing output-capital ratios at the aggregate and at the industry level in 
the Korean manufacturing sector are a sufficient condition for sustainability of 
growth. This contradicts Krugman's argument that economic growth in the NIEs 
can be compared to the experience of former Soviet Russia, which enjoyed high 
growth driven by capital accumulation but experienced a significant setback due 
to decreasing marginal productivity. 
Summary 
This chapter investigated the reasons for the high contribution of capital 
accumulation to growth in NIEs and examined the validity of the unsustainability 
of growth. Section 2 found evidence of a predictable sequence in the principal 
sources of output growth over the period. Productivity growth was a dominant 
source of output growth due to the labour-intensive nature of the industrial 
structure in the period 1968-73, after which capital accumulation became the 
major source of output growth in the Korean manufacturing sector. Subsequently, 
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productivity growth played a more important role in output growth from the late 
1980s, lowering the contribution of capital to output growth. 
Section 3 examined the interaction between productivity growth and capital 
accumulation. According to a Granger causality test, five of the 15 industries 
studied supported the embodiment hypothesis, and six of the 15 industries 
showed induced technological change at the 10 per cent significance level. 
Verification of sequencing of the sources of output growth and interactions 
between capital and productivity growth explain the reason for the low 
productivity gains in NIEs. These countries have not yet arrived at the third stage 
of development, where innovation by R&D investment is the sole means of 
technological change. Rapid growth in these economies has been driven by 
utilising low-level technology, such as technology in a declining product-cycle in 
labour-intensive light industries and standardised technology embodied in capital 
goods in capital-intensive industries. Verification of the two hypotheses is also 
inconsistent with Krugman's unsustainability hypothesis which was derived from 
apparently low productivity gains. His logic is too simplistic. Growth accounting 
techniques measure productivity growth as residual under the assumption that 
technology and capital are independent of each other, and that productivity 
growth is identical to innovative technological change. However, these 
assumptions are not valid for follower countries. Thus, the intersection 
contribution of capital and technology to output growth is mechanically attributed 
to capital accumulation, underestimating the role of technological change. In this 
way, productivity growth and technological change diverge in the case of 
follower countries and a new paradigm, low productivity growth but high 
technological change, arises. 
Section 4 showed that output-capital ratios at the aggregate and sectoral level 
have increased with decreasing growth rates in the past three decades. These 
trends lifted the marginal product of capital. These findings support my argument 
that low-level technology plays a significant role in rapid growth even though it is 
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not apparent in mechanical growth accounting exercises. These findings also 
throw doubt on the idea that growth in the East Asian NIBs is unsustainable. The 
growth rate of the output-capital ratio was an important component of 
productivity growth: it could explain why productivity growth declined over time, 
and why during the 1968-73 period there was extraordinary productivity growth. 
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5 Structural Adjustment in NIEs 
Introduction 
Chapter 4 successfully explained the reasons for low productivity gains in NIBs. 
The answer was provided by an argument based on the sequencing of sources of 
output growth and on the interactions between capital accumulation and 
technological change. Rapid growth in these economies has not been driven by 
technological innovation but by utilising low-level or standardised technologies. 
Low-level technology in labour-intensive light industries is easily transferable 
because it is in a declining product cycle. Standardised technology in capital-
intensive industries is also easily transferable through the market because it is 
usually embodied in capital goods. Empirical verification of the two hypotheses 
in Chapter 4 also invalidated the pessimistic scenario on the sustainability of 
growth in NIBs. Technological change has played a bigger role in economic 
growth than would be predicted by measured productivity growth, since the 
technological component of capital formation is solely assigned to capital in the 
mechanical growth accounting technique. Thus, a new paradigm of growth in 
NIBs was proposed: low productivity gains but rapid technological change. 
However, a detailed description of how capital accumulation is related to 
technological change has yet to be constructed. 
The aim of this chapter is to clarify the role of structural adjustment in the rapid 
growth of NIBs. I suggest that structural adjustments are the driving force behind 
the link between capital accumulation and technological change in follower 
countries, and this claim can be verified if the effects of structural adjustments on 
productivity growth are positive. Thus, structural adjustments accompanying 
capital accumulation in new industries or in the manufacture of high-quality 
products are the reasons for the divergence between technological change and 
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productivity growth (high technological change but low productivity growth) in 
NIBs. 
Section 2 defines structural adjustment after reviewing traditional structural 
change arguments. Section 3 illustrates the experiences of structural adjustment in 
NIBs. Section 4 empirically identifies the role of structural adjustment in 
productivity growth. Section 5 gives a summary. 
Structural change and structural adjustment 
Kuznets (1959),31 Denison (1985) and Chenery et al. (1986) emphasise structural 
change as an important characteristic of modem economic growth. They argue 
that marginal productivity in agriculture is lower than marginal productivity in the 
non-agricultural sector, so resource movement (in particular labour) from the 
former to the latter leads to enhancement of aggregate productivity. 
Developed countries show regularities of structural change in the process of 
economic growth in the long term. The share of the agricultural sector in 
production decreases, whereas the share of the services sector increases. The 
production share of the manufacturing sector increases during periods of 
industrialisation but decreases steadily when approaching the mature stage. These 
regularities are explained by differences in productivity growth and in the 
elasticity of demand with respect to income across sectors. Production and 
employment in the agricultural sector decreases over time because productivity 
growth in the sector is relatively low and demand for this sector decreases as per 
capita income increases. Production and employment in the non-agricultural 
sector increases over time because productivity growth in this sector is higher 
31 Kuznets observes that when a country embarks on a path of sustainable growth, qualitative 
changes have to occur. Investment grows sharply, and industrial structures change, resulting in 
growth and social change. Kuznets coined the phrase 'modern economic growth,' listing some 
common features: (1) the application of modern scientific thought and technology to industry; 
(2) sustained and rapid increase in real product per capita, usually (but not always) 
accompanied by a high rate of population growth; (3) rapid transformation of the industrial 
structure (changing sectoral output, labour force, and capital stock distribution); and (4) 
expansion of international contracts. 
101 
than in the agricultural sector and demand for this sector increases as per capita 
income increases. In separating the non-agricultural sector into the manufacturing 
and services sectors, the production and employment shares of the services sector 
increase over time. This is because higher income elasticity of demand and 
greater increases in prices and wages in the services sector overwhelm higher 
productivity growth in the manufacturing sector.32 Production and employment 
shares in the manufacturing sector decrease in the approach to the mature stage of 
development because high productivity growth in this sector is totally 
compensated by relatively low income elasticity (Park and Kim 1992). 
Economic growth in East Asian NIEs shows similar regularities of structural 
change, even though their production technologies have yet to reach the level of 
the developed countries. According to Table 5.1, the industrial structures in NIBs 
are already very similar to developed countries. The share of agriculture in GDP 
is very low in NIBs (0.2 to 6.3 per cent) whereas the share of the services sector 
in GDP is very high (50.9 to 84.9 per cent). With the exception of Hong Kong, 
industry's shares in NIBs are in the range of 35.6-42.8 per cent. These 
regularities are also explained by differences in productivity growth and in the 
income elasticity of demand across sectors. East Asian NIEs show faster 
structural change than developed countries 
East Asian NIEs also show different characteristics in structural change. This may 
arise from different growth strategies in NIEs where, over the past three decades, 
follower countries have realised opportunities by maximising economies of scale 
in trade or by entering new and high-technology industries. The industry share in 
GDP in Hong Kong arrived at a peak of 41.2 per cent in 1966, and decreased 
thereafter. Corresponding to the movements of industry share, a strong declining 
trend in the share is observed from the rnid-1980s. In contrast, the services' share 
in GDP in Hong Kong increased rapidly in the 1980s, signalling the arrival of a 
services-oriented economy. The share of services in Hong Kong reached 84.9 per 
32 Productivity growth in the services sector is usually lower than in the manufacturing sector. 
However, this is not the case when knowledge intensity increases in the services sector. 
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cent in 1996, considerably larger than the shares of 62.0 per cent in Singapore, 
61.1 per cent in Taiwan and 50.9 per cent in Korea (Table 5.1, Figure 5.1 and 
Figure 2.2). This implies that Hong Kong's rapid growth over the last three 
decades was not fuelled by technological change. 
Table 5.1 Industrial share in GDP, East Asian NIEs, 1960-96 
(per cent) 
1960 19701 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 
Hong Kong 
Agriculture 3.0 1.9 - 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Industry 34.1 36.7 - 31.7 29.9 25.3 15.8 14.9 
Manufacturing 22.3 29.7 - 23.7 22.1 17.6 -
Services 62.9 61.3 - 67.5 69.6 74.5 84.0 84.9 
Singapore 
Agriculture 3.5 2.3 1.9 1.3 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Industry 17.3 29.7 34.1 38.1 36.6 37.0 35.5 37.8 
Manufacturing 11.4 20.0 23.9 29.1 23.6 29.6 26.7 28.6 
Services 79.2 67.9 64.0 60.6 62.6 62.7 64.3 62.0 
Taiwan 
Agriculture 28.5 15.5 12.7 7.7 5.8 4.2 3.6 3.3 
Industry 26.9 36.8 39.9 45.7 46.3 41.2 36.2 35.6 
Manufacturing 19.1 29.2 30.9 36.0 37.6 33.3 28.1 28.0 
Services 44.6 47.7 47.4 46.6 47.9 54.6 60.2 61.1 
Korea 
Agriculture 35.8 25.4 24.1 14.5 12.5 8.7 6.5 6.3 
Industry 19.8 28.7 33.4 40.4 41.0 43.4 43.3 42.8 
Manufacturing 13.6 20.8 26.1 28.7 29.3 29.2 26.9 25.8 
Services 44.5 45.9 42.5 45.1 46.5 47.9 50.2 50.9 
Note: 1) Hong Kong's data in 1970 are 1969 values. 
Source: International Economic Data Bank, ANU, Asia Pacific Profiles 1997, ANU. 
In the case of Singapore, the picture is quite different from Hong Kong. 
Singapore started as a services-oriented economy in 1960, with a share of almost 
60 per cent of services in GDP. However, the share of services decreased in the 
1960s and 1970s, after which it stabilised at around 60-65 per cent. Industry's 
share in GDP shows an increasing trend until the mid-1980s. It reached a peak of 
39.2 per cent in 1984, then stabilised at around 35-40 per cent. Singapore seemed 
to arrive at the mature stage of growth in the mid-1980s, but there the 
characteristics of maturity differ from those in Hong Kong, which only displays a 
services orientation. Taiwan and Korea show similar pattern in terms of the 
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shares of industry and services in GNP until the mid-1980s; industry's shares in 
both countries increased, while the shares of services remained around 45-50 per 
cent. However, the picture changes from the mid-1980s. Taiwan's industry share 
reached a peak of 47.1 per cent in 1986 then declined, while the share of services 
increased rapidly from 1986. In contrast, Korea's industry has yet to peak, while 
the share of services has increased slightly. It is apparent from this difference that 
Taiwan arrived at the mature stage of development in the late 1980s, whereas in 
the case of Korea, there remains potential for industrial growth. 
Figure 5.1 The share of services in GDP in NIEs, 1960-96 
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Note: Data for services' share in GDP in Hong Kong are not available for 1970-79. 
Source: International Economic Data Bank, ANU, Asia Pacific Profiles 1997, ANU. 
Denison calculates the effects of structural change by identifying the movement 
of labour from the agricultural to the non-agricultural sector, and employs it as a 
component of aggregate productivity growth. This traditional approach is based 
on the implicit assumption that industries comprising the non-agricultural sector 
have the same production functions and technologies. This assumption may be 
largely valid in developed countries, which have arrived at the steady state, and 
marginal productivities across industries are equalised. However, if various 
industries within the sector have different production functions and technologies, 
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then marginal productivity in some industries is lower than in other industries. 
Thus, resource movement from the former to the latter leads to enhancement in 
aggregate productivity in the manufacturing sector. If this is the case, the 
traditional calculation for structural change may underestimate its real effect, 
since it ignores opportunities for structural change in the non-agricultural sector. 
Identification of structural change at an industry level (structural adjustment 
hereafter) may be valid for East Asian countries after the Second World War. 
These countries could achieve rapid growth by diversifying their production into 
new industries and moving to high-quality products within the same industries. 
This means that industries have different production functions and technologies 
from each other and over time. Pilat ( 1994) demonstrates that structural change 
plays a role in postwar Japanese economic growth when the economy is 
disaggregated into nine sectors (manufacturing is not disaggregated at the 
industry level). Bernard and Jones (1996a) also introduce a concept similar to 
Pilat's in investigating the convergence of OECD countries at an industry level. 
Recent developments in the endogenous growth model provide a useful basis on 
which to construct an argument about structural adjustment. This new theory 
models technological change as an expansion in the variety of products or 
improvements in the quality of products. The former model sees an increase in 
the number of products as basic innovations, akin to opening up a new industry, 
whereas the latter describes technological change as a continuing series of 
improvements and refinements of goods and techniques (Barro and Sala-i-Matin 
1995: chapters 6 and 7). I claim that both kinds of technological change (entering 
new industries or moving to high-quality products) have been present in East 
Asian NIBs, even though they have not been categorised as innovation. 
Park and Kim ( 1992) define structural adjustment as a movement in the industrial 
structure towards more technology-intensive industries which can sustain higher 
wage rates. They argue that the engine of sustained growth in the Korean 
economy has been a succession of structural adjustments, which have 
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subsequently led to higher productivity growth. Singapore, Taiwan and Korea 
have periodically undergone structural adjustments, moving from labour- to 
capital-intensive industries and from low- to high-quality products. Figure 5.2, 
and Table 5.2 show the movement from labour- to capital-intensive industries in 
merchandise exports in NIBs. The share of capital-intensive exports, a proxy for 
structural adjustment towards high technology intensity, increases over time 
whereas the share of labour-intensive products in total exports decreases, when all 
industries are classified into four categories: agriculture-, labour-, capital- and 
mineral-intensive industry. This movement is quite strong in Singapore but 
relatively weak in Hong Kong. 
Table 5.2 Composition of merchandise exports in NIEs, 1965-96 
(per cent) 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 
Hong Kong 
Agriculture intensive 5.4 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.5 3.3 3.3 3.4 
Capital intensive 14.2 19.4 25.9 36.0 38.7 46.7 50.4 49.6 
Labour intensive 78.1 75.5 70.2 59.2 55.9 47.2 42.4 43.2 
Mineral intensive 1.9 2.0 1.3 1.9 1.6 1.6 2.1 1.9 
Singapore 
Agriculture intensive 44.7 46.0 23.6 19.7 13.5 8.4 5.3 4.7 
Capital intensive 20.4 17.8 31.0 36.7 43.3 62.9 78.3 78.3 
Labour intensive 8.2 8.0 8.4 8.2 6.6 7.8 5.1 4.7 
Mineral intensive 22.2 25.2 35.2 28.2 29.5 19.8 9.1 9.9 
Taiwan 
Agriculture intensive 62.7 29.2 21.8 14.5 10.1 8.8 6.9 6.4 
Capital intensive 13.0 26.4 29.3 36.8 40.6 53.7 66.6 68.0 
Labour intensive 18.8 41.0 46.3 46.3 46.0 34.8 23.8 22.8 
Mineral intensive 4.5 3.1 2.4 2.3 3.3 2.6 2.5 2.6 
Korea 
Agriculture intensive 35.6 28.0 19.7 11.3 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.2 
Capital intensive 13.1 12.3 25.6 41.3 40.0 53.4 68.9 67.6 
Labour intensive 35.1 52.1 49.2 43.8 50.1 38.6 22.5 22.8 
Mineral intensive 16.0 7.6 5.3 3.4 4.5 2.5 3.4 4.4 
Note: Data for Hong Kong exports do not include re-exports. 
Source: International Economic Data Bank, ANU, Asia Pacific Profiles 1997, ANU. 
The structural adjustment process has been accompanied by the import of new 
capital and intermediate inputs. When firms in NIBs entered new industries or 
new production lines for high-quality products, related capital and intermediate 
goods, which embody new technology components, were imported. So it is not 
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surprising at all that capital accumulation is the largest contributor to growth in 
NIBs. An important element is that capital accumulation is accompanied by 
structural adjustment towards higher-technology industries, and that capital 
accumulation in new industries and high-quality products carries the components 
of technological change?3 Thus, structural adjustments are the driving force 
behind the link between capital accumulation and technological change, and 
represent another expression of the two hypotheses verified in Chapter 4: the 
interaction between technological change and capital accumulation and the non-
decreasing marginal product of capital. 
Figure 5.2 The share of capital-intensive exports in NIEs, 1965-96 
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Source: International Economic Data Bank, ANU, Asia Pacific Profiles 1997, ANU. 
The structural adjustment argument predicts that East Asian NIBs do not 
necessarily experience a significant decline in the marginal product of capital at 
the aggregate level, as predicted by the endogenous growth model. This is 
because the force of the declining marginal product of capital at the aggregate 
33 In this respect, Hong Kong's ranking as the economy with the highest productivity growth 
among the NIEs may arise from the mechanical properties of growth accounting; a relatively 
small increase in capital in Hong Kong results in a substantial productivity growth. When 
structural adjustment involving capital accumulation is taken into account, Singapore's rate of 
technological change may be the highest among the NIEs, even though it records the lowest 
productivity growth. 
107 
level can be delayed by industry-level structural adjustment which can offset 
declines in the marginal product of capital at the industry level; if follower 
countries have many potential 'new' industries or products (potential for 
structural adjustment), the marginal product of capital need not decline as 
neoclassical theory would suggest. This claim is partially verified by the result in 
Chapter 4 that showed the marginal product of capital in the Korean 
manufacturing sector exhibits a non-decreasing trend over time. This 
characteristic of growth in NIEs sits in striking contrast to neoclassical 
transitional dynamics, which maintains that the marginal product of capital 
should decline.34 
Structural adjustments in NIEs 
It is interesting to identify changes in industrial structure (structural adjustment) 
and resulting changes in the technological niches in East Asian NIBs over the past 
three decades. In all the Asian NIBs, labour-intensive light manufacturing was a 
technological niche in the early stage of industrial growth; the textile and clothing 
industry played a predominant role in all cases except Singapore. The export 
share of textiles and clothing in Hong Kong reached a peak of 57.2 per cent in 
1975 and declined steadily thereafter. However, the share in Hong Kong has been 
much higher than in other countries. The export shares in Taiwan and Korea, 33.6 
per cent in 1970 and 48.3 per cent in 1973, respectively, declined significantly, 
and reached 15-16 per cent in 1996. The production share of textiles and clothing 
in Hong Kong was over 40 per cent until the late 1970s, whereas the shares in 
Taiwan and Korea were about 20 per cent in the same period. In the case of 
Singapore, the export share of textiles and clothing was about 10 per cent in the 
early 1970s but declined steadily to about 3 per cent in 1995 and 1996. 
34 'Overall, for realistic parameterizations of the production function, our results suggest that 
neoclassical transitional dynamics can only play a minor role in explaining observed growth 
rates. That is, the physical capital accumulation process-which is the key mechanism behind 
the neoclassical model's transitional dynamics--cannot account for much growth without 
generating very large marginal products in the early stage of development...a version of the 
neoclassical model with a capital share close to unity yields protracted transitional dynamics 
and avoids the high initial marginal product; but this model is patently unrealistic unless we 
broaden our notion of capital accumulation.' (King and Rebelo 1993) 
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Figure 5.3 Production and export shares of textiles and clothing in NIEs, 
1970-96 
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Subsequently, a strong wave of growth occurred in fabricated metals and 
machinery, in particular electrical and electronic industries, and these industries 
became the technological niches from the 1970s, the next phase of growth in East 
Asia. East Asian NIEs successfully adjusted their industrial structures to take 
advantage of the world-wide wave of technological change in electrical and 
electronic equipment, and reaped the benefits during this period. The shares of 
fabricated metals and machinery in merchandise export in NIEs, 10-20 per cent 
in the 1970s, increased rapidly and reached 40-70 per cent in 1996: 72.3 per cent 
in Singapore, 60.1 per cent in Taiwan, 55.8 per cent in Korea and 40.0 per cent in 
Hong Kong (Figure 5.4). Most of these shares can be explained by the shares of 
electrical and electronic equipment in merchandise exports, except in the case of 
Korea. Shares of electrical and electronic equipment increased from about 1-15 
per cent in 1970 to 10-32 per cent in 1996: 32.1 per cent in Singapore, 21.9 per 
cent in Taiwan, 19.2 per cent in Hong Kong and 10.3 per cent in Korea. 
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Figure 5.4 Export shares of fabricated metals and machinery, 
and electrical and electronic equipment in NIEs, 1970-96 
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From the mid-1990s, East Asian NIEs had reached a mature stage of 
development. The importance of the services industry increased significantly 
while that of manufacturing declined. They also began to face difficulties finding 
new growth industries or new processes except in the frontier industries, so 
opportunities for high growth through structural adjustment became more limited. 
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Hong Kong 
Textile and clothing industries were the first technological niches for Hong Kong 
during the early phase of growth. The share of textiles and clothing in total 
merchandise exports was about 43 per cent throughout the 1960s (O'Connor 
1995). Their relative importance declined a little after arriving at a peak of 57.2 
per cent in 1975. The share of exports reached 41.8 per cent in 1981, decreased 
steadily in the 1980s and 1990s, reaching 40.8 per cent in 1996 (Table 5.3). The 
production share of these industries to value-added manufacturing also declined 
in the 1970s; it was 48.1 per cent in 1973 but decreased to 41.5 per cent in 1980. 
Production in the textiles industry declined in the 1980s: it was 38.2 per cent in 
1981 but only 36.0 per cent in 1990. Despite a temporary increase in 1984-86, 
40.2, 41.3 and 40.6 per cent, consecutively, the share decreased to 31.5 per cent in 
1993 (Table 5.4). 
Table 5.3 Industry share in merchandise exports in Hong Kong 
1970-96 (per cent) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 
Food, beverages and tobacco 1.43 1.13 0.99 1.64 2.35 2.46 2.73 
Textiles and clothing 47.74 57.16 44.74 43.50 41.37 39.67 40.84 
Wood 1.41 0.64 0.56 0.52 0.34 0.22 0.19 
Paper and printing 1.10 2.55 3.43 1.97 2.75 3.60 3.78 
Chemical products 8.93 7.79 8.26 7.21 6.60 6.20 6.05 
Non-metallic minerals 0.30 0.24 0.42 0.41 0.28 0.34 0.29 
Basic metals 0.68 0.26 0.49 0.36 0.52 0.91 0.94 
Fabricated metals and machinery 19.20 23.38 34.09 35.49 39.82 41.48 39.99 
Fabricated metals 4.40 3.77 4.15 3.22 2.73 2.28 2.22 
Non-electrical machinery 0.75 2.22 3.69 8.00 9.56 9.26 7.85 
Electrical/electronic products 10.62 12.96 14.68 14.86 15.66 19.28 19.24 
Transport equipment 0.57 0.25 0.32 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.17 
Scientific/measuring 1.67 3.70 10.64 8.78 11.01 9.73 9.79 
equipment 
Other manufacturing 19.21 6.85 7.03 8.90 5.99 5.14 5.18 
Source: International Economic Data Bank, ANU, Asia Pacific Profiles 1997, ANU. 
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Table 5.4 Industry share of industries in total manufacturing 
in Hong Kong, 1970-96 (per cent) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 
Food, beverages and tobacco 3.98 5.67 4.64 6.43 8.24 10.29 
Textiles and clothing 41.46 47.44 41.53 40.18 35.97 31.51 
Wood 2.38 2.04 1.45 1.31 0.87 0.51 
Paper and printing 5.12 4.99 5.45 6.70 9.58 12.57 
Chemical products 16.00 10.74 9.64 11.18 8.36 6.35 
Non-metallic minerals 0.82 0.66 0.96 1.02 1.00 1.11 
Basic metals 1.98 1.13 0.90 0.56 0.69 0.92 
Fabricated metals and machinery 23.40 24.62 32.02 28.78 31.70 32.33 
Fabricated metals 6.18 7.38 8.69 6.99 5.95 5.82 
Non-electrical machinery 1.24 2.25 2.56 3.59 8.95 7.76 
Electrical/electronic products 11.75 9.87 13.45 11.43 9.58 11.04 
Transport equipment 3.38 2.95 2.39 2.38 2.77 3.89 
Scientific/measuring equipment 0.85 2.16 4.93 4.39 4.45 3.83 
Other manufacturing 4.85 2.69 3.41 3.84 3.59 3.85 
Source: International Economic Data Bank, ANU, Asia Pacific Profiles 1997, ANU. 
In line with the declining trend in the textiles and clothing industry, fabricated 
metals and machinery, in particular electrical and electronic equipment and 
fabricated metals, became growth industries in the 1970s and the early and mid-
1980s. The export share of fabricated metals and machinery in merchandise 
export increased from 19.2 per cent in 1970 to 34.1 per cent in 1980. It increased 
until 1988, when it reached a peak of 40.5 per cent. The share of the electrical and 
electronic industry rose from 10.6 per cent of merchandise exports in 1970 to 
14.7 per cent in 1980, and it reached a peak of 16.8 per cent in 1988. However, 
textiles and clothing have been by far the largest export sector over the period as a 
whole. In 1996, exports of these goods were twice those of electrical and 
electronic equipment, the second largest export industry, but exports of fabricated 
metals and machinery (electrical and electronic industry plus non-electrical 
machinery and equipment plus scientific and measuring equipment plus 
fabricated metals plus transport equipment) have rivalled textile and clothing 
exports since 1988. The share of fabricated metals and machinery in total 
manufacturing production increased in the 1970s. From 23.4 per cent in 1970, it 
increased to 32.0 per cent in 1980 and 34.0 per cent in 1981. The production 
share of electrical and electronic products also increased from 11.8 per cent in 
1970 to 15.6 per cent in 1981. It was 10-11 per cent in the early 1990s. 
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However, the services sector, notably banking and finance, and trade and tourism, 
has dominated economic growth in Hong Kong. When Hong Kong arrived at the 
mature stage of growth in the 1980s, the share of the services sector in GDP was 
nearly 70 per cent, while that of manufacturing was about 22 per cent. The share 
of the services sector in GDP exceeded 80 per cent in 1993 and recorded 84.9 per 
cent in 1996, while shares of manufacturing in these two years were 11.2 per cent 
and 7.3 per cent, respectively (see Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1). 
Hong Kong experienced adjustment in its industrial structure. In the early phase 
of growth, labour-intensive light industries like textiles and clothing were 
technological niches, along with service sector activities such as trade and 
tourism. Fabricated metals and machinery, in particular electrical and electronic 
industries, became important thereafter, and the role of labour-intensive 
manufacturing industries and the services sector was quite strong. In this respect, 
Hong Kong's experience of structural adjustment differs markedly from 
experience in other East Asian NIEs; Hong Kong's economy has been heavily 
dependent on the services sector, in which income elasticity of demand rather 
than productivity growth plays a major role in growth, and maintained its 
comparative advantage in labour-intensive industries rather than improving 
technological niches (entering the capital- and skill-intensive sectors) during the 
second stage. 35 
Considering these characteristics, Young ( 1992; 1995) is quite misleading in 
arguing that only Hong Kong shows strong evidence of sustainability of growth 
because it enjoys the highest productivity growth among NIEs. The high 
productivity growth in Hong Kong may simply be a product of the labour-
intensive nature of the manufacturing and services sectors. 
35 The share of labour-intensive goods in total merchandise exports of Hong Kong is quite 
large in comparison with other East Asian NIEs. The share in Hong Kong is over 40 per cent, 
whereas the share in Singapore is under 10 per cent and those of Korea and Taiwan are about 
20 per cent. 
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Singapore 
Textiles and clothing were not technological niches in Singapore in the early 
phase of growth, in contrast to the experiences of the other three Asian NIEs. The 
export share of these industries in merchandise exports and their production share 
in manufacturing value-added in 1973 were just 8.4 and 10.5 per cent, 
respectively, when the highest share of the whole period was recorded (Tables 5.5 
and 5-6). Instead, Singapore experienced an early phase of growth, functioning as 
a processing centre for raw materials from Malaysia and Indonesia and as a 
regional base for international trade and finance for multinational corporations 
(O'Connor 1995: 61). For these reasons, the technological niches in Singapore's 
early growth phase were chemicals (rubber processing, petroleum refining), 
fabricated metals and machinery (fabricated metals, shipbuilding and repair, and 
electrical and electronics), food and beverage processing, printing and publishing, 
and timber processing. In particular, the leading industry in exports until1983 
was chemical products. The share of the chemical industry in merchandise 
exports exceeded 40 per cent unti11983 (except in 1973 and 1979). The 
production share of this industry in manufacturing was 23-32 per cent over the 
same period. Fabricated metals and machinery was the second largest export 
industry and the largest production industry in 1970-83. The export share of this 
industry was 19.4 per cent in 1970, rose to 31.6 per cent in 1975, reaching 35.7 
per cent in 1980. 
Singapore experienced dramatic structural adjustment in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Industries which were dependent on primary commodity processing declined, 
while labour-intensive electronics (radio, televisions, semiconductors and others) 
became the next technological niches. Their share in merchandise exports rose 
dramatically: it was 6.2 per cent in 1970, 14.2 per cent in 1975, and 20.0 per cent 
in 1980. By 1980 exports of electronics (electrical and electronic products) were 
half those of exports of chemical products (petroleum refining and rubber 
processing). Moreover, there was structural adjustment within the electronics 
industry, in the form of a production shift to high quality products in the 1980s. 
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Semi-skilled labour-intensive assembly activities became Singapore's technical 
niche in the 1960s and 1970s but skill- and capital-intensities increased rapidly in 
the early 1980s, strengthening Singapore's competitive position in these 
activities. The electronics industry has continued to experience breath-taking 
development. Its export share in merchandise exports was 20.3 per cent in 1985, 
24.5 per cent in 1990 and 34.2 per cent in 1995. Electronics became the largest 
export industry from 1992, replacing chemical products. More interesting is the 
decrease in production share after 1987-88; after increasing rapidly in 1970s and 
1980s, the production share reached a peak of 39.6 and 39.7 per cent in 1987 and 
1988, then dramatically decreased thereafter. This contrasts with continuous 
increases in the export share of this industry. This seems to be strong evidence for 
successful structural adjustment, and a production shift to high-quality production 
in Singapore's electronics industry. In this respect, Singapore's technological 
change may have been the fastest among the NIEs, a trend which was not 
detectable in the growth accounting framework. 
Table 5.5 Industry share in merchandise exports in Singapore, 
1970-96 (per cent) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 
Food, beverages and tobacco 17.51 8.32 7.24 6.57 3.99 3.16 3.10 
Textiles and clothing 8.83 5.83 5.28 4.74 5.25 2.87 2.53 
Wood 5.59 3.44 3.65 2.28 1.58 0.84 0.72 
Paper and printing 1.62 1.09 0.92 1.28 1.45 1.20 1.06 
Chemical products 41.94 46.00 42.21 39.71 28.29 15.67 16.22 
Non-metallic minerals 1.43 0.81 0.72 0.54 0.49 0.52 0.48 
Basic metals 1.88 2.25 3.35 2.60 2.05 2.58 2.23 
Fabricated metals and machinery 19.42 31.58 35.72 41.28 55.91 71.88 72.31 
Fabricated metals 2.71 1.89 1.74 1.90 2.12 1.94 1.84 
Non-electrical machinery 4.74 6.91 7.02 12.73 23.75 30.64 32.66 
Electrical/electronic products 6.20 14.17 20.02 20.26 24.47 34.23 32.76 
Transport equipment 4.33 5.51 4.89 4.26 3.18 2.21 2.19 
Scientific/measuring equipment 0.86 2.93 1.82 1.85 2.10 2.64 2.66 
Other manufacturing 1.78 0.69 0.91 1.00 0.98 1.29 1.37 
Source: International Economic Data Bank, ANU, Asia Pacific Profiles 1997, ANU. 
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Table 5.6 Industry share of industries in total manufacturing in 
Singapore, 1970-96 (per cent) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Food, beverages and tobacco 12.05 7.03 4.92 5.99 4.40 3.93 
Textiles and clothing 5.05 5.46 5.31 4.04 3.23 1.38 
Wood 6.29 2.96 3.09 2.14 1.21 0.74 
Paper and printing 5.58 4.56 4.34 6.38 5.90 6.18 
Chemical products 29.06 25.65 25.21 19.04 20.66 17.12 
Non-metallic minerals 2.95 3.57 2.32 2.98 1.53 2.14 
Basic metals 1.95 1.83 1.78 1.35 1.15 0.67 
Fabricated metals and machinery 34.51 47.82 51.31 56.88 60.95 67.46 
Fabricated metals 6.38 5.03 5.13 6.14 6.13 7.09 
Non-electrical machinery 2.48 9.59 7.97 7.61 22.96 27.88 
Electrical/electronic products 11.25 16.07 23.71 31.64 22.71 23.83 
Transport equipment 14.09 14.58 12.49 9.67 7.47 6.90 
Scientific/measuring equipment 0.31 2.56 2.01 1.83 1.68 1.77 
Other manufacturing 2.57 1.10 1.71 1.19 0.96 0.38 
Source: International Economic Data Bank, ANU, Asia Pacific Profiles 1997, ANU. 
The services sector, particularly banking and finance, and trade, has been a strong 
contributor to economic growth in Singapore, even though Singapore's 
manufacturing base was stronger than Hong Kong's. The industry's share in GDP 
is 37.8 per cent in 1996, comparable to 35.6 per cent in Taiwan and 42.8 per cent 
in Korea, much higher than Hong Kong's 14.9 per cent (Table 5.1). The share of 
capital-intensive products in total merchandise exports in Singapore is 78.3 per 
cent in 1996, a little higher than in Taiwan and Korea, whereas Hong Kong 
records just 50.4 per cent (Table 5.2). The industrial structure of Singapore did 
not change much in the 1980-96 period. The share of the services sector in GDP 
was in the range of 60-65 per cent while the manufacturing share over this period 
fluctuated in the range of 24-30 per cent. The rapid de-industrialisation process 
which was observed in Hong Kong did not occur in Singapore (see Table 5.1). 
The share of services in GDP in Singapore, about 80 per cent in 1970, declined 
until the mid-1980s, in contrast with Hong Kong. 
Overall, structural adjustment in Singapore was accompanied by rapid changes in 
technological niches. In the early phase of growth, the services sector and the low 
technology manufacturing sector, such as petroleum refining, rubber processing, 
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shipbuilding and repair, and food and beverage processing, were Singapore's 
technological niches. However, in the later stage of growth, structural change 
occurred in capital- and skill-intensive industries such as electronics, and high 
value-added service industries such as banking and finance. Viewed from an 
organisational perspective, Singapore has been continuously upgrading the tasks 
it performs for multinational corporations, from a labour-intensive role to a more 
skilled- and capital-intensive one. In this respect, the earlier growth accounting 
studies which are most pessimistic in relation to Singapore are misleading. 
Instead, Singapore is a good example of sustained growth in the midst of 
successful structural adjustment. The low productivity that growth accounting 
studies identify may simply arise from the rapid changes in technological niches 
towards capital- and skill-intensive industries. 
Taiwan 
Like other East Asian NIBs, Taiwan's technological niches were in labour-
intensive sectors in the early phase of growth. They were in clothing and textiles, 
semi-skilled electrical and electronic products, leather goods and wood products. 
The labour-intensive sector was quite strong in the 1960s. However, structural 
adjustment took place towards more skill- and capital-intensive production and 
away from unskilled labour-intensive manufacturing products in the 1970s. 
The textile and clothing industry was the leading industry in merchandise exports 
until1993, when it was overtaken by electrical and electronic products. The 
export share of this industry was considerably larger than any other industry in the 
1970s: 33.6 per cent in 1970, 34.9 per cent in 1975, and 29.5 per cent in 1980. 
However, the industry's export share declined rapidly throughout the 1973-1996 
period: from 33.6 per cent in 1970 to 15.3 per cent in 1996. In contrast, the export 
share of electronics increased over the 1973-1996 period and it became the 
leading industry in merchandise export in 1993. It was 14.3 per cent in 1970, 17.2 
per cent in 1980, 18.0 per cent in 1990, and 20.1 per cent in 1994. An important 
development was structural adjustment in electronics from the 1980s; Taiwan 
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generally strengthened its competitive position in electronics by shifting 
production to high-quality products. The export share of chemical products was 
10-15 per cent in 1970-96, without showing any trends (Figure 5.5 and Table 
5.7). 
Figure 5.5 Export and Production shares of major industries in Taiwan, 
1970-96 
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Table 5. 7 Industry share of industries in merchandise exports in Taiwan, 
1970-96, (per cent) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 
Food, beverages and tobacco 11.13 11.14 6.09 3.41 2.76 2.48 2.30 
Textiles and clothing 33.59 34.86 29.45 27.67 21.08 15.92 15.32 
Wood 10.06 6.01 5.76 4.47 3.17 2.01 1.87 
Paper and printing 0.94 1.12 1.15 0.68 1.37 1.04 1.02 
Chemical products 11.57 11.74 13.27 14.55 11.90 12.12 11.49 
Non-metallic minerals 1.90 1.15 2.16 2.39 2.03 1.11 1.04 
Basic metals 4.98 2.61 2.17 2.64 2.64 3.46 3.61 
Fabricated metals and machinery 22.66 26.41 32.94 37.97 49.21 58.44 60.12 
Fabricated metals 2.57 2.62 4.80 5.58 6.57 6.35 6.11 
Non-electrical machinery 3.64 4.59 5.13 9.86 16.82 22.69 25.33 
Electrical/electronic products 14.30 14.76 17.15 15.35 17.97 22.14 21.89 
Transport equipment 1.04 2.39 3.49 4.42 5.36 5.06 4.75 
Scientific/measuring 0.71 1.88 2.25 2.46 2.31 2.05 1.96 
equipment 
Other manufacturing 3.16 4.96 7.01 6.24 5.84 3.42 3.23 
Source: International Economic Data Bank, ANU, Asia Pacific Profiles 1997, ANU. 
Production shares of major industries show a different picture from export shares. 
The share of textiles and clothing in manufacturing value-added was 16-18 per 
cent with no significant decline from 1974 to 1986, followed by a sharp decrease. 
In contrast, the production shares of chemicals and electronics increased sharply 
from the 1980s. Chemical products were the leading industry in terms of 
production share in 1970-96. O'Connor (1995: 65) explains the rise of the 
upstream chemical industry in 1970s as a result of Taiwan's import substitution 
efforts in this sector, which aimed at supplying synthetic fibre and yam to the 
textile sector. Production in electronics (electrical and electronic equipment) also 
grew strongly in the 1970-88 period (Figure 5.2 and Table 5.8). 
There are some noteworthy characteristics in Taiwan's case. The first is that the 
production share of textiles and clothing in manufacturing value-added did not 
decrease sharply in 1973-86, whereas the export share in merchandise exports 
did. This suggests that Taiwan's structural adjustment into more technology-
intensive intensive industries progressed only slowly. The second is that the 
electronics industry had a larger share of exports than the chemical industry from 
the mid-1980s, even though its share in production was relatively small. This 
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suggests that Taiwan's competitiveness in electronics was stronger than in 
chemicals. It also suggests that the chemical industry in Taiwan was supported by 
the domestic rather than the world market. 
Table 5.8 Industry share of industries in total manufacturing in Taiwan, 
1973-96 (per cent) 
1973 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Food, beverages and tobacco 12.89 16.83 12.33 12.65 10.24 9.36 
Textiles and clothing 18.97 16.06 16.40 16.81 12.14 11.25 
Wood 5.52 3.76 2.92 2.67 2.20 1.84 
Paper and printing 4.32 4.22 4.61 3.91 4.00 3.61 
Chemical products 21.84 21.83 21.07 22.33 20.95 23.10 
Non-metallic minerals 2.90 4.64 4.58 3.76 4.42 4.73 
Basic metals 5.87 3.95 6.49 5.89 6.86 6.73 
Fabricated metals and machinery 24.04 23.76 25.99 26.40 35.41 36.51 
Fabricated metals 2.66 2.32 3.90 4.41 6.41 7.02 
Non-electrical machinery 2.73 3.43 2.89 3.04 4.46 4.92 
Electrical/ electronic products 13.31 10.63 12.02 12.23 15.93 15.81 
Transport equipment 4.58 6.39 5.90 5.46 7.50 7.69 
Scientific/measuring equipment 0.75 1.00 1.28 1.25 1.12 1.07 
Other manufacturing 3.65 4.94 5.62 5.56 3.78 2.87 
Source: International Economic Data Bank, ANU, Asia Pacific Profiles 1997, ANU. 
The manufacturing sector has been a strong contributor to economic growth in 
Taiwan, as it has been in Singapore and Korea. This characteristic differs from 
the experience of Hong Kong, which features a strong services sector. The share 
of the manufacturing sector in GDP reached a peak of 39 per cent in 1987, then 
steadily declined. It dropped to 28 per cent in 1996 (see Table 5.1). Like other 
NIBs, Taiwan experienced rapid changes in its technological niches in the wake 
of changes in its industrial structure. In the early phase of growth, labour-
intensive light industries were Taiwan's technological niches. However, in the 
next stage of growth, Taiwan upgraded and diversified its technological niches. 
Taiwan increased its technology intensity in labour-intensive industries like 
electronics, and moved into new industries such as electronics (electrical and 
electronic equipment). Taiwan secured different technological niches over time, 
adjusting to changes in the world economy. Viewed from an organisational 
perspective, Taiwan's economic growth was relatively stable because it 
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succeeded in specialising in the production of higher technology components and 
parts under the international subcontract and network system. 
Korea 
Like the other East Asian NIEs, labour-intensive sectors were Korea's 
technological niches in the early phase of growth. In the 1960s they were textiles 
and clothing, footwear, electrical and electronic products. In particular, textiles 
and clothing occupied the major role in production and export products until 
fabricated metals and machinery (transport equipment, electrical and electronic 
equipment and scientific and measuring equipment) became the leading industry 
in the early 1980s. 
Structural adjustment towards more capital- and skill-intensive industries 
occurred in the 1970s. The Korean government announced a plan to promote 
heavy industry and petrochemicals in 1973. The targeted industries were steel, 
petrochemicals, non-ferrous metals, machinery, shipbuilding and electronics.36 
Under this program, Korea undertook substantial structural adjustment towards 
the targeted industries; heavy industry and petrochemicals (which includes 
consumer electronics) accounted for a rising share of both manufacturing output 
and merchandise exports during the 1970s. 
Like Taiwan, textiles and clothing industry was the leading export industry. The 
share of this industry in merchandise exports was about 50 per cent in the early 
1970s, but decreased markedly thereafter. The export share of this industry was 
33.2 per cent in 1980, 24.8 per cent in 1990 and 15.5 per cent in 1996. 
Corresponding to declines in this industry, fabricated metals and machinery, in 
particular transport equipment and electronics, increased their shares rapidly. For 
example, the export share of transport equipment, the largest export industry in 
36 The promotion of these heavy industries was in part motivated by an export pessimism 
which questioned the sustainability of an export drive based on labour-intensive manufactures, 
given rapidly increasing wage rates in the early 1970s and the growing protectionism of OECD 
countries against labour-intensive developing country exports such as textiles and clothing 
(O'Connor 1995: 66). 
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1992-96, was 6.4 per cent in 1970, 12.3 per cent in 1980, 22.3 per cent in 1990 
and 30.1 per cent in 1995. Similarly, electrical and electronic products and 
scientific and measuring instruments showed a rapid increase in export shares; in 
the case of electrical and electronic products, the shares were 0.8 per cent in 1970, 
1.84 per cent in 1980, 7.75 per cent in 1990 and 10.3 per cent in 1996; For 
scientific and measuring instruments, the shares were 1.2 per cent in 1970, 5.6 per 
cent in 1980, 9.7 per cent in 1990 and 14.8 per cent in 1996. If electronics is 
defined to include both industries, the export share of electronics was 2.0 per cent 
in 1970, 17.4 per cent in 1990 and 25.0 per cent in 1996. Later, it increases to 
become the second largest exporting industry, after transport equipment (motor 
vehicles and ship building). The chemical industry grew rapidly in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, reaching a peak of 20.1 per cent of export share in 1985. Thereafter, 
its share in merchandise export stayed at 15-18 per cent in 1986-96. It was the 
second largest export industry unti11985. Basic metals (iron and steel) is another 
interesting case. It was the third largest export industry in 1980-82, but its export 
share decreased thereafter, reaching 5.8 per cent in 1996 (Table 5.9). 
Table 5.9 Industry share of industries in merchandise exports in Korea, 
1970-96 (per cent) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 
Food, beverages and tobacco 1.98 5.45 2.83 1.00 1.02 0.98 1.15 
Textiles and clothing 48.28 43.15 33.23 25.62 24.80 16.11 15.52 
Wood 13.55 5.53 3.16 0.49 0.59 0.42 0.40 
Paper and printing 0.19 1.38 1.21 0.85 1.11 1.19 1.23 
Chemical products 6.26 12.58 16.46 20.69 17.20 16.07 17.60 
Non-metallic minerals 0.95 2.33 2.60 1.18 1.09 0.65 0.66 
Basic metals 3.05 6.21 11.83 7.43 7.20 6.05 5.80 
Fabricated metals and machinery 9.94 18.69 25.40 39.80 43.45 56.61 55.83 
Fabricated metals 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 
Non-electrical machinery 1.15 1.94 3.66 4.69 2.62 3.21 2.34 
Electrical/electronic products 0.79 1.43 1.84 3.95 7.75 9.22 10.27 
Transport equipment 6.38 11.06 12.26 13.24 22.04 30.11 27.09 
Scientific/measuring equipment 1.21 2.72 5.60 16.59 9.68 12.70 14.79 
Other manufacturing 0.30 1.54 2.00 1.28 1.32 1.34 1.31 
Source: International Economic Data Bank, ANU, Asia Pacific Profiles 1997, ANU. 
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Figure 5.6 Export and production shares of major industries in Korea, 
1970-96 
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Source: International Economic Data Bank, ANU, Asia Pacific Profiles 1997, ANU. 
The share of major industries in manufacturing production presents a picture 
similar to the export share. The production share of textiles and clothing 
decreased rapidly and the shares of transport equipment, electrical and electronic 
equipment, and scientific and measuring instruments increased rapidly. For 
example, the production share of electrical and electronic equipment was 4.0 per 
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centin 1970,8.1 percent in 1980, 15.0percentin 1990and 17.2percentin 
1995. In contrast, the production share of textiles and clothing was 21.8 per cent 
in 1973, 19.5 per cent in 1980, 12.0 per cent in 1990 and 10.2 per cent in 1995. 
Despite similarities in the overall trend, there were slight differences in the 
production share and the export share of major industries. In part this is because 
domestic demand played a more important role in Korea than it did in Singapore 
and Hong Kong. It also arises from the fact that differences in classification 
between production and export, in particular the classification of electrical and 
electronic products, and scientific and measuring products. The production share 
of chemical products was similar to that of textiles and clothing until 1981, when 
it overtook the latter, even though the overall trend was in decline. The second 
difference is the high share of electrical and electronic products. This industry 
became the leading industry in production in 1989, surpassing the share of 
textiles and clothing. In 1995, the four industries showing the highest production 
shares are electrical and electronic equipment, chemical products, transport 
equipment, and textiles and clothing. 
The manufacturing sector has been a strong contributor to economic growth in 
Korea, as has been the case in Taiwan and Singapore. Like other NIEs, Korea's 
technological niches changed in response to changes in the industrial structure. In 
the early phase of growth, labour-intensive light industries were Korean 
technological niches. However, during the next stage, Korean structural 
adjustment was more thoroughgoing than Taiwan's and its diversification of 
technological niches was broader than Singapore's, entering new areas such as 
heavy industry, petrochemicals and electronics. 
This analysis has a limited ability to identify structural adjustment within 
industries, even though it is useful in identifying structural adjustment across 
industries. 
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Table 5.10 Industry share of industries in total manufacturing in Korea, 
1970-96 (per cent) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Food, beverages and tobacco 25.75 17.76 16.60 . 13.85 10.71 8.61 
Textiles and clothing 17.12 22.55 19.49 16.50 11.95 10.15 
Wood 3.56 2.68 1.74 1.51 1.84 1.94 
Paper and printing 5.07 4.00 4.44 4.60 4.64 5.12 
Chemical products 22.08 22.28 20.48 18.50 18.25 16.54 
Non-metallic minerals 5.97 5.68 5.76 4.81 4.95 4.68 
Basic metals 4.02 6.49 7.79 7.73 7.37 6.83 
Fabricated metals and machinery 13.54 16.64 21.83 30.56 38.52 44.84 
Fabricated metals 2.35 2.40 3.26 4.02 5.13 5.85 
Non-electrical machinery 1.77 2.24 3.44 4.73 6.99 9.00 
Electrical/electronic products 3.98 7.20 8.13 11.78 15.03 17.15 
Transport equipment 5.06 4.04 5.90 9.08 10.22 11.93 
Scientific/measuring equipment 0.38 0.76 1.10 0.94 1.14 0.91 
Other manufacturing 2.88 1.92 1.88 1.94 1.77 1.29 
Source: International Economic Data Bank, ANU, Asia Pacific Profiles 1997, ANU. 
Future directions 
Hong Kong has arrived at a mature stage of growth; the industrial structure has 
stabilised as a service-oriented economy, featuring the tourism, trade, and 
banking and finance sectors. Hong Kong's future growth will thus be determined 
by growth in these industries. Because technological change in the services sector 
is limited except in some knowledge-intensive industries, Hong Kong's future 
growth will be dependent on world economic conditions, particularly Chinese 
economic growth. 
Although Singapore and Hong Kong have reached a mature stage of growth, 
Singapore's manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services are stronger than 
those of Hong Kong. Moreover, its economic activities are a small subset of the 
globalised tasks of multinational corporations. Singapore can thus continuously 
upgrade its economic activities, or secure a more technology-intensive role, as 
long as the international production of multinational corporations expands. 
Singapore's services sector may also experience growth as rapid as Hong Kong's 
if world economic conditions are stable and demand increases. 
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Taiwan has a stronger manufacturing base than Hong Kong and Singapore. Past 
history has shown that Taiwan can achieve rapid technological change and 
growth by upgrading its specialisation in the production of components and parts 
under the international subcontract and network system. This production 
interdependence implies that Taiwan's products have a complementary 
relationship with the final products of developed countries; technological catch-
up in the production of parts and components has had a positive effect on the 
production of developed countries rather than hurting the leader country. In this 
sense, the growth path of Taiwan is more stable than that of Korea. Taiwan 
already has a comparative advantage in the production of high-tech parts and 
components of labour- and technology-intensive goods, such as electronics. 
Taiwan can expect higher growth rates than developed countries, even though 
growth rates will be lower than those of the last few decades, unless world 
economic conditions deteriorate. 
Like Taiwan, Korea has a strong manufacturing base. Korea has the potential to 
undertake rapid technological change and growth as local entrepreneurs diversify 
their production (by entering new or high-tech industries) and products (by 
producing higher quality products in the same industry) by organising 
international capital and intermediate goods transactions. When Korea exported 
technologically standardised goods, parts, and components, the relationship 
between Korea and the leader country was complementary rather than 
substitutive. However, Korean local enterprises have recently begun to compete 
with innovative leader firms in various industries and products, such as 
automobiles, electronics, and even in high technology industries. For this reason, 
the growth path of Korea will be less stable than that of Taiwan as the 
relationship with leader firms changes into a substitutive one. It also means that 
the Korean path could become more dynamic than that of Taiwan as strong 
competition in the world market transforms large Korean conglomerates into 
multinational corporations. The Korean economy is now at the crossroads: it can 
achieve sustained higher growth if Korean firms successfully complete their 
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technological catch-up; otherwise, growth rates will be lowered unless world 
economic conditions improve and demand increases. 
Structural adjustment and productivity growth 
The previous section described structural adjustments in NIBs and their effects on 
changes in technological niches over the last three decades. It was argued that 
industrialising economies in the process of catching up have substantial potential 
to lift productivity and technology swiftly by structural adjustments in 
manufacturing industries. This element of productivity improvement is important 
in understanding the rapid growth in NIBs, along with the transformation of the 
economic structure associated with the movement of labour and other resources 
from the agricultural to the non-agricultural sector in the course of 
industrialisation. 
The objective of this section is to verify empirically the structural adjustment 
hypothesis within the manufacturing sector. Recognition of structural adjustment 
as an important source of growth in East Asian economies verifies the argument 
that it is the driving force behind the interactions between technological change 
and capital growth. For this purpose, Jorgenson's resource reallocation effect is 
reviewed, and the negative resource reallocation effect is calculated as an 
indicator of the structural adjustment effect. Next, Pilat's structural effect, an 
extension of the standard structural change argument in the manufacturing sector, 
is reviewed and calculated to verify the argument. Then, applying the model of 
Bernard and Jones (1996a), the share effect (a proxy for the structural adjustment 
effect) in connection with the productivity growth effect is calculated and the 
results are interpreted. 
Jorgenson's resource reallocation effect 
Jorgenson et al. (1987) open the way to derive a method for calculating the effect 
of structural adjustment across industries by disaggregating whole economies into 
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many industries. Moreover, Jorgenson and his colleagues express the resource 
reallocation effect as a component of aggregate productivity growth. They suggest 
that structural adjustment can be expressed as a component of aggregate 
productivity growth. 
They compute the resource reallocation effect for the purpose of advocating a 
disaggregation procedure and illuminating the problems of the aggregate 
production function approach. Under their framework, resource reallocation is a 
measure of aggregation error. Equation (3-5), which expresses the relationship 
between productivity growth of aggregate manufacturing (¥r), the weighted sum 
of sectoral productivity growth (.Thti .. "lT) and resource reallocation (RR), is 
reformatted as equation (5-1). Equation (5-2), (5-3), and (5-4) are the resource 
reallocations of output (RRr), capital input (RRK) and labour input (RRL), 
respectively. 
where RR = RRr + RRK + RRL 
(5-2) RRr= [In V(1) -In V(T-1)]- I:wi [In V;(1) -In V;(T-1)], 
(5-3) RRK = L·-l>,iK [In Ki(1) -In K;(T-1)]- [In K(1) -In K(T-1)], 
(5-4) RRL = }:_.c~lL [In L;(1) -In L;(T-1)]- [In L(1) -In L(T-1)], (i = 1, 2,-··, 36) 
where wi and :yi T represent share of output and productivity growth of industry i, 
respectively. V(1), K(1), and L(1) represent aggregate indexes of output, capital 
and labour input at timet, respectively. V;(1), Ki(1), and Vi(1) represent industry 
indexes of output, capital and labour input at timet, respectively. 
However, if the sums of the resource reallocation in output and inputs (simply 
resource reallocation) are significantly different from zero, then the aggregate 
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production function is not credible, and the weighted sum of sectoral productivity 
growth is preferred to productivity growth of aggregate manufacturing as an 
alternative measure of aggregated approach. Rearranging equation (5-1) on the 
basis of the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth instead of ¥f, we obtain 
(i = 1, 2;··, 36), 
where STR = -RR. 
Equation (5-5) shows that we can obtain productivity growth (the weighted sum 
of sectoral productivity growth) by adjusting the productivity growth of aggregate 
manufacturing (¥r) for structural effects (STR; resource reallocation with the 
opposite sign, or -RR). 
Even though resource reallocation with the opposite sign is a different concept 
from structural adjustment, it is one indicator of the latter. As long as all 
industries do not have the same sectoral production function, productivity growth 
of aggregate manufacturing is not equal to the weighted sum of sectoral 
productivity growth; resource reallocation37 is not equal to zero. If structural 
adjustment occurs over time, the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth 
may be greater than the productivity growth of aggregate manufacturing, because 
aggregate output and two aggregate inputs cannot capture the sectoral movements 
of disaggregated outputs and inputs towards more efficient sectors. 
In the case of Korea, the structural effect was positive in the periods 1968-73, 
1973-78 and 1978-83, and negative in the periods 1983-88 and 1988-93, as 
expected (Table 5.11). Note that the structural effect was quite large in the first 
three sub-periods; it was 1.30 per cent in period 1968-73, 0.61 per cent in 1973-
37 Resource reallocation (RR) is the difference between productivity growth of aggregate 
manufacturing and the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth, by definition. 
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78 and 1.34 per cent in 1978-83. Thereafter, the structural effect became smaller 
(converging to zero), and became negative: -0.23 per cent in the period 1983-88 
and -0.14 per cent in 1988-93. The last column of Table 5.11 shows that the 
contribution of the structural adjustment effect to the weighted sum of sectoral 
productivity growth was quite significant. It was 11.1 per cent in 1968-73, 8.5 
per cent in 1973-78 and 35.0 per cent in 1978-83. 
The large structural effect in the 1968-83 period implies that diversification-style 
structural adjustment (entering the heavy and petrochemical industries) was an 
important component of the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth, but the 
potential of this diversification effort was exhausted by the early 1980s. 
Subsequently, the production shift to high-quality products within industries 
replaced the role of diversification-style structural adjustment, as argued earlier. 
However, the 36-industry growth accounting scheme cannot identify this effect, 
so the structural adjustment effect, that is diversification across industries, in the 
table becomes to negative. 
68-73 
73-78 
78-83 
83-88 
88-93 
68-93 
Note: 
Source: 
Table 5.11 Structural effect in Jorgenson's framework 
(per cent) 
WSSP Aggregated Structural Resource CIA 
(A) TFP (B) effect (C) reallocation 
11.66 10.35 1.30 -1.30 11.1 
7.16 6.55 0.61 -0.61 8.5 
3.83 2.50 1.34 -1.34 35.0 
5.35 5.58 -0.23 0.23 -4.3 
4.69 4.83 -0.14 0.14 -3.0 
6.45 5.96 0.49 -0.49 7.6 
Resource reallocation of output, labour and capital input was calculated from 
a 36-industry model. 
Table 3.2 in Chapter 3. 
Even though the resource reallocation effect of Jorgenson and his colleagues 
provides some information on the effect of structural adjustment, it has 
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limitations. By definition, resource reallocation represents the difference between 
the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth and productivity growth of 
aggregate manufacturing. In this regard, the standard calculation of structural 
change, which focuses on the effect of the movement of labour from agricultural 
to non-agricultural sectors, is of interest. 
Pilat's structural effect 
Pilat (1994) accounts for sources of growth in Japan and Korea by disaggregation, 
even though the manufacturing sector is not disaggregated to the industry level. 
He calculates the structural effect as the sum of changes in the labour shares of all 
industries weighted by the output share of industry. He then defines aggregate 
labour productivity growth (the total sectoral effect: VLT) as the sum of the 
structural effect and the weighted sum of sectoral labour productivity growths: 
(5-6) 
where vr represents aggregate productivity growth (total sectoral effect), viLT is 
sectoral productivity growth of industry i, wi is output share of industry i, and 
g(sLi) is growth rate in labour share of industry i. 
Table 5.12 Pilat's structural effect 
(per cent) 
68-73 73-78 78-83 83-88 88-93 68-93 
Sectoral labour productivity 12.33 11.33 9.33 9.67 10.50 10.54 
growth (A) 
Structural effect (B) -0.67 -1.17 0.67 0.33 1.50 0.19 
Total sectoral effect (C=A+B) 13.00 12.33 8.83 9.50 9.33 10.46 
B/C -5.41 -10.29 7.14 3.45 14.29 1.82 
Source: Author's calculation. 
38 See Pilat (1994: 129) and Syrquin (1986). 
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According to the table, the structural effect is negative in 1968-73 and 1973-78, 
and positive in other periods: 0.67 per cent in 1978-83, 0.33 per cent in 1983-88 
and 1.50 per cent in 1988-93. Over the whole period, the structural effect 
increases output by 0.19 per cent. The contribution of the effect to the total 
sectoral effects are -5.41 per cent in 1968-73,-10.29 per cent in 1973-78,7.14 
per cent in 1978-83, 3.45 per cent in 1983-88 and 14.29 per cent in 1988-93. 
Over the whole period, the contribution to total sectoral effect is 1.82 per cent. 
These results are quite different from those derived from Jorgenson's framework 
because the focus is on labour productivity growth rather than TFP growth. 
However, Table 5.12 verifies that structural adjustment played a positive role in 
lifting aggregate labour productivity. 
Bernard and Jones's share effect and productivity growth effect 
Bernard and Jones (1996a) make an important contribution to the identification of 
the structural adjustment effect (share effect in their framework) along with the 
productivity growth effect. The rationale for separating these two effects from 
productivity growth is as follows: if individual industries which have different 
production functions arrive at different levels of technology, changes in aggregate 
productivity growth can be separated into two components, such as the 
component caused by structural adjustment across industries and that caused by 
trends in industrial productivity growth within industries. 
They construct an international comparison of productivity growth and 
technology catch-up, and decompose change in the aggregate TFP (catching up or 
falling behind) of a country into a share effect and a productivity growth effect. 
They use relative TFP (a country's TFP level, evaluated by international units, 
divided by that of the leader country) in their study, so positive TFP growth 
directly means TFP catch-up. Here the productivity level of Korean 
manufacturing is indexed by a national unit, so productivity growth does not 
imply TFP catch-up. Instead, it shows the trend in the weighted sum of sectoral 
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productivity growth over time. In this respect, the productivity growth effect in 
this study is different from that in Bernard and Jones?9 
Direct application of Bernard and Jones (1996a) to Korean manufacturing leads 
to the aggregation bias problem again, because they employ aggregate TFP rather 
than the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth as an indicator of the 
productivity level of a country. Thus, the weighted sum of sectoral productivity 
growth is employed in calculating the share effect and the productivity change 
effect. 
Applying their idea of 'separation procedure', the difference between the 
weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth at time T and the weighted sum of 
sectoral productivity growth at time (T-1) is decomposed into the between- and 
within-industry components. The first component, called the share effect, 
represents change in the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth caused by 
changes in input shares of industries combined with actual industrial productivity 
growth. Inter-industry production shift to higher productivity growth industries 
will lead to a positive share effect. The second component, called the productivity 
change effect, represents change in the weighted sum of sectoral productivity 
growth caused by changes in industrial productivity growth combined with the 
actual industry share. A declining trend in industrial productivity growth will lead 
to a negative productivity change effect, and vice versa. Using equation (5-7), 
change in the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth at timeT is 
decomposed into the two components, which are independent of each other by 
definition. 
39 While this approach has a long tradition, productivity growth effect has not yet been fully 
discussed in a single country setting. Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978), Jorgenson et al. (1987), 
Jorgenson and Kuroda (1988), Pilat (1994) and Bernard and Jones (1996a) use this 
terminology in growth accounting studies on international comparisons of productivity growth. 
In particular, Pilat terms this 'catching-up' and Bernard and Jones (1996a) 'productivity 
growth effect across countries', a component of catch-up. 
Dowrick and Gemmel (1991) also decompose differences in the average growth rates across 
countries into differences in productivity growth, labour reallocation, and labour and capital 
growth under the agriculture-industry two-sector model. This study suggests that labour 
reallocation across sectors within a country (structural change) and productivity growth 
(technology catch-up between countries) in industry lead to higher average growth rates in 
upper middle income countries. 
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(5-7) J:J,ti(T)·-'tiJ{T)- :~:*l(T-1)·-lir(T-1) 
= 0.5·[ {~Mi(T)-lir(T)- L-l~i(T-1)-lir(T)} + {L-wi(T),ir(T-1)- L-wi(T-1)-lir(T-1)}] 
+ 0.5·[ {L-wi(T)-lir(T)- L-wi(T)-lir(T-1)} + {L-wi(T-1)-lir(T)- L-wi(T-1)-i>lr(T-1)} ]. 
The first term on the right-hand side represents the share effect, and the second 
term represents the productivity change effect. The former is the average of the 
two measures of share effect, which are evaluated at timeT and (T-1). The latter 
is the average of the two measures of productivity growth effect, which are 
evaluated at time T and (T-1). 40 
Equation (5-7) is calculated using the growth accounting data from Chapter 3, 
and summarises the results in Table 5.13. Share effects are positive over all 
periods except 1978-83. According to the table, share effects are 0.34 per cent in 
1968-73,0.26 per cent in 1973-78,-0.04 per cent in 1978-83,0.19 per cent in 
1983-88 and 0.25 per cent in 1988-93. This means that the production shifts 
across industries lead to the increase in the weighted sum of sectoral productivity 
growth. The share effect is 0.16 per cent over the whole period, or 2.54 per cent 
of the growth in the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth. This result 
empirically verifies the hypothesis that structural adjustment leads to an increase 
in productivity growth and to technological change over time. 
Productivity change effects are negative over all periods except 1983-88, which 
implies that the productivity change of each industry declines over time as a 
follower country's economic growth moves to a higher level. This effect is -0.49 
per cent over the whole period. Negative within-industry effects dominate 
positive across-industry share effects over all the periods, which decreases the 
growth rate in the weighted sum of sectoral productivity growth by about 5.2 per 
40 These measures of share effect and productivity growth effect only consider those evaluated 
at timeT. However, I consider also those evaluated at time T-1 to derive the identity 
relationship between the two effects and the change in productivity growth. 
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cent over the whole period; the decline in industrial productivity growth 
overwhelms the share effect. 
Table 5.13 Share effect and productivity change effect 
(per cent) 
69-73 73-78 78-83 83-88 88-93 
A ('Zwi(T)-~,irt_T)) 12.01 7.16 3.83 5.35 4.69 
B ('Zwi(T-1)-¥ir(T-1)) 12.17 8.62 4.14 4.70 5.72 
Share effect (C) 0.34 0.26 -0.04 0.19 0.25 
TFP change effect (D) -0.50 -1.72 -0.28 0.47 -1.18 
A-B =C+D (E) -0.16 -1.46 -0.31 0.66 -1.03 
CIA 2.8 3.6 -1.0 3.6 5.3 
Source: Author's calculation. 
69-93 
6.31 
6.64 
0.16 
-0.49 
-0.33 
2.5 
The limitation of this result is the characteristic of equation (5-6). It is an identity 
constructed by a mathematical procedure rather than based on economic theory, 
so separation of the change in productivity growth into the two components 
makes it difficult to interpret the share effect and productivity change effect. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter suggests a number of conclusions and implications. 
Section 2 defines structural adjustment across industries after reviewing standard 
structural change across the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. In the case 
of follower countries, structural adjustments are processes which can lead to rapid 
technological change and economic growth through accumulating new capital 
embodying technological components. 
Section 3 describes the experience of structural adjustment in East Asian NIEs. 
Focusing on the manufacturing sector, the leading industries in these countries 
have moved from labour-intensive industries using production technologies 
which are in a declining stage of the product cycle, to skill- and capital-intensive 
industries using standardised production technologies in a mature stage. 
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Subsequently, the production activities of these countries have been moving to 
capital and technology-intensive industries. They will move again to technology-
intensive industries using frontier technologies. Structural change also shapes the 
direction of economic growth in NIBs. Production and employment in the 
services sector have been larger, whereas those of the manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors have been smaller. This is because the demand structure of an 
economy changes according to increases in per capita income. This section also 
showed that the East Asian NIBs have different growth paths. Hong Kong's path 
is characterised by high dependence on the services sector and comparative 
advantage in labour-intensive industries, whereas Singapore's path is 
characterised by rapid structural adjustment towards high technology industries 
with a link to international production of multinational corporations. Taiwan and 
Korea's paths are similar to Singapore's but the efforts oflocal entrepreneurs are 
much more important in Taiwan and Korea. 
Section 4 empirically identifies the role of structural adjustment in productivity 
growth. First, the structural effect in Jorgenson's framework was defined as a 
resource reallocation effect with a negative sign. This effect explained about 7 per 
cent of aggregate productivity growth (the weighted sum of sectoral productivity 
growth) over the whole period. In particular, it was verified that this effect was 
very large in 1968-83. Second, Pilat's structural effect was calculated. It also 
confirmed that structural adjustment played a positive role in lifting aggregate 
labour productivity over the whole period. Then, the share effect, a proxy for the 
effect of structural adjustment on productivity growth, was calculated using the 
framework of Bernard and Jones. The share effect was positive over the whole 
period except 1978-83; its average growth rate was 0.16 per cent per year. These 
results empirically verified that structural adjustment (in particular entering new 
industries) has played a positive role in lifting aggregate productivity growth by 
offsetting the larger declining trend in aggregate productivity growth caused by 
the large decline in the sectoral productivity growth of each industry. 
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However, the measured effects were not as strong as expected. This results from 
the divergence of productivity growth and technological change in the mechanical 
growth accounting scheme. As expressed in equation (4-4), an increase in capital 
stock can be separated into two components: capital accumulation without a 
technological component, such as in former Soviet Russia, and capital 
accumulation with a technological component, such as in new industries or high-
quality process in NIEs. Productivity data used in this chapter did not include the 
latter component. Thus, the effects of structural adjustment on productivity 
growth and technological change are not strong because some capital-related 
effects were mechanically attributed to capital by definition. However, 
considering the interaction between technological change and capital 
accumulation in relation to structural adjustment, the effect on technological 
change is strong. 
The puzzle of low productivity gains in NIEs was successfully explained by the 
sequencing of the sources of growth and interaction between technological 
change and capital accumulation in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 provided more concrete 
information for the explanation from another perspective. Structural adjustments 
are the crux of the link between capital accumulation and technological change 
and present a new paradigm of low productivity growth and rapid technological 
change. Two main characteristics, which distinguish the experience of East Asian 
NIEs from that of developed countries, can be derived from the chapter. First, 
technological change for a follower country is induced by structural adjustment 
across industries. Second, productivity growth in new industries or products, 
where structural adjustments and technological changes occur, is relatively low 
compared with existing industries because of the mechanical property of growth 
accounting in treating interaction between capital accumulation and technological 
change. Thus, it cannot be argued that low productivity growth necessarily entails 
low technological change for a follower country. Large capital accumulation in a 
new industry undergoing structural change inevitably decreases productivity 
growth even though this process results in positive technological change. 
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Moreover, East Asian economic growth in its earlier stage can be endogenised, as 
argued by new growth theory, as long as structural adjustment toward high 
technology industry is pursued and influenced by public policy. 
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6 Technological Change in the East Asian 
NIEs 
Introduction 
Chapters 3 and 4 examined the argument about sequencing of the sources of 
output growth and interaction between capital accumulation and technological 
change. In Chapter 5 structural adjustment was characterised as the driving force 
linking this interaction. Together, these arguments suggest a sequencing of the 
sources of technological change. 
Korea's high productivity growth in 1968-73 resulted from the introduction of 
the modern factory system in labour-intensive industries with low-level 
production technologies. This was followed in 1973-83 by low productivity 
growth as a result of structural adjustment which focused on heavy industry and 
the chemical industry requiring imports of capital and turn-key plants embodying 
standardised production technology. Sequentially, economic growth in 1973-83 
was said to be fuelled by technological change because some parts of capital 
accumulation embodied a technological component, even though the mechanical 
growth accounting scheme does not allocate this role to technology (see Equation 
4-4). Slowed productivity growth in 1983-93, characterised by production in 
capital- and technology-intensive industries, seems to have arisen from 
undetected structural adjustment (production shifts to high-quality products 
within industries), and the major source of technological change seems to be 
technology licensing and R&D investment. Thus, the earlier verification of the 
sequencing of sources of output growth, the interaction between capital 
accumulation and technological change, and sequential structural adjustments in 
Chapters 3-5 suggests that informal methods, capital-related methods, technology 
licensing and R&D investment were the major sources of technological change 
over these stages of development. 
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Another implication of the analysis in previous chapters is that technology can be 
defined in broad terms in follower countries. Follower countries' technological 
paths are characterised by sequential structural adjustments and the related import 
of new capital goods which embody technological components.41 Thus, 
allocation of the role of these technological components to technology rather than 
capital, unlike the framework adopted in the growth accounting scheme, 
inevitably increases the role of technology and defines technology in broad terms. 
After producing sequencing patterns in technological change and defining 
technology from the follower countries' point of view, this chapter investigates 
technological development and transfer in the case of Korea to clarify the 
characteristics of the technological paths followed in East Asian NIEs, with a 
special focus on the role of R&D investment and technology imports. 
The last question considered in this chapter is: What was the main factor that 
caused NIEs to take a different technological path from that of developed 
countries? I identify the reason as being linked to the world economic 
environment after WWII in which the four East Asian NIEs embarked on 
successful industrialisation and the ways in which they reacted to the particular 
conditions confronting each of them to establish their own technological niches 
(Appendix 2). 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the sequencing of the 
sources of technological change. Section 3 introduces a new definition of 
technology in broad terms from the perspective of the follower country. Section 4 
overviews technological change and changing patterns of technology transfer in 
Korea as a case study. Section 5 presents a summary. Appendix 2 examines the 
reason why the technological paths taken in NIEs were quite different from the 
leader countries. 
41 New industries here are not new at all when viewed from the perspective of leader countries. 
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Sequencing of the sources of technological change 
The argument about sequencing of the sources of output growth and interaction 
between capital accumulation and technological change is another expression of 
the mechanical properties of growth accounting in that it attributes technological 
components of capital accumulation solely to the contribution of capital to output 
growth. These two hypotheses, combined with a broad definition of technology 
from the follower countries' perspective, lead to the conclusion that there is a 
variety of methods of technological change, and that the methods of enhancing 
the level of technology change according to the stage of development (sequencing 
of the sources of technological change). 
The aim of this section is to investigate what is the sequential source of 
technological change for follower countries. This section attempts to answer the 
question, with a special focus on Korea. 
Many case studies have found that there are various methods of acquiring 
production technology, especially in developing countries. They include R&D, 
technology imports (technology licensing), foreign direct investment (FDI), 
information embodied in capital goods, information embodied in human capital 
(for example, newly recruited scientists and engineers), reverse engineering, 
information from buyers of export goods and suppliers of components and capital 
goods, informative literature from foreign sources and inspection of foreign 
production facilities (Kim 1995; 1990; Smith and Jordan 1990; Pack 1994; 
Amsden 1989; Enos and Park 1988; Dahlman et al. 1987; Westphal et al. 1985; 
1981). I classify these various technology acquisition methods into five groups: 
informal methods (information from buyers and suppliers, information from 
foreign journals), capital-related methods (information embodied in physical and 
human capital, reverse engineering), technology imports (formal licensing of 
technology from foreign patent holders), FDI and R&D. Follower countries 
generally acquire production technology from leader countries, instead of through 
domestic technological innovation efforts. 
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Case studies emphasise informal methods (including reverse engineering) as a 
source of technological change for developing countries. Informal methods are 
also a major means of enhancing the technological capability of developing 
countries. This emphasis may be driven by the fact that most developing countries 
are in the early phase of development. In the case of Korea, informal methods 
were the major source of technological change in the early stages of economic 
growth in 1960s and 1970s. In this respect, it is noteworthy that Dollar and 
Sokoloff s finding is that scale economies closely related to the transition from 
craft to modem labour-intensive production are the main source of technological 
change in Korea. This kind of technology transfer was prevalent in Korea and 
Taiwan, when they entered labour-intensive, capital-intensive and skill-intensive 
industries which employed low-level and standardised production technologies. 
Developed countries do not seek to block developing countries from entering 
these labour-intensive activities. The buyers of export goods and suppliers of 
capital goods and components willingly transfer old production techniques to 
developing countries, and local entrepreneurs find it easy to obtain information 
from foreign publications and foreign consultants. Kim (1995: 275-76) 
summarises this process as follows: 
Both buyers and suppliers played an important role in enabling Korean firms to 
acquire absorptive capability. Informal technical assistance offered by foreign OEM 
(original equipment manufacture) buyers to ensure that Korean-made products met 
their technical specifications provided invaluable help to Korean firms in acquiring 
necessary relevant knowledge. Local buyers of capital goods provided useful 
information for custom-designed machinery. Technology and capital goods suppliers 
provided relevant knowledge to ensure successful implementation of their supplies. 
The experience of Korea and Taiwan shows that information and knowledge 
about technologies in the declining and mature cycles lead to technological 
change in the early stage of development, whereas this is not the case in leader 
countries. 
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The other informal method of acquiring technology is reverse engineering, which 
played a significant role in the second stage of growth, the period which saw the 
industrialisation of the heavy and petrochemical industries, and interaction with 
(physical and human) capital imports. However, reverse engineering is classified 
as a capital-related method of acquiring technology because it works in the same 
way as capital imports. 
Capital-related technology transfers are carried out through FDI, new capital 
goods, reverse engineering and returning nationals (newly recruited scientists and 
engineers who have had extensive training and experience in the leader country). 
According to Kim (1990;1995: 274-75), Korea acquired foreign technology 
predominantly through capital goods imports. He points out that: 
such a policy led to massive imports of foreign capital, which became a major source 
of relevant knowledge and learning through reverse engineering by Korean firms 
(Kim, L. and Kim, 1985). Of the four categories of technology transfer [FDI, 
technology licensing, technical consultancy and capital goods imports] ... , capital 
goods imports were worth 23 times the value of DFI [FDI] and 35 times the value of 
TL [technology licensing]. The total value of capital goods imports is 14 times that of 
the other categories combined, suggesting that Korea may have acquired more 
technology from advanced countries through the importation of capital goods than 
through any other means. Among NICs, the proportion of capital goods imports to 
total technology transfer was the highest in Korea (Westphal, Kim and Dahlman, 
1985) ... Such a policy ... has been relatively effective in acquiring technological 
capability in the mature industries, since Korea's well-trained human resources and 
their entrepreneurship enabled the country to learn quickly from foreign capital 
goods. 
Pack and Page (1994: 221) argue that returning nationals (information embodied 
in human capital) also played an significant role by providing important 
knowledge and information when Korea and Taiwan shifted their manufacturing 
from labour-intensive sectors to more capital- and technology-intensive sectors, 
through the introduction of new industries in both countries. 
143 
Under the heavy and petrochemical industrialisation program, large Korean 
conglomerates entered these industries, investing in large-scale capacity 
(installing turnkey plants), and trying to maximise capacity utilisation so that they 
could become competitive in the world market.42 Korean firms used standardised 
production technologies embodied in capital goods. As was the case in labour-
intensive industries, developed countries willingly transferred standardised 
production techniques, including the capital goods required to establish new 
plants. 
According to Kim (1995; 1990) and Pack and Page (1994: 218-21), capital 
imports (physical and human) and related reverse engineering were the major 
sources of technological change, rather than informal methods of technology 
transfer, during the second stage of economic growth in Korea (1973-1983), 
particularly during the period of heavy and petrochemical industrialisation. 
There is no evidence that R&D played a significant role in productivity growth or 
technological change in the first and second stages of growth in Korea. However, 
technology imports, technical consultancy and R&D efforts increased in the 
period of high growth in the 1980s, while the growth of capital goods imports 
slowed. In particular, Hong (1994a: 10-11) concludes that technology imports 
became the major method of technology transfer in 1980s. This reflects the fact 
that Korean manufacturing could not secure technology niches using informal or 
capital-related methods after the mid-1980s, and that technology imports became 
critical methods of technological change for further growth; structural 
adjustments over industries could no longer enhance the level of technology, and 
structural adjustments within industries (the production shift to high-quality 
products) were required to sustain economic growth. The Japanese experience in 
the 1950s and 1960s is instructive here. Japan significantly improved its 
technology by licensing foreign technologies and leapfrogged to a high level of 
technology during this period. In the 1980s Korea faced a similar situation to 
42 Scale economies were an important source of productivity growth in that period. 
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Japan in the 1950s and 1960s in terms of its stage of technology catch-up. 
Technology imports played the major role in the 1980s in Korea, showing the 
same evolutionary pattern of technology development as Japan. 
Technology imports were an easier and cheaper method of enhancing technology 
than domestic R&D efforts, because licensing costs were lower than R&D 
expenses and licensing was seen as safer than R&D. However, there were also 
some blocking strategies on the part of leader economies to prevent follower 
countries from obtaining state-of-the-art technology. Pack and Page (1994: 219-
20) give some examples: 
There is some statistical evidence and a growing subjective sense that arms length 
licensing is decreasing as an option for closing technology gaps. Potential licensors 
in the OECD countries have become wary of helping possible competitors, even if 
contracts preclude exports to third countries for the duration of the licences. 
Particularly in R&D intensive sectors such as chemicals, machinery, and electronics, 
firms are increasingly unwilling to license technology as they perceive royalties 
providing an inadequate return for an action which may impair their own long-term 
competitiveness. In effect, there is an imperfect or nonexistent market for critical 
technology transfers. Empirical studies find evidence that sales of licenses to LDCs 
contain a significant element of rent. 
However, these blocking strategies do not appear to have been effective. Korea, 
having accumulated technological capability and spending large amounts on 
R&D expenditure after the 1980s, successfully dealt with the blocking strategies 
of leader countries. Added to this, Korea's industrial structure, characterised by 
large conglomerates, had the strength to proceed successfully with technology 
imports. According to Lee (1996: 199), 
Technology imports [as well as R&D] take considerable technical, administrative and 
negotiation costs. Under capital market imperfection, which is often prevalent in 
LDCs [less developed countries], only firms with relatively strong internal financing 
ability will be able to afford technology imports. Technology imports also involve 
more risk, so that it may be undertaken by only firms more willing to take risk. 
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According to Japan's experience, R&D investments become more important in 
the final stage of technology catch-up following the third stage of growth in 
which technology imports play a major role. These two interact with each other 
and complete the technology catch-up. In the case of Taiwan, there was a 
relatively low level of local R&D until the 1980s, and the contribution of 
domestic technology in explaining TFP growth would appear to be limited. This 
means that Taiwan's economy has yet to arrive at the final stage of technology 
catch-up. However, Korea's situation is a little different. R&D investments and 
technology imports were boosted from the mid-1980s. The ratio of R&D to GNP 
has arrived at the level of developed countries (2.09 per cent in 1993, 2.32 per 
cent in 1994,2.71 per cent in 1995 and 2. 81 per cent in 1996), and a high level of 
technology licensing such as strategic alliances has occurred in electronics, 
computers, automobiles and aerospace. 
The relationship between R&D efforts and technology imports is important in 
determining whether the economies are in the third stage or in the final stage of 
catch-up. Lee (1996) investigates this relationship in Korea. Korean 
manufacturing firms importing technology tend to commit themselves to R&D 
efforts through the establishment of formal R&D institutes. However, technology 
imports have no complementary relationship with R&D efforts among the firms 
with R&D institutes. Moreover, when analysed interactively with international 
innovative activity, technology imports will be shown to have a rather substitutive 
relationship with R&D efforts (Lee 1996: 206-7). 
A substitutive effect rather than a complementary relationship between R&D 
efforts and technology imports suggests that Korea has not yet arrived at the final 
stage of technology catch-up, where technology imports and R&D efforts 
maximise each other's contribution to technological change. However, Lee uses 
1984 rather than 1990s data. Thus, his result is not surprising because Korea was 
at the third stage of growth at that time, where technology imports were the major 
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vehicle of technological change and R&D investment was more closely related to 
learning than innovation. 
In sum, it can be argued that there are various sources of technological change; 
informal technology transfer, capital-related technology transfer, technology 
imports and R&D in turn played significant roles in technological development in 
Korea (sequencing of technological change). In the initial phase of growth (1962-
73), characterised by the transition from craft to modern labour-intensive 
industries, informal methods were the major avenues for technology transfer. In 
the second phase of growth (1973-83), characterised by heavy and petrochemical 
industrialisation, capital imports and reverse engineering were the main sources 
of technology transfer. Interactions between capital formation and technological 
change were dominant during this stage. In the third phase of growth (the 1980s), 
characterised by structural adjustment towards high-quality products within 
industries, technology imports became the major means of technology transfer. If 
Korea were in the final stage of growth, its technology imports and related R&D 
investment would interact with each other and show a complementary 
relationship. However, this is not yet clear. Innovation efforts become the sole 
source of technological change after this evolutionary process of technology 
catch-up is complete. The corollary is that innovative technological change is the 
major source of growth only for leader countries, for which other means of 
technological change are limited. 
Technological change from follower countries' perspective 
Productivity is defined as the degree of efficiency exhibited in the process of 
turning inputs into output. More specifically, total factor productivity describes 
the ratio of output to the combination of all inputs used. Meanwhile, technology 
is defined as a physical concept: the technology of production is a complete 
specification of the inputs and operations to be performed on them to create 
output of a given quality (Norsworthy and Jang 1993: 8). According to Tran and 
Urata (1995: 295), 'technology is often defined as systematic knowledge for the 
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manufacturing of a product, for the application of a process, or for the rendering 
of a service, including any integrally associated managerial and marketing 
techniques' . 
Even though technology is closely related to productivity growth, it is not the 
same thing. To avoid conceptual confusion between them, growth accounting 
studies use a productivity index to measure technological change. According to 
this method, technological change is identical to the percentage rate of growth in 
total factor productivity: technological change is the driving force advancing 
productivity growth. Griliches (1973; 1979; 1980; 1986) also argues that 
technology is an output from consciously undertaken R&D investment. Thus, 
R&D activities play a key role in creating new technology and in enhancing 
productivity. 
Growth accounting methods provide a good tool for calculating technological 
change for leader countries, which have no way to enhance productivity growth 
except through innovative R&D investment. However, as illustrated in the 
previous section, follower countries have ways of accomplishing technological 
change other than through R&D investment, such as information from buyers of 
exported goods and suppliers of capital goods, reverse engineering, imported 
capital goods and technology licensing. Accordingly, technology should be 
defined in broader terms as consisting of improved methods of doing things. In 
the words of O'Connor (1995: 57): 
It [technology] may permit a more efficient transformation of inputs into outputs, or 
the production of a wholly new product or range of products. The improvements may 
be in hardware---for example, in capital equipment-but they may also involve 
organizational innovations or improvements in the quality of human capital. 
When technology is defined in broad terms from follower countries' point of 
view, it may be seen to take various forms. It may be embodied in physical 
capital, such as machinery, or in human capital, such as in the skills of engineers 
and managers, or it may be disembodied as in product design. These different 
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forms of technology suggest four channels for technological development in 
follower countries. First, technology can be developed by the R&D investment of 
a follower country. Creation of a new design (disembodied technology) generally 
requires substantial resources, both human and financial. R&D investment is also 
risky since there is no assurance that these investments will materialise in the 
form of new technology. The large investment and high risk associated with R&D 
investment are disadvantageous to follower countries, whose firms are generally 
characterised by their small scale and limited knowledge accumulation. 
Moreover, a follower firm has no incentive to concentrate on R&D efforts in the 
early phase of development since it has cheaper ways to develop technology, 
namely embodied technology transfer and technology import. 
Second, technology can be acquired through importing capital goods such as 
machinery, in which technology is embodied. In this case the recipient acquires 
the technology by learning how to operate and utilise the machinery. Reverse 
engineering may be included in this category. Technology can also be transferred 
by recruiting foreign engineers or nationals who have experience studying and 
working abroad. This amounts to the purchase of technology embodied in 
engineers. Third, technology can be transferred through technology trade such as 
the sale of patented production processes. Technology transfer through 
arrangements such as production cooperation, technological cooperation and 
OEM is classified under this category. This type of technology transfer usually 
entails a long-term business relationship between the two parties, as remuneration 
accruing to the supplier usually depends on the performance of the recipient 
(measured in royalty payments for example). Fourth, technology can be 
transferred through foreign direct investment. FDI involves international 
transmission not only of financial capital, but also of technology, including 
managerial know-how. In the case ofFDI, technology transfer takes the form of 
intra-firm transfer, whereas in other cases it usually takes the form of inter-firm 
transfer (Tran and Urata 1995: 296).43 
43 Tran and Urata (1995) identify the second, third, and fourth means as the three channels of 
technology transfer. R&D efforts are a fourth source of technology development, even for 
developing countries. 
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Solow (1956) treats technology as an exogenously provided public input: a non-
rival and non-excludable input. A purely rival good has the property that its use 
by one firm or person precludes its use by another. A good is excludable if the 
owner can prevent others from using it. Griliches (1973; 1979) assumes that 
technology has two components: an excludable component of the benefits of 
R&D and a non-excludable component, which is created as a side effect of 
producing the excludable component. This means that technology is accumulated 
by intentional R&D efforts. Growth accounting studies are based on these 
formulations of technology, which imply unbounded growth because of the non-
rival property of technology. 
Romer ( 1990) argues that technological change is endogenous in large part, and 
that innovative technology is non-rival, whereas the human capital component is 
rival. Applying this discussion to the findings in Chapters 2-5, technology has 
three components: the component embodied in physical capital, the component 
embodied in human capital, and a disembodied component, such as product 
design. When applied to a discussion of the properties of technology, embodied 
components are rival and bounded whereas the disembodied component is non-
rival and unbounded. Physical and human capital cannot grow without limit. 
Thus, the fact that physical and human capital accumulation play a key role in the 
growth of East Asian NIBs implies bounded growth in this region. In this sense 
Krugman's criticism of unsustainable growth has some validity. However, his 
argument that there has been no technological change is more difficult to defend. 
Exploiting a rival component of technology, entering new industries or high-
quality production with significant imports of capital goods, is a cheaper method 
of achieving technological change for follower countries and that is the reason for 
the high growth of the East Asian NIBs in the early stages of growth. After these 
opportunities have been exhausted, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea's firms 
concentrated on R&D investment to accumulate a non-rival component of 
technology. In summary, a low level of technological change may have occurred 
in the East Asian NIBs through the intentional actions of entrepreneurs seeking 
structural adjustment (diversification and quality change), and this can be seen as 
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a response to market incentives to exploit the advantages of follower countries. 
Following from this, the non-rival part of technology, the main concern of 
standard growth theory, becomes important.44 
Technology development and technology transfer in Korea 
This section overviews technological development in Korea, paying special 
attention to changes in the vehicles of technology transfer from the 1980s. This 
section is motivated by the findings in earlier chapters that the technological paths 
of East Asian NIEs are quite different from those of developed countries. 
As mentioned in the introduction, technological development in East Asian NIEs 
is closely related to structural adjustments. Table 6.1 summarises this feature. The 
first stage of growth in the 1960s is characterised by a production shift from craft 
to modern labour-intensive light industries. Declining production technologies 
were introduced in these industries. Technical assistance and information by 
foreign buyers and capital suppliers played a role in Korea's learning-by-doing. 
The focus of the industrial structure changed towards heavy and chemical 
industries in the second stage of growth in the 1970s and the early 1980s. During 
this stage, the major means of technology transfer was the import of capital goods 
and turnkey plants. Learning-by-doing through reverse engineering was also an 
important means of enhancing productivity. However, technology transfer 
through licensing increased dramatically in the third stage of growth in 1984-93, 
characterised by a production shift from low-quality products to high-quality 
products in established industries. During this period, technology imports were 
gradually liberalised, and R&D investments became important. Hong (1994a: lO-
ll) argues that 'technology transfer through foreign licensing increased 
dramatically to become the important means of technology import'. When 
44 There is also the question of whether, for some economies, the rival component can be 
important continuing element, given centres of innovation elsewhere in the world. 
151 
technology licensing was recognised not to be useful in transferring frontier 
technology in the early 1990s, FDI and strategic alliances were emphasised.45 
Table 6.1 Technology transfer and industrial structure in Korea 
1960s 1970s-early mid 1980s- 1994-
1980s 1993 
Major sources of Productivity Capital Capital and Productivity 
growth productivity 
Industrial structure Labour- Heavy and High-quality High value-
intensive petrochemical products in added 
light industries; capital- and industries 
industries Capital- and technology-
skill-intensive intensive 
industries 
Technology policy Control of Conditional Liberalisation Encourage-
FDI and liberalisation of technology mentofR&D 
technology of technology imports; in private 
imports imports Encourage- sector; 
mentofR&D Perfect 
in private liberalisation 
sector of technology 
imports 
Vehicles of technology Informal Capital Technology FDI, strategic 
transfer methods imports, imports alliances 
technology 
imports 
Technology Declining Declining and Growing stage Frontier 
product cycle stage mature stage technology 
Source: Compiled by the author using Hong (1994a: 9). 
The basic indicators of technology development in Korea are illustrated in Figure 
6.1. According to Panel A, the ratios of R&D expenditure to GNP and researchers 
per one thousand persons show two structural changes. Their growth rates 
increased in the early 1980s, when R&D investment was encouraged and the 
liberalisation of technology imports was under way, and in the early 1990s, when 
transfer of frontier technology was emphasised and the means of technology 
45 FDI policy was liberalised in 1991; the FDI notification system was changed from a positive 
list system (listing those industries open to FDI) to a negative list system. 
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transfer had been diversified from technology licensing to strategic alliances and 
FDI. 
Panel B shows the trends in the indexes of R&D expenditure, technology 
licensing (technology import) and number of researchers in log values.46 R&D 
expenditure and technology licensing (amount) show a similar trend while the 
number of researchers and cases of technology licensing follow this trend only 
until a significant decline in technology licensing takes place in 1991-92. 
According to Hong (1994a: 16), technology licensing declined in that period 
because of the domestic recession and increased technological protectionism by 
developed countries. However, this is not quite accurate when increasing trends 
in R&D expenditure and number of researchers are considered. The decline in 
technology licensing from the 1990s may be due to the fact that this became an 
ineffective means when Korean firms required frontier technologies rather than 
technologies from mature or growing stages. This is consistent with the rise of 
strategic alliances with leader firms and increasing trends in R&D expenditure 
and employment of researchers. 
Panel C shows changes in the composition of R&D expenditure over time. The 
share of private R&D expenditure in total expenditure increased dramatically 
from the late 1970s, and reached more than 80 per cent in the 1990s. In this 
regard, Korea is similar to Japan in its emphasis on applied rather than basic 
research. Korea has already arrived at the technology level of developed countries 
in terms of the ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP and the number of researchers 
(see Table 6.2). These facts imply that Korea is at the final stage of growth. 
However, there is still a big gap between Korea and other developed countries in 
technology indicators such as amount of R&D expenditure, amount of R&D 
expenditure per researcher, technology trade and the number of science and 
technology papers published (Table 6.2). 
46 The index for these data is 1980= 100. 
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Figure 6.1 Korea: basic indicators of technology 
Panel A 
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Note: TL: technology licensing, PrRD: private R&D share, PrRD: government R&D share. 
Source: Internet: http://www.most.go.kr/research/. Report on the Survey of Research and 
Development in Science and Technology 1994, Ministry of Science and Technology, 
ROK. 
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Table 6.2 International comparisons of technology indicators 
Korea USA Japan Germany France U.K. 
(1996) (1996) (1996) (1996) (1995) (1995) 
R&D expenditures 
Ratio to GDP (%) 2.79 2.54 3.00 2.26 2.34 2.05 
Amount (US$ m) 13522 184665 138619 53070 35954 22610 
Multiplier (Korea= 100) 100 1370 1030 390 270 170 
Gov't: private:foreign (%) 22:78 34:64 21:79 37:6195 45:47 32:55 
Researchers 
Number of researchers 132.0 962.793 673.4 229.893 149.294 148.094 
(thousand persons) 
R&D exp. per researcher 102.4 172.393 205.8 201.993 212.094 151.194 
(US$ thousand) 
Multiplier (Korea = 1 00) 100 170 200 200 210 150 
Technology Trade 
Payments (US$ m) 946.4 4748.2 7177.2 89 3041.4 89 2656.7 2734.789 
Receipts(US$ m) 45.1 20413.7 3676.8 89 1560.389 1801.9 2777.989 
Number of papers (97 SCI 9.1 284.2 67.5 66.0 46.6 75.5 
surve~, thousand cases) 
Note: 1) The ranking of Korea in number of papers is 17th, while Taiwan and Hong Kong's 
rankings are 20th and 30th, respectively. 
Source: Internet: http://www.most.go.kr/research/. Report on the Survey of Research and 
Development in Science and Technology 1994, Ministry of Science and Technology, 
ROK. 
An interesting aspect is that the ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP in Korea is 
rather high in spite of the relatively large technology gap between Korea and 
developed countries. This arises from the fact that R&D investment for follower 
countries increased to imitate the frontier technologies essential in the 1990s at a 
greater rate than in the 1960s. This is also consistent with a slowdown in 
technology licensing in 1991-93. The large role of R&D and the relatively small 
role of technology imports in Korea in 1990 differs somewhat from the Japanese 
experience in the 1960s, when technology licensing was the most important 
vehicle of transfer for frontier technologies. This may be due to changes in the 
world economic environment. The United States, a leader country, underwent 
rapid technological change and related structural adjustments, so technology 
transfer to Japan was not a big problem in the 1960s. Later, technology catch-up 
and structural adjustment in developing economies became more difficult as the 
market for new technology tightened. 
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The evolutionary pattern of technology transfer in Korea, starting from a lower 
level of technology and moving towards a more advanced one was similar to the 
experience of Japan. In particular, technology licensing increased markedly in 
1982-91, confirming the fact that it had became a major source of growth in the 
1980s. However, Korea has been more dependent on capital imports than Japan 
for its technology transfer (see Table 6.3). For Japan, technology imports played a 
major role in the final stage of technology catch-up, but in Korea R&D 
investment and strategic alliances became important. 
Table 6.3 Technology transfer by form to Korea, 1962-91 
(US$ million) 
1962-66 1967-71 1972-76 1977-81 1982-86 1987-91 
FDI 
Foreign licensing 
Technical consultation 
Capital goods imports 
47.4 
0.8 
316 
Source: Yoo Soo Hong (1994a: 11). 
219.0 
16.3 
16.8 
2,541 
879.4 
96.5 
720.9 1,767.6 5,636.0 
451.4 1,184.9 4,359.4 
18.5 54.7 332.3 1,349.7 
8,841 27,978 44,705 52,155 
The evolutionary pattern of technology development in Korea can be identified by 
technology trade data. According to Table 6.4, technology exports increased in 
the early 1980s and reached a peak in 1983, and then decreased in 1983-88. After 
1988, technology exports increased again. These movements in technology 
exports are quite different from technology imports, which increased until the 
1991 recession. The ratio of technology exports to technology imports, a proxy 
for technology independence, thus shows the same movement as technology 
exports. The increases in the ratio in 1981-83 are consistent with the transfer of 
labour-intensive processes, whereas the decreasing trend in 1983-88 was induced 
by structural adjustments from capital-intensive to capital- and technology-
intensive processes. Another increase in 1988-93 marks the end of the structural 
adjustment of the previous period and signals the fact that capital-intensive 
processes had been transferred abroad. 
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Table 6.4 Technology exports and imports, 1981-93 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Exports 
(A, US$m) 11.8 18.2 18.9 16.9 11.3 11.7 9.1 
Imports 
(B, US$m) 107.1 115.7 149.5 213.2 295.5 411.0 523.7 
Ratio 
(AlB,%) 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.02 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Exports 
(A, US$m) 8.9 10.5 21.8 35.2 32.5 45.1 
Imports 
(B, US$m) 676.3 888.6 1,087 1184 850.6 946.4 
Ratio 
(A/B, %) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Source: Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology 1994, 
Ministry of Science and Technology, ROK. 
Table 6.5 shows Korea's technology imports by country. Technology imports 
were valued at US$ 7906.3 and 8766 cases in 1962-93. The United States' share 
was 47.0 per cent while its share in total cases was 27.1 per cent. In contrast, 
Japan's share was 32.0 per cent while its share in total cases was 49.4 per cent. 
Thus, the United States is the major exporter of technology in terms of value 
while Japan is the major exporter in terms of cases. Average payment per case 
from the United States was US$ 1591 and that from Japan was US$ 584. This 
implies that more high-level technologies are imported from the United States 
than from Japan. According to Yoo (1993: 57-60), this is because technologies 
from Japan were imported by small and medium-size firms, and that imported 
technologies were process-related technologies in the mature stage of the product 
cycle. Technology imports from Japan contrast with the United States, which 
transfers technologies in the early stage of the product cycle to establish a 
competitive advantage in the world market. 
The leading industry in technology imports is electronics. According to Table 6.6, 
the share of electronics in total imports is 40 per cent by value and 26.6 per cent 
by cases. Electronics is followed by machinery industry. Its share is 20.1 per cent 
by value and 26.2 per cent by cases. The third is chemicals and refining, with 16.5 
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and 18.5 per cent of shares by value and cases, respectively. These figures are 
roughly consistent with structural adjustment in the 1980s towards high-quality 
products in heavy and chemical industries established in the 1970s. 
Table 6.5 Technology imports by nation, 1962-93 
Panel A (value and number) 
1962 1977 1982 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total 
-76 -81 -86 
Amount (US$m) 
USA 29.7 159.2 602.7 239.9 333 415.7 514.1 622.2 452.5 418.4 3784.5 
Japan 63.7 139.8 323.7 181.4 214.7 273.9 341.4 372.2 266.2 352.9 2530.2 
Germany 8.2 14 49 18.6 22.1 52.8 59.3 60.1 27.1 53.3 364.5 
France 1.6 14.3 34.7 25.1 47.9 39.9 29.9 48.9 56.1 32.6 331 
Others 10.4 124.1 174.8 58.7 61.6 106.3 142.3 80.4 48.7 89.2 896.1 
Total 113.6 451.4 1184.9 523.7 676.3 888.6 1087 1183.8 850.6 946.4 7906.3 
Cases 
USA 164 302 515 180 200 244 221 165 163 224 2378 
Japan 494 631 1074 307 354 343 333 277 232 285 4329 
Germany 23 70 122 35 49 37 55 35 26 31 482 
France 7 39 82 40 47 41 25 26 18 23 348 
Others 64 183 285 75 101 98 104 79 94 144 1229 
Total 752 1225 2078 637 751 763 738 582 533 707 8766 
Panel B (per cent) 
Amount 
USA 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
Others 
Total 
Cases 
USA 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
Others 
Total 
1962 
-76 
26.14 
56.07 
7.22 
1.41 
9.15 
100.0 
21.81 
65.69 
3.06 
0.93 
8.51 
100.00 
1977 
-81 
35.27 
30.97 
3.10 
3.17 
27.49 
100.0 
24.65 
51.51 
5.71 
3.18 
14.94 
100.0 
1982 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total 
-86 
50.87 45.81 49.24 46.78 47.30 52.56 53.20 44.21 47.87 
27.32 34.64 31.75 30.82 31.41 31.44 31.30 37.29 32.00 
4.14 3.55 3.27 5.94 5.46 5.08 3.19 5.63 4.61 
2.93 4.79 7.08 4.49 2.75 4.13 6.60 3.44 4.19 
14.75 11.21 9.11 11.96 13.09 6.79 5.73 9.43 11.33 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
24.78 28.26 26.63 31.98 29.95 28.35 30.58 31.68 27.13 
51.68 48.19 47.14 44.95 45.12 47.59 43.53 40.31 49.38 
5.87 5.49 6.52 4.85 7.45 6.01 4.88 4.38 5.50 
3.95 6.28 6.26 5.37 3.39 4.47 3.38 3.25 3.97 
13.72 11.77 13.45 12.84 14.09 13.57 17.64 20.37 14.02 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology 1994, 
Ministry of Science and Technology, ROK. 
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Table 6.6 Technology imports by industry, 1962-93 
(per cent) 
1962 1977 1982 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1962 
-76 -81 -86 -93 
Amount (US$m) 
Food 1.76 0.73 1.38 0.82 0.77 1.00 0.87 1.22 1.05 0.88 1.03 
Textiles and 8.27 4.03 1.86 1.58 1.23 1.49 1.33 2.13 2.80 2.79 2.14 
clothing 
Pulp and 0.09 1.64 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.26 0.16 0.21 
paper 
Chemicals, 29.75 32.79 13.82 12.49 16.58 17.05 19.97 15.81 13.03 12.57 16.54 
refining 
Ceramic, 0.97 2.33 2.41 1.28 1.01 2.89 1.44 1.54 2.86 1.17 1.88 
Cement 
Metals 21.04 7.09 3.11 2.29 0.89 1.18 0.79 0.58 1.08 1.92 2.08 
Electronics 15.67 14.67 30.19 37.66 39.18 43.71 43.03 39.92 52.97 54.28 40.44 
Machinery 12.85 19.78 20.11 22.86 17.86 17.39 19.91 27.36 14.82 19.73 20.12 
Shipbuilding 4.49 2.48 7.78 2.22 0.89 1.40 1.49 2.88 0.59 2.36 2.73 
Electricity 2.46 5.63 14.67 14.32 16.83 9.93 7.35 5.58 8.02 1.07 8.89 
Others 2.64 8.84 4.61 4.43 4.72 3.86 3.71 2.79 2.53 3.09 3.93 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Cases 
Food 1.99 2.45 4.86 3.61 2.00 2.88 2.44 2.75 2.25 2.40 3.08 
Textiles and 5.05 3.35 6.11 5.81 6.92 7.34 5.96 6.36 3.38 6.22 5.64 
clothing 
Pulp and 0.93 0.57 0.14 0.31 0.53 0.39 0.14 0.17 0.00 0.99 0.40 
paper 
Chemicals, 23.40 18.37 17.90 21.19 21.44 19.66 18.70 18.04 13.70 12.87 18.50 
refining 
Ceramic, 2.79 2.78 2.41 3.92 2.66 2.88 3.52 2.23 2.25 0.99 2.64 
Cement 
Metals 9.84 8.57 5.39 4.87 3.46 3.01 2.85 2.23 2.25 2.12 4.95 
Electronics 23.94 18.45 24.11 25.75 28.23 30.28 29.67 30.58 36.40 33.66 26.75 
Machinery 23.94 32.90 26.28 23.23 24.10 20.71 23.58 25.95 30.96 28.29 26.23 
Shipbuilding 1.46 3.67 4.52 2.04 1.86 1.31 1.90 2.06 2.25 0.85 2.64 
Electricity 1.20 3.02 1.15 1.10 0.53 0.66 0.41 0.00 0.56 0.99 1.13 
Others 5.45 5.88 7.12 8.16 8.26 10.88 10.84 9.62 6.00 10.61 8.05 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology 1994, 
Ministry of Science and Technology, ROK. 
Table 6.7 contrasts technology imports from Japan and the United States. 
According to the table, the leading industries in technology imports from the 
United States are electronics (38.3 per cent of total imports), chemicals and 
refining (18.4 per cent) and machinery (16.6 per cent). In the case of Japan, 
machinery had a much larger share (32.0 per cent) than electronics (24.5 per cent) 
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or chemicals and refining (19.6 per cent). This difference in the direction of 
technology imports is another reason that average per case payment from the 
United States was higher than from Japan. 
Table 6.7 Technology imports from United States and Japan, 
31112/93, cases (per cent) 
Food 
Textiles and clothing 
Pulp and paper 
Chemicals, refining 
Ceramic, cement 
Metals 
Electronics 
Machinery 
Shipbuilding 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
United States 
4.3 
4.3 
0.5 
18.4 
1.7 
3.5 
38.3 
16.6 
1.2 
1.9 
8.8 
100.0 
Japan 
2.7 
3.9 
0.4 
19.6 
3.2 
5.7 
24.5 
32.0 
1.2 
1.6 
5.7 
100.0 
Total 
3.1 
5.6 
0.4 
18.5 
2.6 
5.0 
26.8 
26.2 
2.6 
1.8 
8.1 
100.0 
Source: Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology 1994, 
Ministry of Science and Technology, ROK 
The role of FDI in technology transfer to Korea had not been large until the 
1980s, but FDI rapidly increased from the late 1980s, in particular from 1991. 
Korean firms realised that frontier technology was difficult to acquire, and 
diversified their means of technology transfer in the 1990s. According to Table 
6.8, Japan far surpassed the United States in FDI to Korea. Japan's share in total 
FDI is 39.8 per cent by value and 54.5 per cent by cases, whereas the United 
States' share is 29.2 and 23.9 per cent, respectively. Japan's lead in FDI contrasts 
with that of the United States in technology imports. The small role of FDI in 
technology transfer in Korea is due to Korea's industrial and technology policies. 
Local firms determined which industries and processes to enter and coordinated 
the import of capital and technology, using foreign capital and domestic savings. 
This mechanism is the same as FDI in that foreign savings are transferred to a 
recipient country along with imported capital goods. The difference is that local 
entrepreneurs rather than multinational corporations organised these production 
activities in Korea. 
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Table 6.8 FDI to Korea, 1962-93 
1962 1967 1972 1977- 1982- 1987- 1992 1993 1962- share in 
-66 -71 -76 81 86 91 93 total(%) 
USA 
Amount 25 95 134 235 582 1,478 379 341 3,270 29.2 
(US$ m) 
Cases 25 85 78 67 168 463 70 69 1,025 23.9 
Japan 
Amount 8 89 627 30 876 2,122 155 286 4,466 39.8 
(US$ m) 
Cases 5 241 739 132 276 788 72 85 2,337 54.5 
Others 
Amount 14 34 118 185 309 2,046 360 417 3,473 31.0 
(US$ m) 
Cases 9 34 50 52 135 425 94 125 924 21.6 
Total 
Amount 47 218 879 720 1,767 5,636 894 1,044 11,209 100.0 
(US$ m) 
Cases 39 360 867 251 579 1,676 236 279 4,286 100.0 
Source: Hong (1994b: 21). 
Technology imports, R&D investment and productivity growth 
The aim of this section is to verify empirically the relationship between 
technology imports and productivity growth and that between R&D investment 
and productivity growth. 
Section 2 of this chapter formulated a framework for understanding the 
sequencing of the sources of technological change, and the earlier part of this 
section overviewed technological development in Korea. This suggested that 
technology imports were the major source of technological change in Korea in the 
1980s. A linear regression is performed to verify this relationship, using the data 
on productivity growth in Chapter 3. Formal tests of unit roots and cointegration 
are performed. Data for the absolute level of TFP and technology import certainly 
have unit roots but these two variables are not cointegrated. This lack of 
cointegration may be due to small sample bias: we have only 16 useable 
observations to test the hypothesis of no conintegration. Expanding the estimation 
period is not desirable because capital-related and informal methods were major 
sources of technological change in the early stages of growth. Thus, I focus on the 
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relationship between two series of differenced data instead of levels of TFP and 
technology imports. This can be rationalised as follows: the concern of the 
analysis is to find a variable determining TFP growth rather than a TFP index, 
and TFP level data are calculated from the TFP growth data. The regression 
results using differenced data are as follows: 
!J.log(TFP) = 0.029 + 0.078*./J.log(TL) 
(4.28) (3.37) 
Adjusted R2 = 0.35, D-W statistic= 1.11 
where TFP and TL represent the indexes of productivity and the value of 
technology licensing values (amount of technology imports). 
Even though the t-statistics for the coefficients are good and the sign of the 
coefficient of technology imports is positive, the low adjusted R2 and D-W 
statistic present problems, and suggest that another explanatory variable should 
be included. Inclusion of lagged variables, however, do not improve the 
regression results: the worsening D-W statistic, and the earlier argument of a 
sequencing pattern in vehicles of technological change suggest no other option. 
These results can be validated as follows. According to Panel A of Figure 6.2, the 
fitted value of TFP growth moves along the path of actual TFP growth. The gap 
between actual and fitted TFP growth arises from three factors. First, the actual 
value reveals a bigger fluctuation than the fitted value because of the demand 
factor, as shown in analysing the interaction between capital accumulation and 
productivity growth. Second, the two values reveal a negative relationship in 
1991-93, as shown in the earlier part of this section. Third, the graph shows 
structural change around 1980 before 1980s: actual TFP lagged behind fitted TFP 
growth. This phenomenon can also be explained by the earlier part of this 
chapter: technology imports became a major source of technology transfer from 
the early 1980s, as outlined in the argument in the earlier part of this chapter. 
These three factors are reasons for the low R2 in the above estimation, but they do 
not constitute a significant theoretical basis for diminishing the link between 
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technology imports and productivity growth. In this respect, the estimation result 
can be validated empirically. 
Figure 6.2 Technology imports and productivity growth, 1974-93 
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0.10 .--------------------------------.. 
0.09 
0.08 
O.Q7 
0.06 
0.05 
0.04 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
-0.01 
Panel B 
.... 
' 
" 
.... 
' 
' i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
I 
0.10 r····--~·············-----····························--·······················--·-··························-----·····-···········--·-············-----·-·-·-·············1 
0.09 
0.08 
0.07 
0.06 
0.05 
, ..... -, 
/ .... 
I 
0.04 
0.03 
0.02 
O.D1 
75 76 77 78 1 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 
-0.01 ········-----·······----
Notes: 1) DLTFP is ~log(TFP). 
2) F _DL TLI is the fitted value of the regression in which the explanatory variable is the 
amount of technology import, while F _DL TLCI is the fitted value of the regression in 
which the explanatory variable is the number of cases of technology import. 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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The second panel of Figure 6.2 shows the actual and fitted values of TFP growth 
when a regression is performed using cases of technology imports instead of 
value of technology imports. Actual and fitted TFP growth show closer 
movements than was the case in the first estimation. The regression results are as 
follows: 
t1log(TFP) = 0.039 + 0.061 *t1log(TLC) 
(6.49) (2.23) 
Adjusted R2 = 0.17, D-W statistic= 0.82 
where TLC represents the index of cases of technology licensing. 
In sum, technology imports are a significant source of productivity growth in 
Korea in the 1980s. 
Griliches (1973; 1979; 1980; 1986) argues that R&D investment is the driving 
force behind enhanced productivity growth, and this position is explicitly and 
implicitly accepted by growth accountants. However, earlier chapters of this 
thesis found that this is not the case. R&D investment become a major source of 
productivity growth followed by technological change after arriving at the final 
stage of growth. This suggests that R&D investment does not have a significant 
effect on productivity growth in the case of Korea. Simple regressions are 
performed to verify empirically the relationship between R&D investment and 
productivity growth. As in the case of the regression by technology imports, the 
number of observations is quite small (the number of useable observations is at 
most 17), so a formal regression based on unit root and cointegration relationship 
is impossible. However, the validity of simple regression has been justified 
theoretically by Griliches (1973; 1979). The best regression results are obtained 
as follows: 
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~log(TFP) = -0.017- 0.087*RDGP + 0.112*RDGP (t-1) 
(-1.05) (-1.96) (1.53) 
+ 0.096*RDGP(t-2)- 0.094*RDGP(t-3) 
( 1.23) ( -1.32) 
- 0.036*RDGP(t-4) + 0.001 *RDPR 
( -0.88) (1.46) 
Adjusted R2 = 0.72, D-W statistic = 2.01 
where RDGP and RDPR represent R&D-GDP ratio and the share of private R&D 
share in total R&D investment. 
Panel A of Figure 6.3 shows the movements of the actual and fitted values of the 
regression equation. R&D investment seems to explain TFP growth successfully. 
Exclusion of the share of private R&D from the explanatory variable leads to 
similar results. The following estimation is the best among them: Panel B shows 
the actual and fitted productivity growth in this case, confirming a positive but 
weak relationship between productivity growth and R&D investment.47 
~log(TFP) = 0.001- 0.055*RDGP + 0.131 *RDGP (t-1) 
(0.19) (-1.34) (1.71) 
+ 0.078*RDGP(t-2)- 0.095*RDGP(t-3)- 0.041 *RDGP(t-4) 
(0.95) (-1.26) (-0.95) 
Adjusted R2 = 0.72, D-W statistic = 2.01 
47 Because of the complementary relationship between R&D and technology import, it may be 
that private R&D is important to productivity growth through its interaction with technology 
import. However, inclusion of a technology import variable in the regression did not improve 
the empirical result. 
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Figure 6.3 R&D investment and productivity growth, 1977-93 
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Cross-section analysis, however, rejects the hypothesis of a positive relationship 
between the two variables. Figure 6.4 plots the scattergram of R&D-sales ratio 
(horizontal axis) and productivity growth (vertical axis) of 36 Korean 
manufacturing industries. First the scattergram shows the possibility of a positive 
relationship between the ratio of average R&D to sales in 1979-93 and average 
productivity growth in the same period (Panel A), while the Panel B shows the 
relationship between the ratio of average R&D to sales in 1988-93 and average 
productivity growth in the same period. Both pictures strongly imply that R&D 
investment and productivity growth are not correlated with each other in the case 
of Korea's manufacturing industries. 
Figure 6.4 productivity growth and R&D-sales ratio across industries 
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Panel B:1988-93 
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Notes: 1) TFP means productivity growth calculated under a 3-input growth accounting 
framework, while R&D means R&D-sales ratio of each industry. 
2) The regression result of the Panel A is as follows: 
TFP = 1.510 + 0.379*R&D, Adjusted R2 = 0.11. 
(5.46) (0.16) 
3) The regression result of the Panel B is as follows: 
TFP = 1.151 + 0.160*R&D, Adjusted R2 = 0.001. 
(1.15) (0.16) 
Source: KDI dataset. 
Summary 
The discussion about East Asian growth in earlier chapters introduced the 
importance of two ideas: sequencing of the sources of technological change and a 
broader definition of technology. 
Section 2 introduced the sequencing of the sources of technological change. The 
major channels of technology development and transfer changed over time. 
Informal methods of acquiring old technologies were the major source in the 
initial stage of growth, and capital import followed in the next stage. Then 
technology imports played the major role in the third stage of growth, 
characterised by a production shift to high-quality products. This also suggests 
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that R&D investment becomes a important source of growth from the final stage 
of technology catch-up. 
Section 3 puts forward a definition of technological change applicable to follower 
countries. It includes rival but bounded embodiment components which have 
played a crucial role in the growth of East Asian NIEs in the last three decades. 
This broader definition provides an understanding of why extraordinary growth 
and technology catch-up is possible, and why the high growth rates will be 
lowered ultimately unless non-rival components of technology are developed by 
R&D efforts. 
Section 4 investigated technological developments in Korea, with a special focus 
on the relationship between technology imports and productivity growth and 
between R&D investment and productivity growth. Basic R&D indicators suggest 
that Korea may be at the final stage of technology catch-up. This section also 
identified the major sources of technological change over stages, and concluded 
that sequencing of vehicles of technological change was correspondent to 
structural adjustments over stages. The effect of technology imports on 
productivity growth is positive and significant in linear regression but a 
regression of productivity growth by R&D investment did not produce significant 
results, as expected. 
Appendix 2 sought to find the reason for the difference between the technological 
paths of NIBs and those of developed countries. It is argued that follower 
countries have enjoyed a favourable world economic environment characterised 
by the rapid technological change and deepening interdependence and 
roundaboutness of production achieved by leader countries. Under these 
circumstances, East Asian countries have successfully dealt with technological 
and marketing barriers in different ways: specialisation in labour-intensive 
industries characterised by low barriers, participation in small set of tasks for 
multinational corporations, and local firms' organisation of state-of-the-art 
production utilising imported capital and intermediate goods. These favourable 
169 
world economic conditions and appropriate reactions to these environments were 
the reason why the technological paths in NIEs were quite different from leader 
countries. 
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7 Summary and Conclusion 
In previous attempts to identify the reason for the remarkable growth in NIEs, 
growth accounting exercises have been employed to examine whether 
productivity growth is the major source of output growth. The results suggested 
that capital accumulation rather than productivity growth was the main source of 
economic growth (Westphal, Kim and Dahlman 1985; Chenery, Robinson and 
Syrquin 1986; Young 1992; 1994; 1995; Kim and Lau; 1993; 1994a; 1994b; 
1996; Collins and Bosworth 1996). These results led to the inference that growth 
in NIEs and other Asian countries is unsustainable. 
These studies are deficient in that they lack careful consideration of the ways that 
growth paths taken in follower countries differ from those of developed countries, 
and there is no consideration of the implications of the mechanical properties of 
growth accounting. 
According to the growth accounting scheme, productivity growth ('\>IT) is 
calculated as residual as follows: 
(7 -1) '\>IT= ~ ln V(I) - '\>IK ~ lnK(1) - '\>IL ~ lnL(1), 
where '\>IK, '\>IL and '\>IT represent the average value shares of inputs. 
If a linear-homogeneous Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed, the 
equation (7-1) can be expressed more simply: 
(7-2) '\>IT=~ ln y(I)- '\>IK ~ ln k(I), 
where y = VIL and k = K/L. 
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Thus, a high capital share (low labour share) in output leads to low productivity 
growth, regardless of technological change. Similarly, capital deepening leads 
mechanically to low productivity growth, regardless of technological change. 
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Economic growth in NIEs has been characterised by rapid structural change and 
adjustment during the last four decades. The production share of industry in GDP 
increases rapidly, except in Hong Kong (Panel A of Figure 7.1 ), whereas the 
production shares of services and agriculture in GDP increased or decreased 
slowly. This structural change inevitably increases the capital intensity of these 
economies and results in low productivity growth, in line with the mechanical 
properties of the growth accounting scheme. Capital intensity in industry is 
normally higher than that of services and agriculture. Structural adjustment is 
more important than structural change in explaining low productivity growth in 
NIEs. The export share of capital-intensive products in total merchandise exports 
increased rapidly over the last three decades (Panel B of Figure 7.1 ). It was 10-20 
per cent in 1965 but reached 50-80 per cent in 1995. Panel B shows that strong 
structural adjustment occurred towards capital-intensive industries and away from 
labour-intensive industries. This inevitably increases capital intensity in the 
industrial sector and thereby contributes to lowering productivity growth. 
Structural adjustment and change in NIEs give a clear answer to why growth 
accounting studies produce low productivity gains in NIEs. 
In any consideration of structural adjustment and change in NIEs, a simplistic 
interpretation of growth accounting results and arguments about long-run growth 
are problematic. There remain many questions to be answered when seeking to 
derive implications from the findings. Does disaggregated growth accounting lead 
to results that differ from the aggregated results? Is the aggregated approach 
valid? Does high capital accumulation necessarily mean low technological 
change? Are productivity growth and technological change the same in 
developing countries? 
To answer the first and second questions, a disaggregated growth accounting 
framework was constructed. First, the manufacturing sector was disaggregated 
into 36 industries, following Jorgenson, to check the validity of the aggregate 
analysis. Second, the embodiment effect and quality change of capital in each 
industry were considered as components of productivity growth, following 
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Denison, to examine productivity growth as a fundamental source of growth. 
Disaggregated results show that productivity growth was the largest contributor to 
output growth in eight of the 15 industries. They are textiles, clothes and leather, 
wood, paper and printing, chemical products, machinery and fabricated metals, 
office and medical machinery, motor vehicles and other vehicles. Past and present 
leading industries are included in this category, with the exception of electrical 
and electronic products. In these industries, disaggregated growth accounting 
leads to different conclusions from an aggregated growth accounting approach. 
The most important finding of the studies in Chapter 3 is the invalidity of the 
aggregated approach. The aggregate production function approach was not valid 
in considering the sum of resource reallocations. It was quite different from zero 
in 1968-73, 1973-78 and 1978-83, when the Korean manufacturing sector 
experienced structural adjustments through diversification. The result of no 
aggregation bias in 1983-88 and 1988-93 is also doubtful. This might arise from 
the failure of growth accounting to capture structural adjustment within industries 
(production shift to high-quality products). This finding gives a valuable 
indication that aggregation bias is systematically linked to sequential structural 
adjustments, even though the growth accounting scheme failed to identify the real 
role of technological change owing to its mechanical properties. 
Interaction between capital accumulation and productivity growth was 
investigated in Chapter 4 to clear for the effect of structural change on measured 
productivity growth. According to a Granger causality test, five of the 15 
industries studied supported the embodiment hypothesis, and six of the 15 
industries showed induced technological change at the 10 per cent significance 
level. Growth accounting techniques measure productivity growth as residual 
under the assumption that technology and capital are mutually independent, and 
that productivity growth is identical to technological change. However, this is not 
the case, when verification of the interaction between capital accumulation and 
productivity growth is taken into account. If an increase in capital stock is 
separated into two parts: dtpital accumulation without a technological component 
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(LllnKa) and with a technological component (LllnKb), then productivity growth 
in equation (7-1) and (7-2) is expressed as equation (7-3) and (7-5). At the same 
time technological change can be defined broadly as equation (7-4) and (7-6): 
(7-3) :Yr = illn V(1)- "rr-K LllnKa(1)- "rr-K LllnKb(1)- "rr-L illnL(1), 
(7-4) "rf-T + "rr-K illnKb(1) = Llln V(7)- "rr-K LllnKa(1)- "rr-L illnL(7), 
(7 -5) :Yr = illn y(1) - "rr-K illn ka(1) - "rr-K Lllnkb(1), 
(7 -6) :Yr + "rr-K Lllnkb(1) = illn y(1) - "rr-K illn ka(1), 
where ka = Ka!L and kb = Kb/L. 
Growth accounting is mechanical, because the joint contribution of capital and 
technology to output growth (:YK LllnKb or "rr-KLllnkb) is solely attributed to capital 
accumulation, underestimating the role of technological change. Productivity 
growth and technological change diverged in the case of NIEs. It is therefore 
misleading to interpret low productivity growth as a sign of the unsustainability 
of growth on the assumption that measured productivity growth is identical to 
technological change. 
Chapter 4 also found evidence of a predictable sequence in the principal sources 
of output growth over the period. Productivity growth was a dominant source of 
output growth due to the labour-intensive nature of the industrial structure in the 
period 1968-73, after which capital accumulation became the major source of 
output growth in the Korean manufacturing sector. Subsequently, productivity 
growth played a more important role in output growth from the late 1980s, 
lowering the contribution of capital to output growth. Verification of the 
sequencing of the sources of output growth and interactions between capital and 
productivity growth explain the reason for the low productivity gains in NIEs. 
These countries have not yet arrived at the third stage of development, where 
175 
innovation by R&D investment is the sole means of technological change. Rapid 
growth in these economies has been driven by utilising low-level technology, 
such as technology in a declining product-cycle in labour-intensive light 
industries and standardised technology embodied in capital goods in capital-
intensive industries. 
Chapter 5 identified structural adjustments as the driving force behind the link 
between capital accumulation and technological change in follower countries. 
This is because structural adjustments were associated with accumulation in new 
industries or in the manufacture of high-quality products sequentially. East Asian 
NIEs exhibited strong structural adjustment over the last four decades. The 
leading industries in these countries moved from labour-intensive industries using 
production technologies which are in a declining stage of the product cycle, to 
skill- and capital-intensive industries using standardised production technologies 
in a mature stage of economic development. Subsequently, production activities 
in these countries have been moving to capital and technology intensive-
industries. They will move again to technology-intensive industries using frontier 
technologies. This chapter also showed that each of the East Asian NIEs has a 
different growth path. Hong Kong's path is characterised by high dependence on 
the services sector and comparative advantage in labour-intensive industries, 
whereas Singapore's path is characterised by rapid structural adjustment towards 
high technology industries with a link to the international production of 
multinational corporations. Taiwan and Korea's paths are similar to Singapore's 
but local entrepreneurs' efforts are much more important in Taiwan and Korea. 
This claim was verified as follows. First, the structural effect in Jorgenson's 
framework was defined as a resource reallocation effect with a negative sign. This 
effect explained about 7 per cent of the weighted sum of sectoral productivity 
growth in 1968-93. Second, Pilat's structural effect was calculated. It also 
confirmed that structural adjustment played a positive role in lifting aggregate 
labour productivity over the whole period. Then, the share effect, a proxy for the 
effect of structural adjustment on productivity growth, was calculated using the 
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framework of Bernard and Jones. The share effect was positive over the whole 
period except 1978-83; its average growth rate was 0.16 per cent per year. These 
results empirically verified that structural adjustment (in particular entering new 
industries) has played a positive role in lifting aggregate productivity growth by 
offsetting the larger declining trend in aggregate productivity growth caused by 
the large decline in sectoral productivity growth of each industry. In sum, 
structural adjustments led to rapid technological change and economic growth 
through the accumulation of new capital embodying technological components. 
On the basis of the discussion of sequencing of the sources of output growth, the 
interaction between capital accumulation and productivity growth, and structural 
adjustment as a driving force of the interaction, two implications were drawn out 
in Chapter 6. These were the need to incorporate the sequencing of the sources of 
technological change and a broader definition of technology into analysis of 
technological change and productivity growth. The major channels for technology 
development and transfer change in different stages of economic development. 
Informal methods of acquiring old technologies were the first major source in the 
initial stage of growth, and capital imports followed in the next stage. 
Subsequently, technology imports played the major role in the third stage of 
growth, characterised by a production shift to high-quality products. This also 
suggests that R&D investment becomes an important source of growth from the 
final stage of technology catch-up. The effect of technology imports on 
productivity growth in Korea's manufacturing sector was positive and significant 
in the linear regression but regression of productivity growth by R&D investment 
did not produce significant results, as expected. Chapter 6 also put forward a 
definition of technological change applicable to follower countries. It includes 
rival but bounded embodiment components which have played a crucial role in 
the growth of East Asian NIEs in the last four decades. This broader definition is 
consistent with an understanding of why extraordinary growth and technology 
catch-up occurred in NIEs. 
The other findings of this thesis are as follows. 
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First, differences in productivity growth in several growth accounting studies 
arose from the data source. The National Wealth Survey and the Mining and 
Manufacturing Survey allow a disaggregated approach, and result in relatively 
high productivity growth. In contrast, National Income Account data only allow 
an aggregated approach, and require some arbitrary assumptions to estimate 
capital stock and productivity growth. 
Second, Sarel's (1995a: 246-47) argument that estimates of productivity growth 
are very sensitive to a specific estimation period is quite right. Productivity 
growth and its contribution to output growth are very high in 1968-73 but very 
low in 1978-83. Thus, extending the estimation period to the 1960s and/or to the 
1990s leads to relatively high productivity growth, whereas focusing on the late 
1970s and 1980s leads to low productivity growth. 
Third, the trends in productivity growth in 1970s and 1980 are quite different 
from the picture put forward by Dollar (1991) and Dollar and Sokoloff (1990), 
who emphasise changes in manufacturing structure from heavy industry to light 
industry and resulting TFP convergence. What really happened in Korea is a 
change in the manufacturing structure from light industry to heavy industry and 
TFP convergence. 
Fourth, output-capital ratios at the aggregate and sectoral level have increased 
with decreasing growth rates in the past three decades. These trends lifted the 
marginal product of capital. These findings support the argument that low-level 
technology played a significant role in rapid growth, even though they do not 
appear in mechanical growth accounting exercises. 
Fifth, the measured effects of structural adjustment on productivity growth were 
not as strong as expected. This results from the fact that productivity data used in 
empirical verification did not include the interaction technological component of 
capital accumulation. However, in the light of the interaction between 
178 
technological change and capital accumulation in relation to structural 
adjustment, the effect on technological change might be strong. 
Sixth, two main characteristics which distinguish the experience of East Asian 
NIEs from that of developed countries can be derived from the discussion. One, 
technological change for follower countries was induced by structural adjustment 
across industries. Two, productivity growth in new industries or products, where 
structural adjustments and technological changes occur, is relatively low 
compared with existing industries because of the mechanical property of growth 
accounting in treating the interaction between capital accumulation and 
technological change. 
Seventh, East Asian economic growth in the earlier stage can be endogenised, as 
argued by new growth theory, as long as structural adjustment towards high 
technology industry is pursued by economic growth agents and encouraged by 
public policy. 
Eighth, the sequencing of the vehicles of technological change was related to 
structural adjustments over the stages of economic development. 
Ninth, a favourable world economic environment and appropriate responses to 
these conditions were the reasons why technological paths in NIEs were quite 
different from those in leader countries. East Asian NIEs have enjoyed a 
favourable world economic environment characterised by rapid technological 
change and deepening interdependence and roundaboutness of production 
achieved by leader countries. East Asian countries have successfully dealt with 
technological and marketing barriers in different ways: specialisation in labour-
intensive industries characterised by low barriers, participation in a small set of 
tasks for multinational corporations, and local firms' organisation of state-of-the-
art production utilising imported capital and intermediate goods (Appendix 2). 
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However, this study has some limitations and further research is clearly required. 
First, the thesis argues that technological change played an important role in 
economic growth in NIEs by broadening the definition of technology into rival 
and bounded technologies, which are considered as parts of physical and human 
capital in the standard growth model. On this point, the definition of technology 
is quite different from that of the neoclassical growth model, focusing on the 
nonrival and unbounded properties of technology (innovative technology), and 
predicting permanent effects of technological change on growth. Thus, deeper 
discussion of on technology and growth theory is necessary to reduce the gap 
between the arguments of this thesis and the neoclassical model. 
Second, this thesis conceptualised the technological components of capital 
accumulation (~lnKb) induced by a production shift to new industries and high-
quality products. However, data for these components were not constructed, so 
the role of technological change in growth was not measured empirically. 
Finally, the relationship between productivity growth and technology import was 
investigated at the aggregated level. Cross-sectional industry data would be a 
useful addition to the time-series estimations undertaken in this study. This would 
allow a more detailed analysis of the relationship between technology import and 
the productivity growth which occurred in Korean manufacturing. 
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Appendix Tables 
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Table A3.1 Classification of manufacturing industries 
A. Thirty-six industries 
Number Industry Number Industry 
1 Food products 19 Glass and glass products 
2 Beverages 20 Non-metallic mineral 
products 
3 Tobacco 21 Steel 
4 Spinning, weaving, 22 Non-ferrous metals 
bleaching, and dyeing 
5 Knitted and crocheted 23 Fabricated metal products, 
fabrics and articles except machinery and 
equipment 
6 Other textiles except clothes 24 Engines and turbines 
7 Wearing apparel 25 Industrial purpose machinery 
and machine-tools. 
8 Leather and leather products 26 Office machinery and tools 
(footwear included) (service purpose machinery 
and tools included) 
9 Wood and products of wood 27 Electric and industrial 
(furniture included) machinery and apparatus 
10 Paper and paper products 28 Radio, TV and 
communication equipment 
and apparatus, and other 
electric components 
11 Publishing, printing and 29 Domestic purpose electric 
related processing appliances 
12 Chemicals for industry 30 Other electric, electronic 
machinery and apparatus 
13 Other chemical products 31 Building and repairing of 
ships 
14 Refined petroleum products 32 Railway locomotives 
15 Other refined petroleum 33 Motor vehicles 
products and coal products 
16 Rubber products 34 Motor cycle, aircraft, and 
other transport equipment 
17 Plastic products 35 Medical, precision, and 
optical instruments 
18 Ceramic products and clay 36 Other manufacturing 
Eroducts 
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B. Integrated industries (15 sectors) 
Classification 
A Food products, beverages, and tobacco 
B Textiles 
C Clothes and leather 
D Wood, paper and publishing 
E Chemical and chemical products 
F Refined petroleum 
G Rubber and plastic 
H Non-metallic mineral 
I Steel and non-ferrous metals 
J Fabricated metals and machinery 
K Office machinery, and medical/precision instruments 
L Electric and electronic products 
M Motor vehicles 
N Transportation vehicles except cars 
0 Other manufacturing 
Notes: 1) Panel A is from Kim and Hong (1992: 38). 
2) Panel B is aggregated from Panel A. 
Source: Kim and Hong (1992) 
Industry 
1, 2, 3 
4,5,6 
7,8 
9, 10, 11 
12, 13 
14, 15 
16, 17 
18,19,20 
21,22 
23,24,25,27 
26,35 
28,29,30 
33 
31,32,34 
36 
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Table A3.2 Sources of growth (three-input model), 1968-93 
A. Growth rate(%) 
Output TFP Intermediate Capital Labour 
in ut 
Food, beverages, 12.73 1.25 9.01 2.27 0.19 
tobacco 
Textiles 13.94 1.72 10.40 1.35 0.47 
Clothes, leather 10.94 1.29 8.00 1.11 0.53 
Wood, paper, 12.54 1.65 9.06 1.21 0.62 
printing 
Chemicals 19.38 3.08 12.93 2.54 0.82 
Refined petroleum 11.21 0.63 7.76 2.75 0.08 
Rubber, plastic 17.45 1.67 13.00 1.92 0.86 
Non-metallic 14.16 1.85 8.77 2.76 0.79 
minerals 
Steel, non-ferrous 18.63 0.97 15.12 2.06 0.49 
metals 
Machinery, 18.96 2.44 13.08 2.02 1.42 
fabricated metals 
Office, medical 24.90 3.34 16.90 2.61 2.05 
machinery 
Electrical/ electronic 23.52 1.76 16.47 3.66 1.64 
products 
Motor vehicles 22.16 2.93 15.02 2.91 1.30 
Other vehicles 17.07 2.57 11.51 1.87 1.12 
Others 14.81 1.59 10.23 1.89 1.10 
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B. Contribution to output growth(%) 
Output TFP Intermediate Capital Labour 
in ut 
Food, beverages, 100 9.84 70.79 17.85 1.51 
tobacco 
Textiles 100 12.37 74.58 9.71 3.34 
Clothes, leather 100 11.76 73.19 10.19 4.87 
Wood, paper, 100 13.17 72.27 9.63 4.93 
printing 
Chemicals 100 15.90 66.75 13.13 4.22 
Refined petroleum 100 5.58 69.21 24.52 0.69 
Rubber, plastic 100 9.59 74.48 11.02 4.91 
Non-metallic 100 13.06 61.92 19.47 5.55 
minerals 
Steel, non-ferrous 100 5.20 81.13 11.03 2.64 
metals 
Machinery, 100 12.84 68.98 10.68 7.50 
fabricated metals 
Office, medical 100 13.42 67.88 10.48 8.21 
machinery 
Electrical/electronic 100 7.47 70.01 15.54 6.98 
products 
Motor vehicles 100 13.22 67.80 13.12 5.86 
Other vehicles 100 15.07 67.43 10.92 6.58 
Others 100 10.71 69.08 12.79 7.41 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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Table A3.3 Productivity growth by time period (three-input model), 1968-93 
(per cent) 
1968- 1973- 1978- 1983- 1988- 1968-
73 78 83 88 93 93 
Food, beverages, 2.75 1.52 0.77 0.32 0.85 1.25 
tobacco 
Textiles 3.43 2.49 0.07 1.37 0.84 1.72 
Clothes, leather 1.78 1.14 0.88 1.46 1.14 1.29 
Wood, paper, 2.51 1.22 1.52 1.74 1.07 1.65 
printing 
Chemicals 6.42 6.46 0.92 1.31 0.82 3.08 
Refined petroleum 2.22 0.23 -0.85 0.84 0.89 0.63 
Rubber, plastic 3.06 1.55 0.70 2.92 0.13 1.67 
Non-metallic mineral 3.60 3.26 -1.09 1.21 2.66 1.85 
Steel, non-ferrous 2.37 0.95 0.33 0.71 0.54 0.97 
metals 
Machinery, 3.10 3.94 1.68 2.44 1.41 2.44 
fabricated metals 
Office, medical 4.52 4.20 2.19 3.45 2.55 3.34 
machinery 
Electric and 2.74 2.08 1.88 1.80 0.91 1.76 
electronic products 
Motor vehicles 3.55 4.43 2.29 2.45 2.13 2.93 
Other vehicles 4.25 2.39 2.69 1.20 2.50 2.57 
Others 2.23 2.62 1.88 2.55 -1.43 1.59 
Total 10.36 6.53 2.49 5.57 4.80 5.95 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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Table A4.1 Sources of growth over time period (two-input model), 1968-93 
(per cent) 
68-73 73-78 78-83 83-88 88-93 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
TFP 49.85 30.91 24.62 12.18 35.94 
K 41.4 62.16 72.65 81.9 64.86 
L 8.75 6.93 2.73 5.91 -0.8 
Textiles 
TFP 57.45 49.57 4.61 46.79 49.11 
K 21.69 34.17 91.52 42.97 62.87 
L 20.86 16.26 3.87 10.24 -11.97 
Clothes and leather 
TFP 41.26 22.38 63.4 63 125.18 
K 30.44 50.33 37.51 20.13 39.18 
L 28.3 27.29 -0.91 16.87 -64.36 
Wood, paper and printing 
TFP 55.03 32.5 64.33 50.71 34.97 
K 23.64 39.75 34.09 31.07 48.98 
L 21.34 27.75 1.58 18.22 16.05 
Chemicals 
TFP 72.07 62.52 21.69 29.04 20.73 
K 16.44 26.49 68.23 55.1 66.15 
L 11.49 10.99 10.08 15.86 13.13 
Refined petroleum 
TFP 40.44 15.06 -118.1 33.07 23.74 
K 58.98 82.64 207.97 64.02 72.55 
L 0.59 2.31 10.13 2.91 3.71 
Rubber and plastic 
TFP 50.85 27.49 25.29 51.26 5.6 
K 26.58 41.73 65.33 33.26 91.41 
L 22.57 30.78 9.38 15.49 2.98 
Non-metallic minerals 
TFP 50.56 44.93 -33.35 23.54 54.85 
K 40.35 34.69 112.65 62.19 30.56 
L 9.09 20.39 20.7 14.27 14.6 
Steel, non-ferrous metals 
TFP 41.83 21.57 13.18 32.73 26.34 
K 50.45 66.01 72.61 41.78 51.14 
L 7.71 12.42 14.21 25.49 22.52 
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Table A4.1 Sources of growth over time period (continued) 
68-73 73-78 78-83 83-88 88-93 
Machinery and fabricated metals 
TFP 53.16 45.73 30.27 41.71 32.68 
K 19.93 32.98 47.9 36.23 37.06 
L 26.91 21.29 21.83 22.06 30.25 
Office and medical machinery 
TFP 52.92 36.25 33.24 42.54 46.11 
K 23.22 36.93 43.29 30.71 27.29 
L 23.86 26.82 23.47 26.75 26.6 
Electrical and electronic products 
TFP 27.61 21.34 34.86 26.08 25.59 
K 39.09 56.97 57.79 52.07 50.52 
L 33.3 21.69 7.35 21.85 23.9 
Motor vehicles 
TFP 48.04 50.85 38.83 31.39 33.84 
K 29.6 28.89 43.85 49.89 53.18 
L 22.36 20.26 17.33 18.72 12.98 
Other vehicles 
TFP 70.75 1.04 57.53 67.63 58.72 
K 18.11 54.96 27.77 43.58 21.41 
L 11.14 44.01 14.7 -11.21 19.88 
Others 
TFP 34.09 43.13 44.51 44.44 260.33 
K 30.12 38.09 47.66 34.04 -207.43 
L 35.79 18.79 7.83 21.51 47.11 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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Table A4.2 Sources of growth over time period (three-input model), 1968-93 
(per cent) 
68-73 73-78 78-83 83-88 88-93 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
TFP 14.97 10.43 7.64 2.93 8.54 
X 70.31 67.76 63.35 76.37 76.43 
K 12.16 19.61 27.98 19.29 15.22 
L 2.56 2.2 1.03 1.41 -0.18 
Textiles 
TFP 15.46 11.72 0.96 13.25 12.15 
X 72.91 76.48 77.67 71.18 75.38 
K 5.93 7.93 20.48 12.5 15.38 
L 5.7 3.87 0.88 3.07 -2.91 
Clothes and leather 
TFP 9.84 5.36 39.98 16.04 28.49 
X 74.52 74.43 35.93 74.8 77.58 
K 8.11 13.12 24.98 5.01 8.57 
L 7.53 7.09 -0.9 4.15 -14.63 
Wood, paper and printing 
TFP 15.04 8.76 19.24 14.55 9.28 
X 72.66 73.01 69.84 71.19 73.42 
K 6.42 10.74 10.42 9.01 13.02 
L 5.88 7.49 0.5 5.25 4.28 
Chemicals 
TFP 25.87 21.71 6.71 8.14 5.63 
X 63.21 64.12 66.48 71.95 73.12 
K 6.41 10 23.36 15.47 17.72 
L 4.51 4.17 3.44 4.45 3.52 
Refined petroleum 
TFP 12 2.37 -20.09 9.45 6.8 
X 63.57 68.64 84.22 69.09 69.99 
K 24.19 28.13 34.17 20.55 22.08 
L 0.23 0.86 1.69 0.92 1.13 
Rubber and plastic 
TFP 11.73 6.44 6.8 15.34 1.61 
X 76.79 76.51 73.54 69.91 72.09 
K 6.19 9.82 17.24 10.05 25.47 
L 5.29 7.23 2.41 4.7 0.83 
Non-metallic minerals 
TFP 19.74 17.17 -12.82 8.84 20.6 
X 61.03 61.84 61.83 62.38 62.62 
K 15.7 13.21 43.1 23.41 11.36 
L 3.53 7.78 7.89 5.38 5.42 
Steel, non-ferrous metals 
TFP 8.31 3.76 2.11 5.56 4.26 
X 77.62 81.41 83.99 82.98 83.87 
K 12.19 12.49 11.62 7.13 8.25 
L 1.88 2.34 2.28 4.34 3.62 
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Table A4.2 Sources of growth over time period (continued) 
68-73 73-78 78-83 83-88 88-93 
Machinery and fabricated metals 
TFP 16.68 13.78 9.66 12.97 9.97 
X 68.48 69.83 68.17 68.9 69.48 
K 6.3 9.96 15.22 11.27 11.32 
L 8.54 6.42 6.96 6.86 9.24 
Office and medical machinery 
TFP 18 11.42 10.57 13.42 14.35 
X 65.77 68.51 68.13 68.45 68.81 
K 8.01 11.62 13.82 9.69 8.55 
L 8.22 8.44 7.48 8.44 8.3 
Electrical and electronic products 
TFP 8.83 6.32 9.86 7.34 7.03 
X 68.2 68.78 71.59 71.83 72.46 
K 12.41 18.02 16.45 14.68 13.94 
L 10.56 6.89 2.1 6.16 6.57 
Motor vehicles 
TFP 16 14.95 13.34 10.23 10.95 
X 66.77 70.6 65.54 67.68 67.73 
K 9.73 8.48 15.18 16.03 17.15 
L 7.5 5.98 5.94 6.05 4.17 
Other vehicles 
TFP 22.08 7.1 16.37 51.19 15.53 
X 66.87 73.03 60.31 8.68 73.66 
K 6.82 11.04 15.25 49.49 5.63 
L 4.23 8.84 8.06 -9.36 5.18 
Others 
TFP 9.08 13.85 14.3 14.93 91.23 
X 71.45 67.79 67.89 66.62 64.23 
K 8.89 12.29 15.27 11.36 -71.63 
L 10.57 6.07 2.54 7.1 16.17 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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Table A6.1 R&D expenditure and researchers, 1966-93 
1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1990 1991 1992 1993 ______ , 
~~--
R&D expenditure 
Amount 12 29 200 526 1,865 4,676 5,466 6,328 7,615 
(US$ m) 
GNP ratio 1.73 1.88 1.94 2.09 2.33 
(%) 
R&D researchers 
Number 3.0 5.3 11.7 20.7 47.0 70.5 76.3 88.8 98.8 
(thousand) 
per 10 thousand 1.0 1.7 3.3 5.4 11.4 16.4 17.6 20.3 22.0 
eoeulation (%) 
Source: Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology 1994, 
Ministry of Science and Technology, ROK. 
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Table A6.2 Technology imports by industry, 1962-93 
1962- 1977- 1982- 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1962-
76 81 86 93 
Amount (US$ m) 
Food 2 3.3 16.4 4.3 5.2 8.9 9.5 14.4 8.9 8.3 81.2 
Textiles and 9.4 18.2 22 8.3 8.3 13.2 14.5 25.2 23.8 26.4 169.2 
clothing 
Pulp and paper 0.1 7.4 0.7 0.3 0.4 1 1.2 2.3 2.2 1.5 16.9 
Chemicals, 33.8 148 163.8 65.4 112.1 151.5 217.1 187.2 110.8 119 1307.8 
refining 
Ceramic, 1.1 10.5 28.5 6.7 6.8 25.7 15.6 18.2 24.3 11.1 148.4 
Cement 
Metals 23.9 32 36.9 12 6 10.5 8.6 6.9 9.2 18.2 164.3 
Electronics 17.8 66.2 357.7 197.2 265 388.4 467.7 472.6 450.6 513.7 3197 
Machinery 14.6 89.3 238.3 119.7 120.8 154.5 216.4 323.9 126.1 186.7 1590.4 
Shipbuilding 5.1 11.2 92.2 11.6 6 12.4 16.2 34.1 5 22.3 216.1 
Electricity 2.8 25.4 173.8 75 113.8 88.2 79.9 66 68.2 10.1 703.2 
Others 3 39.9 54.6 23.2 31.9 34.3 40.3 33 21.5 29.2 310.9 
Total 113.6 451.4 1184.9 523.7 676.3 888.6 1087 1183.8 850.6 946.4 7906.3 
Cases 
Food 15 30 101 23 15 22 18 16 12 17 270 
Textiles and 38 41 127 37 52 56 44 37 18 44 494 
clothing 
Pulp and paper 7 7 3 2 4 3 1 1 0 7 35 
Chemicals, 176 225 372 135 161 150 138 105 73 91 1622 
refining 
Ceramic, 21 34 50 25 20 22 26 13 12 7 231 
Cement 
Metals 74 105 112 31 26 23 21 13 12 15 434 
Electronics 180 226 501 164 212 231 219 178 194 238 2345 
Machinery 180 403 546 148 181 158 174 151 165 200 2299 
Shipbuilding 11 45 94 13 14 10 14 12 12 6 231 
Electricity 9 37 24 7 4 5 3 0 3 7 99 
Others 41 72 148 52 62 83 80 56 32 75 706 
Total 752 1225 2078 637 751 763 738 582 533 707 8766 
Source: Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology 1994, Ministry of 
Science and Technology, ROK. 
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Appendix Figures 
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Figure A4.1 Sources of growth in industries, 1968-93 
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Appendix 1 Technology Catch-Up 
The TFP index of Korea is calculated from the aggregate productivity series while 
United States data is from BLS, which takes Denison's approach in estimating 
productivity trend. The following table shows that Korean productivity growth is 
much higher than in the United States. According to the table, the difference in 
productivity growth between the two countries is 4.84 per cent during the whole 
period. It is specially high during the 1968-73 period, when Korean 
manufacturing had comparative advantages in light industries. The table implies 
that the technology gap between the two countries has been narrowing, contrary 
to the prediction of cross-country analysis. 
Table Al.l Productivity growth comparison: Korea and United States 
Korea 
United States 
Difference 
68-73 
10.36 
1.98 
8.37 
73-78 
6.53 
0.49 
6.04 
78-83 
2.49 
0.88 
1.62 
83-88 
5.57 
2.11 
3.46 
88-93 
4.80 
0.58 
4.22 
68-93 
5.95 
1.11 
4.84 
Note: United States growth rates are calculated from multifactor productivity index 
of United States manufacturing (BLS data) after changing the basis year from 
1987 to 1980. 
Source: Table 3.2 and BLS. 
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Appendix2 
Reasons for Asian Technological Paths: the 
Economic Environment after WWII and 
Three Options for Follower Countries 
The thesis constructs a new paradigm of Asian growth: low productivity growth 
but high technological change. Low productivity growth is an artefact of the 
mechanical properties of growth accounting, which fails to attribute the 
technological components of capital accumulation, both rival and bounded, to the 
residual. Structural adjustment is another expression of the paradigm, resulting in 
sequential changes in technological niches over time. Accordingly, the earlier 
section of Chapter 5 produced a definition of technology in broad terms and a 
hypothesis about the sequencing of sources of technological change (transfer), 
illustrating the difference between the technological paths of NIBs and those of 
developed countries. What is the main reason that NIBs took a different 
technological path? I seek an answer for that in the world economic environment 
after the Second Word War. 
The remarkable growth of the East Asian NIBs has been driven by large domestic 
and overseas investments in the region and by exports to the United States and 
Japan under favourable world economic conditions after the Second World War. 
As noted by Krugman (1979; 1994), rapid growth in this region is highly 
dependent on the international economic environment. The economic 
environment following WWII shaped the experience of East Asian growth; the 
same set of economic circumstances after WWII resulted in the same set of 
characteristics for growth in the region; yet different responses on the part of the 
four countries to these conditions may have led each of them down different 
growth paths. The objective here is to identify the characteristics of the world 
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economic environment after WWII, and to discover how the four East Asian NIBs 
reacted to these different conditions to secure their own technological niches. 
Economic environment after World War II 
Economic growth after WWII is exceptional in economic history in terms of 
growth rates in GDP, GDP per capita, and exports. In particular, the period 1950-
73, termed 'a golden age of unparalleled prosperity' by Maddison (1995), records 
the highest growth rates in the history of capitalism. Table A2.1 also shows that 
the economic performance of the next period (1973-92) is even better than the 
first. Performance over these years is comparable to that of 1870-1913, a 
relatively peaceful and prosperous era. Overall, economic performance after 
WWII surpasses that of all other eras. 
Table A2.1 Phases of growth of the world, 1820-1992 
(annual average compound growth rate) 
1820-
70 
GDP 1.0 
GDP per capita 0.6 
Merchandise Exports 4.2 
Source: Maddison (1995: 41, 74). 
1870- 1913- 1950- 1973-
1913 50 73 92 
2.1 1.9 4.9 3.0 
1.3 0.9 2.9 1.2 
3.4 1.3 7.0 3.7 
Table A2.2 Phases of Growth in the Leader Countries, 1820-1992 
(annual average compound growth rate) 
1820-70 1870-1913 1913-50 1950-73 1973-92 
GDP 
UK 2.04 1.90 1.19 2.96 1.59 
USA 4.22 3.94 2.84 3.92 2.39 
JaEan 0.31 2.34 2.24 9.25 3.76 
Labour productivity (GDP per hour worked) 
UK 1.16 1.13 1.66 3.12 2.18 
USA 1.10 1.88 2.48 2.74 1.11 
JaEan 0.09 1.89 1.85 7.69 3.13 
TFP 
UK 0.15 0.31 0.81 1.48 0.69 
USA -0.15 0.33 1.50 1.72 0.18 
Japan n.a. -0.31 0.36 5.08 1.04 
Source: Maddison (1995:41). 
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What were the reasons for high world-wide growth after WWII? First, there were 
rapid technological changes in the developed countries, causing an increasing 
technology gap between developed and developing countries. According to Table 
A2.2, technological change in developed countries in the 1950-73 period was 
exceptionally high. In this period, the TFP growth rate of the United States, the 
leader country, was 1.72 per cent and its labour productivity growth was 2.74 per 
cent. Technologically new industries evolved, leading to structural adjustment 
from old to new industries. In particular, electronics innovations in the 
information-related industries were important. As Chandler (1990: 607) explains: 
the electronic revolution not only brought into existence a number of new industries 
but also transformed the processes of production and distribution, as the coming of 
electricity had before the tum of the century. In the 1960s and 1970s a wide variety 
of industries shifted from electromechanical to electronically controlled processes of 
production that began to transform the work place and alter the materials used in 
production. They realigned the economies of scale and scope, often reducing 
minimum efficient scale and at the same time expanding the opportunities for 
exploiting the economies of scope. 
The other industries which displayed high rates of technological change were 
transportation and communications. The commercial introduction of the jet plane, 
and cable and satellite communication encouraged the internalisation of markets 
by diminishing the effects of distance. 
The second significant characteristic of the economic environment after WWII 
has been greater economic interdependence between countries triggered by an 
increase in the roundaboutness of production. The rapid increase in world exports 
is a good indicator of this phenomenon. Growth rates in merchandise exports in 
1950-73 and 1973-92 were 7.0 and 3.7 per cent, respectively. These growth rates 
are higher than those of other periods (see Table A2.1 ). The expansion of the 
international production activities of multinational corporations was the result of 
this interdependence and roundaboutness of production. Why did this occur? One 
explanation may be that leader countries transformed their firms into more 
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vertically and horizontally integrated structures to exploit economies of scale and 
scope (Chandler 1990). The other may be the economics of transaction costs. 
Market failure in intermediate product markets and the need for firms to exploit 
the economies of interdependent activities led them to replace the market 
mechanism of cross-border transactions with internal hierarchies (Dunning 1988: 
17). Whatever the reasons, the importance of international production marked a 
change in the organisational structure of firms towards the formation of large 
conglomerates after WWII. Dunning ( 1993: 14) explains the significance of 
activities of multinational corporations in the mid-1980s: 
MNEs accounted for between 25% and 30% of the gross domestic product of the 
world's market economies in the mid 1980s. They were also responsible for around 
three-quarters of the world's commodity trade, and four-fifths of the trade in 
technology and managerial skills of these economies. 
East Asian NIBs accomplished rapid growth in a world economic environment 
characterised by rapid technological change and deepening interdependence 
triggered by roundaboutness of production. How did these two factors affect the 
growth paths of East Asian countries? The first factor had a positive effect on 
East Asian economic growth. This was because structural adjustment from the 
low technology sector to the high technology sector in leader countries 
necessitated more imports from follower countries in the low technology sector. 
A follower country could target industries which were in decline in leader 
countries. Thus, as observed by Krugman (1979), Dollar (1986), Segerstrom et al. 
(1990), and Grossman and Helpman (1991a), follower countries could enjoy 
sustained growth by entering the declining industries of leader countries 
sequentially, as long as technological change in leader countries created new 
industries or new processes of production. Thus, the structural adjustment of the 
leader countries is directly linked to that of follower countries, and this link 
increased the efficiency of production world-wide. 
The effect of the second factor was positive in one way but negative in another, 
because exploiting economies of scale and scope or deepening interdependence 
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acted as technological and marketing barriers as well as opportunities for follower 
countries. For example, countries which pursued an inwardly-oriented 
industrialisation strategy experienced bad performance because they entered 
industries with technological and marketing barriers, such as the capital goods 
sector at the starting point of industrialisation. Michael E. Porter called this 
phenomenon an error in the technological dimension of competitive strategy. 
Simply put, follower countries' firms were not competitive in the world market in 
producing high technology products at the initial stage because the firms were not 
able to coordinate various production activities based on the roundaboutness of 
modern production and thus failed to benefit from development in modern 
technology. By contrast, East Asian countries experienced successful 
performance by first entering industries with low barriers, then moving to 
industries with higher barriers. Only when they moved into industries with higher 
technology barriers in the later stage, did they benefit from developments in 
modern technology by linking domestic production activities with those of 
developed countries via imports of capital and intermediate goods. Because of 
this kind of internationally coordinated production, the second feature of the 
world environment, deepening interdependence and roundaboutness of 
production, became an opportunity rather than a barrier. 
Three alternatives 
Given rapid technological change and deepening of roundaboutness of 
production, East Asian follower firms had three alternatives in dealing with 
technological and marketing barriers. The first option was to specialise in labour-
intensive products with no technological and marketing barriers in which follower 
firms had a comparative advantage. This strategy can be typically seen in Hong 
Kong before it reached a mature stage of development and services became the 
major industry. Labour-intensive light industries were also the most competitive 
industry in other East Asian NIEs and Japan in the early phase of development 
before they entered the electronics, and steel and iron industries. These labour-
intensive products were the major Japanese exports of the 1950s. Products from 
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these industries were also the major exports for Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s, 
1970s and early 1980s before electronics and/or heavy industry replaced them 
from the late 1980s. It is noteworthy that all the developing countries began their 
industrialisation in this labour-intensive sector. 
The second alternative in dealing with technological and marketing barriers was 
to specialise in small subsets tasks of the international production activities of 
large conglomerate MNEs. In this case, there were no entry barrier problems 
because follower production activities depended on the technological and 
marketing ability of the MNEs. Moreover, there was no cooperation problem. The 
parent company organised all the transactions of the state-of-art capital and 
intermediate inputs, as well as providing organisational skills. This strategy was 
typically seen in the growth path followed by Singapore. 
The third alternative was for local firms to organise state-of-the-art production of 
a target industry's products in accordance with world-wide structural adjustments 
triggered by technological change in developed countries. Under this alternative, 
market transactions rather than intemalisation of production in multinational 
corporations solved the coordination problem. Local firms organised imports of 
capital and intermediate inputs in the international market to keep up with 
international production technology until the technological gap disappeared. They 
were also responsible for the development of their own organisational and 
marketing skills. Under this scenario, access to information is very important in 
making rapid adjustments to changes in the international industrial structure. This 
was the path taken in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. 
The second and third options are the same from the technological point of view. 
The follower firms entered target industries in which the technological entry 
barrier had been lowered through world-wide structural adjustment. They also 
organised transactions of state-of-the-art capital and intermediate goods 
embodying modem technological developments based on the deepening of the 
roundaboutness of production. The difference lies in who organises production 
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and how it is organised. In the case of the second alternative, multinational 
corporations organise it through intemalisation. In the latter case, local 
entrepreneurs organise by means of market transactions. 
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